
THE 1941-42 RADIO FORUMS

ASPECTS
OF
A WORLD AT WAR

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

ASPECTS OF A WORLD AT WAR

RADIO FORUMS
OF THE
LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

Edited by

ROBERT BECHTOLD HEILMAN

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Contents

<i>Preface</i>	5
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I

LESSONS OF THE PAST

<i>The Last Peace and the Next</i>	11
<i>France's Fadeout</i>	25

II

PRESENT ISSUES

<i>Contrasting World Orders</i>	41
<i>What Price War for Consumers?</i>	53
<i>Rights and Duties of Capital and Labor</i>	67

III

SOME PROBLEMS ABROAD

<i>Our Relations with South America</i>	81
<i>The Durability of Japan</i>	93

IV

THE SOUTH AND THE WAR

<i>Southern Farms Produce for Victory</i>	109
<i>Industrialization: The Old South Fades</i>	119

V

THE ARTS AND THE SCIENCES

<i>War and the Scientist</i>	135
<i>The Artist in Wartime</i>	149

VI

AFTER THE WAR

<i>Economic Aspects of the Peace</i>	165
<i>The Post-War Problem: Resuming National Life</i>	177
<i>An Old Map in New Colors</i>	189

Preface

THIS printed record of the Louisiana State University Radio Forums of the year 1941-1942 has been made under the auspices of the General Extension Division of the University, of which Mr. Marion B. Smith is Director. The General Extension Division, in whose domain the radio activities of the University take place, is publishing this volume as a means of making available, on a wider scale and in a permanent form, the discussions by faculty-groups of "Aspects of a World at War." In these discussions, some purely informative and some thoroughly argumentative, by groups which include both specialists and laymen, there are facts and points of view which may well be of further use to schools, clubs, and other organizations, and to individuals concerned with the directions in which our world is moving. To be restricted to their brief life on the air condemns the forums to a transitoriness which, unpretentious as they are, is perhaps not a totally adequate measure of their worth.

A participant in one of the forums has deprecatingly remarked, doubtless with an excess of modesty, upon the lack of final, expert pronouncements in the series. In a time, however, when history daily topples experts (who cannot remember the quick doom unanimously accorded to Russia early in the summer of 1941?), one may without risk doubt the value of printing one more set of *ex cathedra* decisions, which make a moment's sharp impression and then are gradually forgotten. No expertness is claimed here, no finality intended. Nor must discussion of a world at war, to be worth engaging in for a public audience, present all the answers, or even any answers. The intent is rather to bring into focus the questions to which answers must

A WORLD AT WAR

be sought in the evolution of the experiences in which we are now participating, to point out the directions which may be taken by and the tendencies inherent in the solutions which have been proposed for the various dilemmas in which our world, and specifically our country, finds itself. Price-ceilings and peace-proposals may be attacked and defended, but hardly the soul who proposes to be prophetic and to discern inevitable outcomes.

Fifty-two members of the faculty of the Louisiana State University, representing twenty-six different departments, took part in the forums. The number of the individuals and of the fields of study should be ample guarantee that the total problem of the present world is discussed with variety from as many points of view as possible. It has been our purpose to present every available avenue of approach. Wherever the plan could be worked out, the participants in a forum were selected with a view to securing some difference of opinion and the enlightenment that flows from rational disagreement. At least the speakers have always represented a sufficient spread of departments to promise the variety of outlook attendant upon a difference in professional pursuits.

At times the clash of opinion is entertainingly vigorous, as in "Industrialization: The Old South Fades" and "The Artist in Wartime." Differences likewise appear in "The Last Peace and the Next" and "What Price War for Consumers?" In other discussions, such as "Rights and Duties of Capital and Labor," the varying stands that may be taken are presented expositively rather than argumentatively. Other forums, notably "The Durability of Japan," naturally take on a purely informative cast. Whatever the tone or manner of the individual forum, however, the group as a whole exemplifies, as the moderators at the first and the fourteenth indicate, the exercise of one of the privileges

PREFACE

in behalf of which the war is being fought—the right of free discussion.

"Aspects of a World at War" was originally presented over the air in bi-weekly forums from November, 1941, to May, 1942. The series was broadcast directly over WJBO, Baton Rouge, and nearly all of the discussions were broadcast by transcription over WSMB, New Orleans; KWKH, Shreveport; and KMLB, Monroe.

The series had its origin as a University Defense Activity under the auspices of the University Defense Council, which in the year 1940-1941 had sponsored the radio lecture series "Aspects of Democracy," subsequently published under the same title. The committee in charge was composed of Alden L. Powell, Professor of Government, Chairman; Robert B. Heilman, Associate Professor of English; and Ralph W. Steetle, University Radio Program Director.

After the initial planning of the series, Professor Powell bore the brunt of the laborious task of organizing the forums—explaining the project to and securing the participation of some four dozen faculty members. This part of the work was not really finished until the end of the series, since illness, absence, and other such reasons made necessary a constant reorganization of the groups originally planned.

Mr. Steetle took complete charge of the broadcasting, assembling the participants for preliminary discussion and planning, making the mechanical arrangements, and acting as moderator at thirteen of the forums. Professor Powell presided at the final one.

The other member of the committee has been chiefly concerned with the editing of the present volume, an activity which has brought up one or two problems for solution. In a platonic view of things editorial conscience should doubtless be devoted

A WORLD AT WAR

to a minutely faithful reproduction of all the words of every speaker. Editorial conscience has been concerned that there be no alteration whatsoever of any part of the point of view of any speaker. But perhaps it would too stringently exercise editorial conscience to bring forth, in the pseudo-permanence of print, that sizable array of *well's* and *uh's* and other expletives on which, in conversation, we are wont to lean as we organize our next syntactical units; the repetitions with which oral speech fumbles toward clarity and emphasis but which, on a page that can be reread at will, are excrescent; the initial jabs which somehow do not materialize into sentences and are abruptly replaced by fresh starts; the interruptions that do not jell and the answers that waver off into silence; the amiable vagabondage of ideas which informal talk, when not subject to a rigid disciplinarian, is heir to; all the tentative steps of the extemporizer's logic, which, unaccompanied by the annotations of voice and gesture, seem in print strangely directionless. At any rate, the editor has taken the latitudinarian view: he has regularly cut out colloquial redundancies of various sorts and has endeavored, while retaining the fundamental characteristics of each man's style, to make the various speeches as straightforwardly expository as circumstances permit.

This is, after all, a record of ideas, not a sort of literary Bertillon record. The excisions amount to less than five per cent of all the words transcribed. For whoever wants the whole story, down to the last cough, the transcriptions are available in the files of the University Radio Office.

I

LESSONS OF THE PAST

The Last Peace and the Next

ALEX B. DASPIT

Associate Professor of Government

CHRISTIAN JORDAN

Associate Professor of Music

FRED B. KNIFFEN

Professor of Anthropology

ROBERT C. YATES

Associate Professor of Mathematics

RALPH W. STEETLE

University Radio Program Director

MR. STEETLE: The Louisiana State University Defense Council presents the first of a series of Radio Forums centered on the aspects of a world at war. In these times of immediate crisis and impending decision it is well to exercise our democratic privilege and responsibility: free discussion. In an effort to profit from past experience our Forum tonight discusses the topic "The Last Peace and the Next." All right, Mr. Daspit.

MR. DASPIT: I take it as a proposition needing no demonstration that we are in this war [November 5, 1941]—in it to the last shot, in the President's words. I take it also that the assumption of most of us is that the last shot is not to be fired by Hitler. And since we are in this war and in it to win, in due course we will be in at the peace. This is to look ahead to a time which may perhaps seem very remote indeed. Nevertheless, we must not be too proud to learn from our enemies, and we should not fail to understand that the greatest reason for the staggering German successes of this war is that experts in Germany have for a generation studied the errors that Germany

A WORLD AT WAR

made in the last one. The treaty had scarcely been signed when this study commenced—and the errors have not been recommitted.

The task of creating an enduring peace based on democratic and Christian values is no doubt a more difficult one even than the conquest of Europe and Asia. Therefore, the effort to achieve it must be commensurately greater. As the Germans studied their failures of the war, we must study our failure of the peace. What are the lessons of Versailles? What are the errors we must avoid committing again?

The cardinal mistakes of the peace seem to me to be (1) America's failure to accept the proposition that it had become the most powerful nation of the world with an obligation to aid in the maintenance of an international situation in which democracy could function; (2) the failure of the treaty-makers to recognize the economic and psychological as well as the purely political causes of war; (3) the failure to understand the special problem of Germany; (4) the failure to create a system with sufficient appeal even to the beneficiaries of the treaty to enable them to offer united resistance to those determined to wreck it.

The slogan "America First" is perhaps a little blunt in its insistence on national self-interest; but it expresses a principle which must be self-evident to any American. Nevertheless, there is a world of difference between "America First" and "America Alone." We may all subscribe to "America First"; the problem remains as to what policy will assure the preservation of what we value most as Americans. And to many it seems that this principle requires, not the denial, but the frank acceptance of the proposition that we are citizens of a world of shrinking dimensions, from which it is impossible in the twentieth century to isolate ourselves. Such acceptance was in our slogan

THE LAST PEACE AND THE NEXT

of the first World War: Make the World Safe for Democracy. In the reaction which followed that adventure, which saw the repudiation of the treaty and the growth of national introversion, it became fashionable to sneer at the slogan as purest hokum. Yet it seems to me that it expressed a fundamental truth, and reluctantly we are by implication again coming to admit it. We are coming to understand that democratic and constitutional government is impossible in a world of violent instability, alarms, and recurrent wars. If democracy is to endure in this country, it will require a world system of relative stability and security, and we shall be required to play a role in maintaining world order that extends far beyond our continental frontiers. We were not yet willing to face this stubborn fact in 1919 and the generation after. Consequently, we find ourselves today committed to the fearful task of destroying an enemy who already has engulfed one entire continent and is now engaged in swallowing another and threatening a third.

The second in my catalog of mistakes is that the Versailles treaty, through the device of the League of Nations, sought to impose an artificial political peace upon a system which confirmed economic and social upheaval. Any political system depends for its continued operation on a balance of consent and force, and these elements vary inversely; the less consent, the more force required. The system which the Treaty and the League sought to perpetuate was of a nature not calculated to win great loyalty, nor even substantial consent. And when the forces of disintegration incorporated within the system began to manifest themselves (as they did in Manchukuo in 1931, and in Ethiopia in 1935), it became obvious that there was not enough force, or the will to use it, to prevent disruption. The principal elements contributing to economic and social upheaval were the strengthening of economic nationalism, the attempt to collect the vast sums of reparations and war debts, and failure of

A WORLD AT WAR

the victorious powers to achieve within their own borders a solution to the class struggle and the crisis of capitalism which had already appeared before 1914. The combination of these factors led directly to the economic chaos of 1929. Economic nationalism, operating through tariffs, quotas and embargoes, accentuated the poverty of those countries poorest in natural resources. War debts and reparations profoundly disturbed the economies of debtors and creditors alike, and introduced a factor of violent disruption into international trade. The maladjustments of the capitalistic system, obvious before the war began, thus accentuated by these international factors, became so acute internally that they contributed greatly to the class struggle—and consequently to the unrest and violence which beset the world. Superimposed upon this foundation of quicksand was the League of Nations, which, whatever its professions, in fact devoted itself to the maintenance of the status quo—a status quo which not even all Englishmen and Frenchmen thought worth preserving. The treaty-makers lacked the realism of the Nazis. They understand clearly what the statesmen of Versailles apparently did not: if you are constructing a "new order" which nobody wants but yourself, you must make sure that you have ample force to impose that order, and no lack of will to use it. The only alternative is to build an order sufficiently acceptable to reduce force to a minimum—though its necessity can never be completely eliminated. The recent Roosevelt-Churchill declaration—the so-called Atlantic Charter—recognizes this principle in the provisions which promise to all people access to the markets and raw materials of the world, and at the same time implies that Great Britain and the United States will not so weaken themselves by voluntary disarmament as to be unable to maintain the terms of the settlement. This no doubt is not enough; but it points the direction.

THE LAST PEACE AND THE NEXT

My third proposition boils down to the simple statement that the Germans are collectively, as a nation, peculiar, and that a realistic peace policy will not treat them as if they were Englishmen, Swiss, Frenchmen, or Americans. In making this statement I do not mean to subscribe to their own theory of the uniqueness of the Germanic Aryan, or to any racist theory which will call forth Professor Kniffen's anthropological erudition in refutation. What I have to say about the collectivity of the German nation will not apply to individual Germans who grew up in Indiana like Mr. Willkie, or in the Germanic cantons of Switzerland where hundreds of thousands of Muellers and Arndts and Schimmelpfennigs stand ready to resist to the death any effort to co-ordinate them with the Reich. How and why are the Germans peculiar? I have time to do no more than sketch an outline and drop a few hints. First, they have an age-old urge to world empire which has been cropping out for a thousand years. It found expression in the first Reich, the Holy Roman Empire; it is voiced every time they sing their national anthem, *Deutschland über Alles*—Germany over all. Second, there is an absence among great portions of the population of genuine Christian values, which are also the values of democracy. The reasons for this: the Protestant revolt which began in Germany went on in most of the nations of the western world to work a profound change in the outlook and values of the middle and lower class; in Germany, Lutheranism quickly became identified with the state and served as an instrument of state policy. The lateness of the industrial revolution in that country has served to produce a pagan proletariat, largely untouched by the teachings of Christ. Third, a lack of individualism, and a strong tendency toward absolute rule. The country was made by strong men: the Hohenzollerns, Bismarck, Hitler. Its triumphs have been made possible by a combination of leaders of genius, and followers of great efficiency and utter subservience. Finally, and

A WORLD AT WAR

in sum, there is a marked deficiency of any genuine democratic spirit, and small foundation on which to build one. The mistake of Versailles was to expect such a people, under conditions difficult as I have indicated, to develop a genuinely liberal and democratic political system.

The lessons for the next peace to be drawn from Versailles, which did not work, should be coupled with those from the Treaty of Vienna, which did. Between 1790 and 1815, France had played in Europe much the role that Germany has played for the past quarter of a century. There was as much reason in 1813 to be pessimistic about ever achieving anything like an enduring peace as there is today. Yet beginning in 1815 there was ushered in a century which in comparison with ours seems almost idyllic. What are the lessons?

First, the myth of the invincibility of German arms has got to be destroyed for the Germans themselves. It is a fact that within a few years after the war the army command and the Nazis had succeeded in persuading the German people that they had been betrayed at home, but never beaten by the enemy. This war should be so conducted as to leave no possible doubt, and the responsibility for the defeat should be brought clearly home to the Nazis and the army command.

Second, a legitimate government, calculated to appeal to a substantial portion of the population as actually their own, needs to be established. But the control of the privileged and predatory class which has dominated the army, industry, and, for the most part, politics in modern Germany must be broken—else a war of vindication will be undertaken as soon as they feel themselves sufficiently strong.

Third, once a government drawn from a class which represents a tradition and standards of value which do not make it a threat to civilization is established, every effort must be made to

THE LAST PEACE AND THE NEXT

strengthen it: it must be treated with respect in international affairs; it must not be saddled with a humiliating peace settlement; it must be aided in making German economy function, so as to provide the German people with butter, which they may ultimately come to prefer to guns.

My final proposition is one which would carry this discussion into a maze too difficult to thread in a few minutes. Nevertheless, it must at least be mentioned. Given a victory, the democratic powers must use the peace to repair the solid foundations of a truly democratic system, which will evoke the abiding loyalties of their citizens. Failing this, they will find themselves divided and helpless as was France in the 1930's before the first brazen challenge to the structure they have built.

MR. JORDAN: Well, Mr. Daspit, it seems to me that we can't do much to disagree with that statement of the situation. But we can take up some minor points. Now, I was struck by some strong language that you used there which hit me pretty well. You said that the Germans are a peculiar people. Now, I happen to be of German descent on both sides. I've only been in this country three generations. Now—

MR. DASPIT: That wouldn't be enough to get you into Naval Intelligence, would it?

MR. JORDAN: No—and then of course I realize that I'm quite a bit of a peculiar fellow. But I'm going to ask Mr. Kniffen a question. Mr. Kniffen, as an anthropologist, what do you think about the Germans as a peculiar people? As Mr. Daspit defined them, are the Germans so different from the Americans by nature, or are they the product of their geographical position in Europe?

MR. KNIFFEN: Well, certainly, Mr. Jordan, the Germans are not peculiar inherently. If that were true, that certainly would damn—*peculiar* is a damning word—a very large percentage

A WORLD AT WAR

of our population here in this country. It certainly has been adequately demonstrated that the Germans include representatives of every European race, and any peculiarities that they have are probably due to their cultural training and possibly their war-like spirit which in some measure can be attributed to their peculiar geographical position, that of a centrally located country without natural boundaries. Does that in any manner answer your question?

MR. JORDAN: Yes, it does. How would you explain this, for instance? I'm a musician and Germany has produced a Beethoven, a Bach, a Brahms, Mozart, Schubert, Schumann—sublime music.

MR. DASPIT: And Wagner.

MR. JORDAN: And—well, I wouldn't include Wagner now, because Wagner was an anti-Semite. [*Laughter*]. Germany has produced this great music, and other great works of art—by Goethe, by Schiller, by Thomas Mann, who is in America now. And yet the Germans have also produced Frederick the Great, the goose-step, militarism. Now then, given the conditions of Germany that you alluded to—without natural boundaries and all that, surrounded by people that they might be suspicious of—given those conditions, do you think that the Americans might themselves be rather militaristic?

MR. KNIFFEN: Decidedly I do.

MR. JORDAN: Well, what do you think about that, Mr. Yates?

MR. YATES: I don't want to enter that discussion, Mr. Jordan. However, I would like to throw a question back at Mr. Daspit to get the issue clear. Mr. Daspit, were the American people really behind Woodrow Wilson when he announced his fourteen points, or were the points just an idyllic view that he himself held? If they were behind him, why didn't we join the

THE LAST PEACE AND THE NEXT

League of Nations? If we're going into a new peace—and I really question our ability to set ourselves up as peace-makers, in view of our lack of knowledge of the scene of conflict and our real lack of knowledge of the other people involved in the conflict—how are we ever going to make peace? Is Mr. Roosevelt going to be allowed to make the peace single-handed? How can he do it and keep voters? How can he do it without the American people behind him? How can a new peace be established without the intimate knowledge of the American people?

MR. DASPIT: Well, Mr. Yates, you have suddenly thrown several things into my lap at the same time. It seems to me that there are several propositions there. Whether or not the American people subscribe to the fourteen points, it seems to me, doesn't have any direct bearing on the nature of the Treaty of Versailles. It may very well be argued, as perhaps might be inferred from my proposition with respect to the relative merits of Vienna and Versailles, that the politician—that is the expert—can be counted on to make a better peace than the democratic people. In a democratic country the people have to be carried along, and it is my conception that it is part of our function to explain the implications of the present problem and perhaps to persuade the American people to accept the point of view that, by and large, the cheapest way that they can buy a permanent peace is to persuade themselves that they've got to do something in the way of maintaining it on a permanent basis; that it is an economic waste and a most extreme folly to embark each generation upon a gigantic war which is going to cost them untold billions in revenue, and I don't know how many hundreds of thousands of lives. If your proposition is simply that since nothing can be done, nothing had better be said, I disagree. If, on the other hand, you think that peace is a delusion, well, I agree with that, but then I don't see things

A WORLD AT WAR

in terms simply as black and white, as you apparently do. There's such a thing as a relative peace and as a relative stability or security, and it's my conception that the United States may contribute to maintaining relative stability and relative security in the world, sufficient at any rate to enable us to avoid the anguish through which we are at the present time, it seems to me, preparing to go.

MR. JORDAN: Referring to your speech, Mr. Daspit, I'd like to ask a question about your statement concerning the necessity for a complete military victory over the German army on the field of battle. Isn't there a strong probability that the Nazi regime will crack up from internal causes long before enough military force can be assembled to lick the German army on the battlefield? If this should be the outcome, do you think the possibility of a future peace with Germany will be no better than it was in 1918?

MR. DASPIT: I think that we are being considerably optimistic here tonight in looking forward to a German defeat at all. But I see no other basis on which to discuss the peace. Obviously, if the Germans win, the problem of the peace terms has been settled long since. However, I think that there is considerable to be said for your proposition. If the Germans are beaten at all it's going to be a combination of internal disintegration and defeat in battle; those two things can't be separated. That is, disintegration at home is going to produce a disintegration of morale in the army, which would enable a relatively weak striking force to score military victories. My proposition is simply that, if we do get Germany into that position, their nose has got to be rubbed into it.

MR. JORDAN: Well, I'd like to question a little further. Isn't it a fact that, beginning with August, 1918, the German army was being beaten on the battlefield?

THE LAST PEACE AND THE NEXT

MR. DASPIT: Yes, that is a fact.

MR. JORDAN: Hasn't Hitler simply lied to his people about this? What is to prevent a future German dictator from once again lying to a new generation of credulous young Germans? So why should we establish the fact that Germans can be beaten in battle only to have the fact nullified by the lies of some future demagogue? It seems to me that a long war of simple blockade of Germany would be just as effective for future peace as a war of military invasion, because of the terrific problems—cost of lives—and it seems to me that we could stand a long war of blockade far better than to send over an expeditionary force under the present conditions when we have no place to land them.

MR. DASPIT: Well, I've certainly got no business posing here as a military expert, but from the reading of history I've done, nations are not defeated by a long-range blockade alone. The defeat may be hastened by that device, but the wars are won, ultimately, by a striking force.

MR. JORDAN: Such as airplanes?

MR. DASPIT: And ultimately a force may be required to invade the continent. And I would be hopeful that it would not need to be too enormous a force. But, once put there, if I had anything to say about the conduct of affairs, they would march on to Berlin where the treaty would be dictated, and certainly the German army command would have to associate itself with that treaty.

MR. KNIFFEN: Mr. Daspit, will you agree with me that we Americans should feel a large and considerable responsibility for the present situation, in that we, in no small measure, contributed to economic nationalism by our own set-up in this country, in demanding the payment of war debts, and at the same time not making it possible for foreign nations to sell here;

A WORLD AT WAR

and by so doing we actually contributed to the rise of Hitlerism?

MR. DASPIT: I would agree with that completely, Mr. Kniffen. It seems to me that, in part, at any rate, your comment is an answer to Mr. Yates. America is a part of this world, and it can't, whatever it likes, dissociate itself from it. And our domestic policy, such as the tariff, such as the insistence on the collection of war debts, which is part domestic, I suppose, and part a question of foreign affairs, is going to have its effect through the world. I don't think that it's possible to demonstrate absolutely and completely that the United States is responsible for Hitler, but I do think that a fairly convincing case could be made for the proposition that, had American policy been different, Hitler might not have come along.

MR. JORDAN: You're referring to our pacificism—that is, we taught our young students that any war of any sort was evil, and that we would rather see anything happen in the world than go to war.

MR. YATES: We did not teach them that, Mr. Jordan. They found it out for themselves—and they're sticking to it.

MR. JORDAN: Did they find out something that was so, or did they fit Lord Chesterfield's dictum, "The trouble is not for the people to know anything, but that they know so many things that aren't so?"

MR. YATES: Why, the truth came out. You spoke of the Germans a minute ago as being lied to after the war and being really convinced that they did not lose the war on the battlefield, but I don't believe, honestly, that they themselves believe that. And I don't believe that you can submerge truth in any race, even in the German race. You've implied that the Germans are so constituted that they would believe almost anything, that they are docile and servile and can be led by the nose, but I believe that in the long run you can not submerge truth.

THE LAST PEACE AND THE NEXT

MR. DASPIT: And how is truth going to come out, Mr. Yates? By sitting down and rubbing one's hands while it emerges?

MR. YATES: No. You can get truth almost any way if you look for it. You can find it in your neighbor's voice. You can find it in the effect of one nation on another. There are a number of—

MR. JORDAN: With bullets?

MR. YATES: Well, I don't think—you might *impress* truth upon somebody with a bullet, but you can't *teach* him the truth with a bullet.

MR. JORDAN: What about a criminal? What is the pistol on the policeman's hip for? Is that intended just as a kind of symbol of authority, or is it expected that he might have to shoot sometime?

MR. YATES: Oh, yes, but I don't believe that truth is involved in the very fact that a policeman wears a pistol on his hip. That's simply to enforce the law, and I believe that most criminals do know that they are breaking the law and that it would be better if they did not; but for other reasons they do break the law.

MR. DASPIT: Well, Mr. Yates, it seems to me that you have a scientist's illusion that there is such a thing as absolute truth. I think our subject of discussion is peace, peace based on fundamental values, which we accept as Americans. Those fundamental values I hold to be ultimately true, but so far as scientific demonstration is concerned, they are assumptions. Now, my assumption is that what we have got to do is to maintain a world situation within which it's possible, not for truth as an abstract conception to prevail, but in which the democratic assumptions which underlie our structure have a reasonable chance of survival.

A WORLD AT WAR

MR. YATES: And if I understand you clearly, and Mr. Jordan, too, you would maintain this peace through some force, some set-up stabilized by force. [*General murmur of approval*]. Now, who is going to hold the balance of force? Are we the people?

MR. JORDAN: Right.

MR. YATES: I admit that the United States has a tremendously important role to play in international affairs, but are we to hold the balance of power, the big club?

MR. DASPIT: Right. That's my conception, Mr. Yates . . . [*In summary*]:

Well, this discussion, it seems to me, has been a bit on the desultory side; as far as the possibility of any ultimate summing-up is concerned it seems to me to be a little difficult. Mr. Jordan encouraged me considerably in the beginning by saying that everyone was in complete agreement with everything I said, with the exception of a few incidental propositions which I developed. Now Mr. Yates has thrown at least a small bomb into the general discussion. As to whether we have succeeded in assimilating that bomb I have my doubts indeed. Nevertheless, it seems that we can say that so far as this battle of four people is concerned, Mr. Yates is more or less in a minority of one. If we can get anywhere like as near an agreement among the bulk of the American people on the question of peace, I think we may consider ourselves fortunate, indeed; assuming, of course, that the general agreement is on the basis of the proposition to which we have agreed ourselves.

France's Fadeout

JAMES M. CAFFERY

Assistant in Government

LYNN M. CASE

Associate Professor of History

JOHN T. KRUMPELMANN

Assistant Professor of German

PAUL M. SPURLIN

Associate Professor of French

MR. STEETLE

MR. CASE: The most sensational event in recent European history was the sudden collapse of France in 1940. In an effort to explain this tragedy of a proud nation, Frenchmen and foreigners, liberals and conservatives, have published innumerable books and articles. In view of the censorship, lack of communications, and manufactured propaganda, it is impossible to get a clear and accurate picture of France before or after her fall. The best we can do, I believe, is to sift the conflicting information which we have, measure it with our own knowledge of France, and present tentative guesses.

Reactionaries and conservatives have asserted that democracy and the Popular Front program were responsible for France's downfall. With these opinions I heartily disagree. I have seen too many monarchies and dictatorships fail miserably in the task of national defense to believe they have any superiority over democracies. I also know of many instances where democracies have done very good jobs of defense. Likewise we are witnessing in Russia today a country which in labor and industrial policy

A WORLD AT WAR

out-Popular-Fronted the Popular Front, and yet is offering the most successful resistance to German aggression. I therefore do not believe that democracy and the Popular Front were primarily the cause of France's defeat.

Going from the negative approach to the positive, let us see what may have been some of the causes. While democracy was not the cause of her downfall, France's particular parliamentary regime was a handicap to effective long-range policies. One outstandingly unsatisfactory feature was a constitutional provision which encouraged frequent changes in administration. In these critical years France found herself peculiarly lacking, too, in effective political leadership.

But, after all, France's downfall was essentially a military defeat. That opinion was voiced by Mr. Van Zeeland, former premier of Belgium, when he was here last winter, and in that opinion I concur. France's military leaders were very conservative, slow to innovate, inclined to think that the methods which obtained victory in the last war were good enough for this war. They built their plans largely around a war of position with the Maginot Line as their frame of reference. These professional military leaders likewise insisted on a professional army rather than a totally armed nation. To be sure, they had a system of conscription, but the main body of the army was professional. The conscripts came and went for their compulsory service, but later as reserves they were not kept in first-class shape for instantaneous service in a swift-striking citizen army. The army leadership preferred to make the army an exclusive clique, hoary with tradition, unimaginative in outlook, if not unintelligent. Instead of trying out every new suggestion and making long-range plans for complete coordination between the war machine and industry, commerce, and agriculture, they failed even in devising a successful plan of mobilization.

FRANCE'S FADEOUT

The military leaders not only did not know their business, but in many instances they did not even want to fight the war against Hitler. The French army leadership has been known for its monarchist sympathies during the whole period of the Third Republic. The scorn of the generals and other officers for the common people made them detest both democracy and a citizen army. They admired the one-man governments of Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco and rebelled against fighting side-by-side with democratic Britain. Many circumstances are now coming to light which give good grounds to suspect that many French military leaders deliberately sabotaged the military efforts of France against the Nazis. Nothing can equal the irony of the present situation, where we see the deflated monarchist militarists like Pétain, Weygand, Huntziger, Dentz, and Darlan [November 19, 1941] pointing accusing fingers in every direction except at themselves in a frantic effort to find scapegoats for their country's catastrophe.

In approaching some other causes of France's collapse, I do not want to say that the French are a peculiar people, as was suggested concerning the German people in the previous round-table discussion. I must say, however, that the French do have some admirable traits which, if over-worked during emergencies, can be, and probably were, fatal to her. One of these traits is individualism, universally recognized as a characteristic of Frenchmen. But insistence on individualism just before or during a national crisis means lack of team-work, lack of coordination, and even lack of discipline.

Frenchmen are famous, too, for their thrift. But thrift which will not scrap out-moded weapons for new, which will not order fresh supplies until the stale ones are consumed, which will pile red-tape on red-tape to check every minute expenditure down to the last sou and centime—such a thrift may be a national menace in wartime.

A WORLD AT WAR

Another trait which Frenchmen have to a greater degree than some other people is respect for age. Younger members of families show great deference to the opinions of their elders. In political life this is reflected by the adoption of the rule of seniority. Seniority is also closely connected with the French ideal of equality. If a man is not unusually bad, he will be promoted by seniority as a routine matter until the places of high responsibility in army, navy, and civil service are likely to be peopled by mediocrities, men without ability or initiative. Because of their age they can hold the respect of the general public and keep down the brilliant young upstarts. The best example of this is the contrast between Gamelin and De Gaulle.

I have not elaborated very much on these points, but I wanted to state succinctly at the outset of our discussion, not all, but at least *some* of the important factors leading to France's capitulation.

MR. STEETLE: And you've done a good job, Mr. Case, of posing the problems for consideration. Our radio audience can't see Mr. Spurlin shaking his head and tapping his foot, but I can. Mr. Spurlin, would you like to have an inning with Mr. Case?

MR. SPURLIN: I would certainly take exception, Mr. Case, to what you have to say about certain traits of French character to which you apparently attach a great deal of importance. Personally, I do not consider thrift, respect for old age, or the tradition of army seniority as characteristics over which the French have a monopoly. No people, for example, is more thrifty or has a greater respect for old age than the Chinese. Why, Frenchmen would be considered spendthrifts among these people, who would cut a deck of playing cards in two halves in order to make two decks. My point, Mr. Case, is that China, in spite of excessive thrift and extreme respect for old age, has succeeded very well indeed in a war against Japan which is al-

FRANCE'S FADEOUT

ready over four years old. Finally, as regards the Frenchman's respect for seniority in the army, I believe that respect for seniority is characteristic of all armies today—Russian, German, American, as well as French. But, granting all you have said about these so-called French traits, the fact remains that they were also French traits in 1914-1918, when France's armies were victorious. Furthermore, tremendous numbers of French soldiers in World War Number Two also fought in the first World War. No, Mr. Case, in my opinion we shall have to look for many other causes than French national characteristics for an explanation of France's downfall.

MR. CASE: I would disagree with you there, because in the first place I did not imply that France had a monopoly on thrift or on any of these other traits, but it is a matter of degree. I do feel that of thrift and respect for old age, the French have a slightly greater degree than some other peoples, and I could cite you some very interesting examples of that, particularly in preparations for war. Some of the soldiers have recorded since the war that the cans of meat which they were given as supplies were all painted over very freshly. So they suspected something, and, taking their knives and scraping off some of the paint, they discovered the date of the meat, which was 1919 and 1921. They were supposed to eat that because the French would not throw it away and supply them with fresh meat, and that is corroborated again by the British. When they sent their army over to France at the beginning of this war, they were supposed to be fed by the French; but the British said that their meat was so stale that the British finally had to bring their own supplies from England. Then you have the same thing in regard to old weapons. I have a letter from a friend in France who says that the French were furnished weapons of the date of 1873 to try to fight—of course, they were not on the front line, they were

A WORLD AT WAR

the Alpine Chasseurs—but some also who were on the front line were using rifles of 1866, the famous Chassepot; some of them were using the rifles of 1890, the famous Lebel rifle. They were famous in their day, but the French needed something more famous for the present-day warfare, and yet some of them actually went into the trenches or went up to the Maginot Line without any arms.

MR. SPURLIN: Well, Mr. Case, perhaps some of those prize packages that the French soldiers, you say, were to eat were at that slightly better than ersatz packages in Germany. But as a matter of fact, Dorothy Thompson, in a column some months ago, recounts her experience at a meal which she attended in the Maginot Line, and she describes the menu for that date, which consisted of hors d'oeuvres, chicken with vegetables, asparagus, green salad and ices, petits fours glacés, black coffee, and three kinds of wine, and she adds that the men, the enlisted men, were dining that day on very good quality beef and wine. Now it may well be—

MR. CASE: But—

MR. SPURLIN: Mr. Case, if you will allow me to continue, that the French were using old stock rifles. The American Army until very recently used, and perhaps still is using, old rifles. How would you reconcile your point about the unwillingness of the French to spend any money on equipment, with the \$500,000,000 cost of the Maginot Line?

MR. CASE: Nowadays \$500,000,000 is a mere drop in the bucket for armaments, and if they had spent twice that much on tanks they would still be rather niggardly in making preparations for the kind of war machine that the Germans have.

MR. KRUMPELMANN: It seems to me that Mr. Spurlin has given good evidence that what Mr. Case said about food is true. That meal that Dorothy Thompson describes is enough to ruin any army. [*Laughter*].

FRANCE'S FADEOUT

MR. CASE: Well, if I were in charge of the French army and I saw a very pleasant American woman correspondent coming up to the front, I would attempt to put on the best feed possible, because we would be going to get a write-up about it in the press.

MR. STEETLE: This food is making me a little bit hungry. Suppose we leave that for a little bit later. I would like to ask Mr. Krumpelmann whether he agrees with Mr. Case's point that democracy and the Popular Front were not at fault.

MR. KRUMPELMANN: Well, Mr. Case has seemed to put all his emphasis upon the failures of the high command in the army. Now, there are parts of the government which must also bear part of the blame, it seems to me. In a democratic state, the legislative should be above the military. I wonder if it wouldn't be well to look into the situation supposed to prevail in the French legislative part. I quote from a book that some of you may have read, by Mr. André Simone—that's a pseudonym, by the way—in which he says, "Clemenceau once tartly remarked, 'French parliamentarians do nothing but *toucher et coucher*'." That would seem to place at least some blame on the legislative part of government. Then, how about the press? The press must also, it seems to me, have played a large part in the formation of French opinion. Finally, we must consider, in a democracy, the part the general public plays. In Hitler's regime we need not consider the common people. But what was the attitude of the French people as to war or in war? Of course, there is one more element which I think we had better refrain from discussing, because not much is said about that, and of course we know nothing of it. Did the church play any part in the situation at the time of the collapse?

MR. STEETLE: We'll have to take those one at a time, Mr. Krumpelmann. I suggest that we ask our Government Department man to discuss the governmental side.

A WORLD AT WAR

MR. CAFFERY: The principal objection I have toward what Mr. Case has to say is of the sort Mr. Krumpelmann has suggested. Can we say that the defeat of France is primarily military? Can we separate a military defeat from other kinds of defeat in a country such as France? It seems to me that we have to look beyond a simple military defeat, and that the important thing was what Jacques Maritain has called political and economic demoralization of the French people. That, of course, would keep us from laying too much of the blame on Leon Blum and the Popular Front government.

MR. CASE: I might say, in this connection, that the political leaders have to depend upon the experts in the army to advise them on military affairs. And we have had reported one very famous incident in that regard. When they were spending this \$500,000,000 for the Maginot Line, as Mr. Spurlin mentioned, there was a man in the army, De Gaulle, who was very much opposed to that. He believed the next war was going to be a war of movement. He believed that France should be prepared for that war of movement with a large amount of tanks and planes and other mobile equipment, and he tried to put the idea across, but it was squelched every time. He finally did, however, get the ear of the Military Affairs Committee of the French Parliament, and went before it and presented all of his evidence, and it appears that the Military Affairs Committee was about to accept his ideas. But not one general of the French Army backed up the agitation of De Gaulle; so what was the committee to do with it—the committee of politicians who were in the Parliament? They had to take the generals' word for it, and when they had to choose between the opinions of a great many generals and the feeling of one insignificant colonel, of course they took the attitude of the generals. So the generals there determined the policy. Furthermore, in regard to the generals, they rise in rank largely by seniority, and, as a way of

FRANCE'S FADEOUT

keeping politics as much as possible out of the army, they are not changed until a war comes and they are tried and found wanting. And so you would not have the generals changed by politics, but they would remain there to misadvise, sometimes, those politicians who are not experts in military affairs.

MR. KRUMPELMANN: That means that the generals are retained by politicians.

MR. CASE: They are retained by politicians at least in order to prevent the appearance of too much politics in the military until they have proved that they are wrong. Just today we have witnessed a change in the leadership of the English army when the politicians finally decided that they needed Brooks instead of Dill.

MR. CAFFERY: Well, if the military defeat was the most important thing, as you say, it seems to me that something we ought to consider is some of the economic disorganization which was present in France before the war and so far as we know in the months after the war had begun. In an article in *Harpers Magazine* for March, 1940, I read of the amazing amount of traffic which went on between France and Germany in the two or three years before the war and that as late as November, 1939, there were at least 1,000 tons of French iron ore being shipped into Germany per day. This I should think would be an amazing figure from the point of view of armament manufacture and would play quite an important part in an armament program.

MR. SPURLIN: I agree with Mr. Caffery, and I disagree with Mr. Case. [*Series of interruptions.*]

MR. STEETLE: Good! We all agree to disagree. Go ahead, Mr. Spurlin.

MR. SPURLIN: The war was not lost on the battlefield. The French did not really suffer a military defeat. The war was lost elsewhere. Perhaps we should speak of a political rather than a

A WORLD AT WAR

military defeat. A battle presupposes an opponent. France was hardly an opponent, possessing practically no planes and little war matériel, and her soldiers outnumbered by the Germans in a ratio of two and a half to one. The historians of the future, in my opinion, are not going to say that the French lost the war because French workmen were granted eight hours a day or forty hours a week, nor will they spend much time on Flanders Field or the Maginot Line, but they will probably have a good deal of research to do and much to say about the Rue de Pressebourg in Paris—a little street near the Arch of Triumph, in which is located the General Federation of Employers.

MR. CAFFERY: I quite agree, Mr. Spurlin, but I think at the same time we can't place all the blame on French industrialists. I think a further indication of French economic demoralization can be seen in the role played by the Communists, by the labor unions in France during the time of the Popular Front. It seems to me that there you have an indication that all was not well. Here were people who refused to realize the crisis that was facing them.

MR. CASE: I agree with both Mr. Spurlin and Mr. Caffery in regard to the role that some of the big business men and concerns played in perhaps undermining the strength and morale of France to resist the invader. From another article I have evidence to corroborate what Mr. Caffery said about the sale of iron ore to Germany by the French through Belgium and Luxembourg before the Germans started to invade France. Even after the war started, and until the Germans started to invade Holland and Belgium—in that intervening period—at least one million five hundred thousand tons of iron ore were being shipped from France to Germany. That was under the auspices of the Comité des Forges, or steel combine in France, under the leadership of Wendel, a French steel magnate. But I do want to point out, in regard to the challenging of my view of the

FRANCE'S FADEOUT

military defeat, that before the last war it used to be thought that mobilization was the first act of war. Now, in this war it was not mobilization, but it was something even back behind mobilization, and that was preparation. As a matter of fact, the German war was all won, the German invasion of Holland and Belgium and France was previously won by preparation made in Germany and by the lack of preparation in France. And the responsibility for that lack of preparation in France must fall primarily on the shoulders of the military leaders.

MR. STEETLE: Gentlemen, our discussion is subtitled "Lessons of the Past." In speaking of lessons, is there any connotation that the fall of France should have for us in America?

MR. CAFFERY: Mr. Steetle, it is my own opinion that the thing we should remember, if my own view be correct, is that what wrecked France was a lack of faith, a lack of ordinary faith, among ordinary people, in their own institutions, in their democratic institutions. They failed to prepare because of that, and it seems to me from that lack of faith stem most of their troubles.

MR. SPURLIN: I'm somewhat inclined to agree with Mr. Caffery, here, and I should like to quote a propos another statement from Dorothy Thompson, which expresses my view somewhat. "The men at the front did not believe in the government behind them. They believed that they had been sold out twice—in Spain, and in Czecho-Slovakia—and that the same government would sell them out again. And the men behind, that is, the men who were leading, did not trust their own masses. Many of them were more afraid of French socialism than they were of Hitler."

MR. CASE: I think we can learn one lesson from the fall of France, and that is, to have more faith in the potentialities of our country and the ability of our countrymen, but at the same time I think we can sympathize with the French when they tell

A WORLD AT WAR

what a botched job the military leaders had made of preparation. They certainly did lose faith in their military leaders, and therefore they had their morale undermined. I think, therefore, that another lesson we should learn is that we should keep our army and navy and air force up-to-date. We should try to get just as expert and open-minded leadership as possible in our military forces, so that there will not be from that direction any undermining of our morale and faith in our country.

MR. KRUMPELMANN: Another point that we might consider is this: we hear so much talked today about a fifth column. Now, of course, there was a fifth column in France. The fifth column was those parts of France who were perhaps more inclined to Hitlerism or centralization than they were to democracy, and we have seen—Mr. Case has pointed out—that generals were monarchists, which means centralization. We know that a large number of the political leaders—Pétain, for instance, the present head of the French government who was then a general, and others—were more inclined to centralization than to democracy. We know that the industrialists feared the French communists, who had a large part in setting up the Popular Front. Now then, it seems that the fifth column was an internal organization, composed largely of Frenchmen. How large a part did German agents, as Germans, play in the fifth column in France? Anyone have anything to offer on that?

MR. SPURLIN: We do have this one fact. In the school year of 1938-1939 there was a noticeable influx into some French universities of students, all of whom could speak German, and who claimed to be victims of Nazi persecution. Under the subject of what America might gain from France's plight, perhaps America might well consider closer supervision over various organizations. I mention this in connection with our fifth-column discussion in France, because we know that such organizations as the Croix de Feu and the Cagoulard existed, and it is true

FRANCE'S FADEOUT

that the Croix de Feu bought airplanes and munitions and, it is alleged, incited revolts among the French people.

MR. KRUMPELMANN: Isn't it also alleged that the airplanes were bought with government money?

MR. SPURLIN: That I can't answer.

MR. CASE: I might just add here, with regard to the Cagoulard, that there was one very famous French general who associated himself with the Cagoulard.

MR. STEETLE: To summarize the work of this forum, then, we haven't decided anything, because forums should not package their information for the listener, but in passing we have commented on the fact that democracy in France was not at fault—in general, you gentlemen agreed. But you did say that governmental weakness and weak leadership were partially at fault; that in Mr. Case's estimation, it was a military defeat; Mr. Spurlin believed that it was not quite a military defeat, because France was not really equipped to be a worthy opponent. Mr. Caffery states that you can't separate a military defeat from defeat as a whole; that there was political and economic demoralization of the whole people. As for lessons for America, we decided that it's wise for us to have faith in our own country, to know that country better in order to have more faith, and to prepare for defense.

II

PRESENT ISSUES

Contrasting World Orders

CLEANTH BROOKS, JR.

Professor of English

GEORGE GLOSS

Associate Professor of Physical Education

RUDOLPH HEBERLE

Professor of Sociology

CARL ROSENQUIST

Visiting Professor of Sociology

MR. STEETLE

MR. HEBERLE: It seems to me that we should limit our discussion to the fundamental differences between a democratic and a totalitarian regime. The question concerning the future political order of the world in case of the victory of one or the other party will be discussed by another group. That question, however, can not be answered in a satisfactory way unless the essential contrast between the two regimes is perfectly clear. If you agree, we might start our discussion by considering the following three points: First, it seems to me that there is a great deal of confused thinking about the main element of democracy and a totalitarian regime. To put it bluntly, quite a number of people seem to think that it would not be worth while to fight Hitler if, in doing so, our American democracy would have to be transformed into a dictatorship. Why try to swap the devil for the witch? The faultiness of such argument becomes obvious if we call the totalitarian regimes by the name they deserve—tyrannies or despotisms, and if we consider that the true dictatorship in times of war is perfectly in harmony with a democratic form of government. Ever since the ancient

A WORLD AT WAR

Romans invented this institution, practically all democratic constitutions have provided for it as a temporary emergency measure. The dictatorial powers conferred by the people upon a democratic government are something very different from the absolute, permanent authority assumed by the leaders of totalitarian nations.

The authority of the democratic dictator is, like all democratic government, based on law, and restricted by law, while the authority of the leaders in a totalitarian state cannot be subject to the law, since the leader himself is lastly the sole creator of all law in such a state.

In speaking of governments based on law, I mean, of course, that any act of government has to be in accord with fixed and determinate general rules, which determine not only the content of such action, but also the forms of procedure which have to be observed.

Now to the second point: According to democratic political creed, the individual is the ultimate end of political action and institutions. The Nazis and Fascists believe, on the contrary, that the welfare of the individual is no political end in itself but that the power of the nation is the only end and purpose of political action. This is one reason why those regimes were bound to get into conflict with the Christian churches. For the consideration for the individual, for his soul, for his material welfare which is characteristic of all democratic institutions is certainly one of the great gifts of Christianity to our Western Civilization. To deny the value of the individual means to deny some of the most important teachings of Christianity.

From these two fundamental differences between the two orders follows a third contrast which is probably the one most strongly felt by the individual citizen. Democracy as it is generally understood in this country is a form of government under

CONTRASTING WORLD ORDERS

which the individual citizen can be certain that he is safe against any arbitrary use of state power.

This is due to a complicated system of individual rights and of institutions which serve to safeguard those rights. These constitutional safeguards have been developed through more than three hundred years and have become so familiar to us that we tend to take them for granted, or often do not even realize their value.

The Germans, who have never had to fight seriously for these safeguards of civil liberty because they were bestowed upon them by far-sighted statesmen, gave them up in 1933, when they tolerated a regime of discrimination and terror against certain unpopular minorities; when they succumbed to the perversion of protective custody into the concentration camp; when they tolerated the centralization of all political powers in the hands of one uncontrolled ruler and his personal retainers.

MR. BROOKS: Mr. Heberle, I'm interested in your phrase, "government based on law." It seems to me that it's a concept that oftentimes is shadowy for all of us, and certainly it is for myself. I wonder whether you mean something suggested by the phrase, "the rule of law," which has as its basis the idea that we try to make our laws conform to a set of general rules of general applicability, something quite different from a decision on an immediate law which might rest on an intuition of a particular personality or a mystic illumination or whim of a particular man at a particular moment.

MR. HEBERLE: Why, I think that is what most of us have in mind if we speak of rule by law. You might say, of course, that the totalitarian regimes are also ruled by law. In fact, they have been very productive of legislation. But the principles upon which such legislation is based can be changed as the situation seems to warrant. That is one point, I think, which has to be considered.

A WORLD AT WAR

MR. GLOSS: I am inclined to bring this down to a little more simple form. I conceive of these two types of government based upon an ideal which each one of them has. Now, I'm not concerned which one of them is right or wrong, but I'm just trying to picture it for the moment, conceiving the totalitarian government as being like a pyramid. The head of the government is like the top stone, and he tells everybody what to do; he has complete authority, and all the other stones in the pyramid have no authority. They give up all responsibility, they give up comfort and are happy under the discipline from the stone above and they give up individuality as stones. They are cogs in the machine. They give up freedom. They can't be moved; the top stone has to be moved first. They give up their whole lives to maintaining and supporting this leader. Now, on the other hand, our ideal is that this leader can be removed; he's only elected by us for a certain specified time. He can be changed, he can be impeached, he can have many things done to him. However, some of these things have changed recently. We are tending to have this immovable stone at the top when we find, for instance—even tonight, in a previous announcement—that labor is slowly but surely losing something of its rights, that a third term has come into effect against our traditional constitution, and that there's greater control over manufacturers and even over the citizen; that is, we are now going to be organized for civilian defense, and that sort of thing. So in trying to picture these two ways of life I see them as two pyramids, but shifting closer to each other.

MR. ROSENQUIST: I wonder, Mr. Gloss, if in discussing the matter entirely from the point of view of law and of government we aren't overlooking something a little more fundamental, namely, the economic aspects of the system under which we live. It seems to me that in a capitalist industrial economy the success of the system depends upon the continuous accessibility

CONTRASTING WORLD ORDERS

of foreign markets. But just as soon as these markets disappear, depressions come along. Now it happens that in the world as it is at present, foreign markets have been on the way out for quite a little while. Apparently Germany was one of the first countries to suffer most severely from this loss, and we have felt it also, of course. It seems to me now that Germany, in the effort to regain some of her world markets, has embarked upon the totalitarian regime in an effort to substitute a political or military for a purely economic control, out of which she was beaten by the terms of the treaty following the first World War. If this point of view is correct, it would appear that the purely political aspects of the thing are not the only significant ones but that we need to take into consideration also this matter of where the markets of the world have gone and the kind of economic control that we will subsequently have.

MR. HEBERLE: Well, what then would you say is the fundamental difference in the two regimes with regard to their economic policies?

MR. ROSENQUIST: I would say that the difference is primarily that the totalitarian regimes expect to exert their control by force and that the democracies are still attempting to manage the thing through law and so-called economic controls.

MR. GLOSS: What surprises me, Mr. Rosenquist, is your not stating—maybe the omission is intentional—that perhaps, after all, we're still inveigled into war. I've heard—I don't know how true it is—that we are still selling steel to totalitarian states, and that wars are often fostered by the people who gain profit by them. We've just heard tonight over the radio that there was a great deal of profit upon a battleship. Don't you suppose that's some of the economic gain that you are referring to? Or did you leave that out on purpose?

MR. ROSENQUIST: It isn't possible to speak of all things at once, but certainly if I had had time I should have mentioned

A WORLD AT WAR

that. It would appear that one of the earliest supporters of the Hitler regime in Germany was the industrial system or the industrialists, the large ones, particularly, of that country. They probably supported Hitler because they felt their world slipping out from under them in the fact that their markets were gone. It's perfectly possible that the same kind of situation may operate in other countries and that the industrial system suffering from its lack of world markets is making some kind of attempt to regain its position and markets in the form of colonies, or mandates, or spheres of influence, or by whatever name they may be called. Do you agree with that, Mr. Brooks?

MR. BROOKS: I think that we certainly can't afford to neglect the economic causes, and they're certainly interwoven in the fabric of the situation which produced totalitarian states. The question is so involved, as perhaps the last moment or two of conversation have indicated, that perhaps we do well to discuss this on the level at which Mr. Heberle has put it, that is, that the economic problem is very confused. You might get, as Mr. Gloss suggested, economic forces in democratic states and totalitarian states for the moment seeming to approach or grow closer together. I think that it's highly important, in view of that confusion, for us to discuss basic ends, I should say, even matters of creed, matters of ultimate belief, particularly because one does find Fascistic elements in our own country, and one can see that the temptation on certain levels in our own civilization to imitate the totalitarian regimes is here and has to be guarded against.

MR. HEBERLE: Mr. Brooks, wouldn't you think that the firmness of democratic traditions, at least the Jeffersonian traditions, and also the gift of Americans for voluntary cooperation on new matters of policy would prevent any Fascist element from getting the upper hand?

MR. BROOKS: I don't know that I would agree that it would

CONTRASTING WORLD ORDERS

prevent, though let's hope that it would be a strong stay. I think that the essential permanence and strength of that Jeffersonian tradition would make us bitterly regret having gone in a totalitarian direction after we had done it. On the other hand I think it's only fair for us to admit that there are certain things in our folkways and traditions which would make certain aspects of totalitarianism attractive to us. Even in the case of the South, which has this Jeffersonian tradition strongly imbedded, there are factors which might render the temptation to imitate totalitarian methods very strong.

MR. ROSENQUIST: Mr. Brooks, you recall that Mr. Heberle mentioned the safeguards of democracy as one of the features that distinguish the totalitarian from the democratic regime. I wonder if there's any danger of these safeguards becoming purely symbolic? I have in mind the poor man in court. He has the right, to be sure, to take his case to the Supreme Court. But whether that right does him any good or not depends upon his economic standing rather than upon the merits of his case. If he happens to find himself with an opponent who is able to engage the best lawyers and to continue the battle on purely economic grounds, he may find that he will lose out even though he has an entirely justifiable case to bring to the court. In such cases it would appear that the individual after an experience or two would not feel so sure about the value of these safeguards which we as a nation have considered so important for our national and individual life.

MR. BROOKS: I would agree, Mr. Rosenquist, thoroughly. I think that's an excellent example that, in proportion as these safeguards become merely symbolic, we give mere lip service to them, and they cease to act as real safeguards.

MR. GLOSS: I just wondered if, in addition to that, we aren't through our mechanized aids approaching a state where communication becomes standardized. We have the tabloid maga-

A WORLD AT WAR

zines, the standard radio broadcasts, the production of movies on a grand scale. Mr. Wise's presence in the studio reminds me of a speech that he made several years ago in which he stated that drama is best when it is produced by the individual community as a folk thing. That is one of the Jeffersonian traditions, to keep the diversity of the various parts of the country, as opposed to the Hamiltonian conception of national control and national standardization. And I think that fits in with this particular point: that we have to be careful that we don't become a solid group, for when we become a solid group we become easier to manipulate. We have to have local control and yet somehow become efficient enough to get along as a nation.

MR. ROSENQUIST: Mr. Gloss, I wonder if there isn't a dilemma there? We should like indeed to maintain these individualities, the autonomy of the local community, the freedom of the individual, through economic choice. But obviously in a world which is getting so closely tied together by the lines of transportation and communication as is ours we can no longer go our own individual ways with the same freedom that we once could. Do you agree with that, Mr. Heberle?

MR. HEBERLE: Yes, I think so, but I would like to come back to an earlier remark of yours. You said, "Very often the poor man has not the chance of winning a case in court because he lacks the means to carry it to the higher courts." Well, in a democracy, under any regime, such defects may occur. But I think you have to contrast with this the situation in the totalitarian countries. I would like to draw your attention to this one point, which is perhaps not so very well known. For instance, in Germany the courts are instructed, first of all, to interpret statute law very broadly whenever the interests of the state or the party warrants, and certain of the courts are also instructed that any lawsuit has to be dismissed if its pursuance

CONTRASTING WORLD ORDERS

would endanger the prestige or the interest of the party or the state. Now in a democratic country whenever there is miscarriage of justice, there will be somebody to holler about it, and public opinion will be aroused. In a totalitarian regime the incident will be muffled in deep silence, and those who try to start public opinion will probably find themselves sooner or later either out of job or in a concentration camp.

MR. ROSENQUIST: I wonder, Mr. Heberle, if you haven't hit upon something that is perhaps even more fundamental than the form of government, namely, an attitude toward it. The custom of complaining about the government is not only tolerated but accepted and highly praised in the countries that we call democratic. We rather encourage people to be critical of the government, and I think that indicates the wholesome fact that the government can't go too far wrong before it will be halted, to some extent at least, by public opinion.

MR. BROOKS: I'd like to make a point, Mr. Rosenquist, which goes back to the dilemma you spoke of a few minutes ago. Actually, isn't the matter this, that a healthy state or healthy democracy has a sort of organic life? I suppose that there ought to be a healthy tension between forces which undoubtedly tie together, may tie too tightly together in purely abstract and mechanical patterns. In a healthy state you get the kind of tension which is resilient, makes adjustments possible, has some kind of healthy life in it.

MR. HEBERLE: I think you are right, Mr. Brooks, and I would like to draw your attention to one other point. Under the totalitarian regime what you might call a responsible opposition, which may have a function, a recognizable function, in the process of formulation of policy, is not known. It is entirely foreign to the totalitarian regime because you are either for the leader or against the leader. If you're against him you're against your own country, your nation, everything which is

A WORLD AT WAR

deemed to be sound and respectable. They are not willing to grant the supposition of good will to the opposition. No, not even a respectable constructive opposition is possible.

MR. BROOKS: In other words, the healthful tension is gone, and instead of the tension between the bow and the bowstring the bow is permanently bent.

MR. HEBERLE: Yes, and of course you get a great deal of factional strife, Mr. Brooks, within the party, which is always underground, can not be controlled, and is not responsible.

MR. GLOSS: Well, you get an efficiency, though, expressed in terms of a single goal. Things go faster toward that goal.

MR. HEBERLE: Yes, but who determines what the goal is?

MR. GLOSS: Well, of course, they have the leaders who determine that.

MR. BROOKS: I wish Mr. Heberle would tell us about the efficiency that we've heard so much about in Germany which, undoubtedly up to a point, must be true, and which is likely to prompt us to a feeling of imitation because of our despair of opposing it. How efficient is Nazi Germany, would you say?

MR. HEBERLE: In view of the successes in foreign policies and in war, so far, of course you would be inclined to think the regime very efficient, but I think this entire matter of efficiency cannot be judged on the basis of short-term experience but must be viewed as a long-range problem, and then I think the matter looks very different. Now I would like to give you an illustration. A while ago we talked about rule by law, and we pointed out that in a totalitarian country not only the principles of law but also legislation can be changed by one stroke of the pen at any moment, if the government or the people in control deem it advisable. That, of course, creates a situation which is very inconvenient—for instance, for the businessman or manufacturer who has to make long-range, long-term dispositions.

MR. ROSENQUIST: I wonder if it isn't true, Mr. Heberle, also,

CONTRASTING WORLD ORDERS

that this efficiency in the totalitarian regime is necessarily quite temporary? One of the axioms of political science, I believe, is that in the long run, at least, government has to rest on the consent of the governed, and it's only a matter of time, therefore, until the majority of people in any totalitarian regime anywhere in the world as it is now constituted will throw off the yoke of their oppressors and set up a government which is a little more to their liking?

MR. HEBERLE: Yes, that's very likely what will happen, Mr. Rosenquist. I would like to make another point in connection with the civil liberties we spoke about. We are always tempted to take extraordinary action against minority groups which we happen not to like, and in Germany many people rejoiced when the Nazi government cracked down on the Communists, putting aside all constitutional or statutory obstacles. But people did not realize that very soon it would be the turn of the Roman Catholics, of the Freemasons, to be treated in the same way. Then, of course, when that happened, they were horrified, but they did not understand that they gave away their civil rights when they condoned the very first steps of Nazi emergency or extra-legal action.

MR. STEETLE: In summary, then, gentlemen, I think you will agree that this forum has in some respect defined *dictatorship*, which has been used as a scare-word quite a bit nowadays. What we call a dictatorship should really be called a despotism or tyranny. People who fear that wartime may turn democracy into dictatorship are confused in their thinking; for a voluntary assignment of temporary dictatorial powers to a wartime government is perfectly consistent with democracy. The loss of foreign markets has been an important factor in the World Wars. Different treatments of economic matters must be considered in distinguishing different types of government. In America we must guard against Fascist tendencies, and we are

A WORLD AT WAR

helped in our guarding against them by the nature of the American people. American democracy and democracy in general are safeguarded by certain rights and the guarantees of them, but we must be careful that those rights remain genuine and do not become merely formal. Democracy possesses a healthy tension of forces and conflicting ideas which tend to hold it together, to make it a coherent whole, and in answer to those who might say that a totalitarian form of government is more efficient, we can say, first, that the efficiency is doubtful, and, second, that it is purely temporary, since in the long run government is by the consent of the governed.

What Price War for Consumers?

ROBERT J. HARRIS, JR.
Associate Professor of Government

WEX S. MALONE
Assistant Professor of Law

HARLAN L. McCracken
Professor of Economics

CHARLES W. UPP
Professor of Animal Husbandry

MR. STEETLE

MR. McCracken: The consumer is going to get hit, and hit hard, in two ways. First, he is going to have to pay much higher prices for the things he buys, and second, he is going to have to do without a lot of things to which he has become accustomed. In other words, he is going to want a great many things which he cannot get at any price.

MR. MALONE: Will you explain, Mr. McCracken, how and why it is that war causes such a rise in prices?

MR. McCracken: Prices rise from two main causes. Specific commodities rise in price because they become scarce and dear, and the whole level of prices rises because money and credit become abundant and cheap. There is certainly no mystery as to why aluminum, steel, and even cotton and many types of skilled labor have gone up in price. The demand has vastly increased, and the supplies are limited. In other words, many prices rise because our old friends, demand and supply, enter the picture. Many laws are repealed in war time, but if de-

A WORLD AT WAR

mand increases while supply remains the same, the economic law of demand and supply says that price will rise.

In this connection, you may be interested in a remark which I once heard Governor Olsen of Minnesota make when he was addressing a student forum at the State University. He said, "If I am ever made a dictator, the first law which I will repeal will be the law of demand and supply." That was in 1933. Since that time, Governor Olsen has died, and the law of demand and supply still lives.

MR. HARRIS: Yes, we can all see why the prices of *some* things go up in war time because of scarcity in face of an increased demand, but you said that the whole level of prices rises because money gets cheap. I am not so sure of that. And I'm not so sure, either, that this is the full story. Why does money get cheap in war time?

MR. MCCracken: Well, Mr. Harris, the amount of goods which you can buy with a dollar is largely determined by the ratio between the quantity of dollars and the quantity of goods. That is why we get such terrific inflation under greenbackism or printing-press money. When we double the quantity of money by issuing billions of greenbacks but do not increase the quantity of goods, then the consumer has to spend about twice as much money to maintain the same standard of living. Economists frequently refer to this as the "quantity theory of money," which, stated in popular terms, is that the value of the dollar or the level of prices is pretty largely determined by the ratio between the quantity of goods and the quantity of money. So, if you double the quantity of money without increasing the volume of goods, prices will tend to double and the value of the dollar will be cut in half.

MR. UPP: Yes, we all know that paper money and greenbackism give inflation but, although the United States has carefully avoided greenbackism, inflation is already with us. In fact,

WHAT PRICE WAR FOR CONSUMERS?

I believe we are told that the cost of living to the consumer has already [December 17, 1941] gone up about 15%, and the *Magazine of Wall Street* for November 15 says, "You haven't seen anything yet." What makes you think that the cost of living is going up and that the consumer is getting squeezed because we are making dollars less valuable by increasing the quantity of money?

MR. McCracken: I am glad you asked that question, Mr. Upp, and I think I can answer it by referring you to World War No. I. You may recall that the United States scrupulously avoided greenbacks, and even adhered to the gold standard, slightly modified. Yet the cost of living more than doubled. In fact, our statistical experts tell us that we had so much inflation that it took \$252 in May, 1920, to buy the same quantity and quality of goods as could have been purchased with one hundred dollars in 1913. And it came about largely because we vastly increased the quantity of money and credit.

MR. HARRIS: Just how, Mr. McCracken, did we increase the quantity of money and credit?

MR. McCracken: Well, we did it, Mr. Harris, through the sales of bonds and the expansion of Federal Reserve Notes and bank credit. If you will pardon a personal reference, I well recall the Second Liberty Bond Drive. Two of my good friends came to me and said, "Mr. McCracken, we have come to ask you to buy some Liberty Bonds." I said, "Well, that's fine. But, you know, I am a young married man on a pretty low salary, and my wife has recently come from the hospital with a new baby, so I am pretty short of money." The reply was, "Oh, you don't have to have any money; you just subscribe for the bonds, and the bank will lend you the money." I said, "All right, what is my quota?" The reply was, "\$200. You can borrow the money at the bank at 6% with the bonds as collateral, and the bonds will yield you 4%, so your patriotism will only

A WORLD AT WAR

cost you four dollars a year." Of course I subscribed, got my bonds, borrowed the money, and everything was fine. But note carefully what really happened. The government needed the money and didn't have it. That was why it was selling bonds. The banks didn't have the money, or they would have bought the bonds themselves. I didn't have the money. That's why I borrowed at the bank. So the government borrowed money of me, I borrowed money of the bank, and the bank used my note as collateral to rediscount with the Federal Reserve Bank in Chicago, and on the basis of those promises and collateral the bank was able to issue Federal Reserve Notes—yes, to some extent a form of paper money. The effect of such an arrangement increases the quantity of money and has effects not too different from genuine greenbackism.

MR. MALONE: Up to this time we haven't embarked on anything quite of that nature, have we? I understand that our sale of bonds is more or less on a cash basis. Is that correct?

MR. MCCracken: So far, Mr. Malone, the government has got most of its money by selling bonds to banks and insurance companies, which have been glad to buy them with their idle reserves. That is why the sale of government bonds which has carried our indebtedness from thirty billions to sixty billions has not caused any more inflation than it has. But now that we are formally launched in an "All-out" war, and are warned to get ready for appropriations totaling 150 billion dollars, you may be mighty sure that we will soon have some high-powered campaigns for the sale of government bonds to Johnny Q. Public, and he is going to have to buy whether he has the money or not. And if the war lasts as long as many good authorities think it will, we will be borrowing money at the banks to buy bonds just as we did before, only on a much larger scale. Pearson and Allen told us in their Merry-Go-Round last Sunday that in the first World War we only borrowed about 34 billion, but

WHAT PRICE WAR FOR CONSUMERS?

now we're getting ready for 150 billion. So, Mr. Consumer, you had better get ready for some really fancy prices!

MR. HARRIS: From what you say, it looks as if the consumer is going to have a battle with the high cost of living as well as with the Japs and the Germans. But you wouldn't want us to believe that all consumers are in the same category, would you, or that they're all going to get hit equally hard?

MR. MCCracken: Oh, no. Some groups even get rich during war time, or at least they did in the last war. But, Mr. Upp, how do you think the war is going to affect the farmers?

MR. UPP: Well, I would not attempt to answer that completely, of course, but I would like to get one thing set straight first, and that is, how well the farmer fares is not going to be determined just by the price that he gets per bushel of grain or per hundredweight of livestock or per dozen eggs, but by the relationship between those prices and the cost of what he has to buy. There's where he enters as a consumer. To the extent that farmers produce food and fuel and feed for the live stock, and so forth, at home, the increased cost of living isn't going to be as important to them as it is to some others. However, one thing a lot of us overlook is that most modern farms are not self-sufficing units. They don't produce nearly all that they use. In fact, many farms have chiefly one crop—cotton, sugar cane, and so forth, and this type of farmer quite often gets hardest hit, because he's more dependent on what he has to buy. Too many times home gardens, milk cows, hogs and meat and chickens are missing from the farm program, and all of these help in cash incomes, as well as in meeting human needs. The diversified or live-stock farming is safer, and again economic studies in this state show us that stock yields better in general in Louisiana. Now we should recall in this connection that farmers are really challenged to go on a war basis in supplying food. Not just for our own needs, but for the world needs, and as a lot of

A WORLD AT WAR

people have said, for the post-war food-supply. Now I still haven't answered your question concerning the ways in which a farmer will be directly affected. Well, first of all, of course, our old friend taxes, and that's strictly hard-cash outlay. A second thing is farm machinery. Although 200% as much machinery is needed this year as last, only 50% as much steel is allocated for farm machinery. Also, the price of farm machinery is going to enter in there. A third thing that's a big cost is fertilizer, and both fertilizer and machinery compete directly with war materials. And the fourth thing is farm labor. The rural labor supply is the lowest that it's been since '26, and, in proportion to what our needs are, it's the worst that it's been since the last war.

MR. HARRIS: Well, Mr. Malone, you've been a student of price control and trade practices for several years. What in your opinion will be the effects of inflation and high prices on the business man?

MR. MALONE: Of course, the business man makes his money by having something to sell and someone to sell it to, but obviously the difficulty with the average businessman today is that while plenty of people want to buy from him, he hasn't anything to sell. Most of the materials that he wants to sell to people demand raw materials for their manufacture, and these raw materials, of course, are being used by the government. I suppose that when the Price Priorities and Allocation Board gets through with us, most business men will have little to do but twiddle their thumbs. Some businesses, of course, are going to be hit harder than others. Take, for example, the seller of automobiles, with the 75% cut that we know is coming in automobile-production; you can't imagine a garage-man making a great deal of money. Plenty of people want cars, but we can't get them, and I think that's going to be true to a certain extent of all business.

WHAT PRICE WAR FOR CONSUMERS?

MR. McCracken: Mr. Harris, you are in the field of government, and the Roosevelt administration seems to be pretty friendly to labor. How do you think labor will fare as a consumer?

MR. HARRIS: From the standpoint of increased employment and higher wages, Mr. McCracken, certainly labor groups will stand to benefit from the defense effort and the war. This is particularly true with reference to the highly organized skills, but not quite so applicable to unorganized labor and some of the mass production industries, and to unskilled labor, and to farm labor. To say, however, that labor stands to benefit in the form of increased employment and higher wages does not mean that labor will be rolling in wealth. Figures recently released by the Bureau of Employment Security reveal that 4/5 of all the laborers in the defense effort receive less than \$30 a week. This, of course, is a very small wage when we take into consideration the general increase in the cost of living. Labor as a consumer, therefore, will be affected in pretty much the same way as all other consumer groups. It will have to pay much more for the products it buys, and it will be unable to purchase many commodities which will cease to be available. For labor as a whole, therefore, we must conclude that it will benefit only relatively as compared with other consumer groups.

MR. MALONE: It seems that farmers generally, and many labor groups, at least, and even some of the business men, are going to be able to fare pretty well in spite of the war. Where is this so-called consumer that is going to take such a beating or lose his shirt, as it were?

MR. McCracken: In a general way, Mr. Malone, I suppose we might say that it will be the great "Middle Class" or white-collar workers who are tied to a relatively fixed income. The cost of living will rise, but they will have no more dollars to spend than before. In this group will be found government em-

A WORLD AT WAR

ployees, whether they be post-office clerks or men in the state house, the court house, or city hall. It includes bank clerks, store clerks, telephone operators, school teachers and college professors, salaried executives, widows and others living on pensions or annuities—in fact, it includes everybody in the fixed-income class. And in modern times, this is a tremendous group.

MR. UPP: So far, it seems that we have taken for granted that we are to have terrific inflation and a very serious increase in the living cost. I am not so sure that this is inevitable. Is what happened in World War I any indication of what will happen in World War II? Aren't there several things which the government can do to prevent this?

MR. HARRIS: But to go back for a moment to the matter of supply and demand, and the amount of money in circulation, Mr. Upp, I agree with Mr. McCracken to the extent that, as consumers' goods are withdrawn from the market and purchasing power is increased, and that a free market exists, prices would undoubtedly be determined by supply and demand, the amount of money in circulation, and the rapidity of its circulation. We should bear in mind, however, that the prices of a vast number of consumers' commodities are administered prices. I refer to those prices that in time of peace and in time of war are fixed by means of monopolistic controls, trade-association agreements, and other monopolistic devices. To the extent that these devices exist, the increases in the prices of consumers' goods are artificial and can and should be prevented by governmental action in the form of a ceiling on prices. It is common knowledge that there has been a considerable amount of hoarding of consumers' goods by manufacturers and distributors, and that, as a result of this hoarding, prices have been arbitrarily marked up without reference to supply or demand.

MR. MCCrackEN: So far, I've been a little skeptical of a

WHAT PRICE WAR FOR CONSUMERS?

government ceiling on prices. They've talked a great deal about that, but every time they got around to it, they said, "Of course, we can only put a ceiling on the price of finished commodities; we mustn't think of putting a ceiling on the price of labor or the price of farm products." Now, I'd like someone to tell me how you can ever keep a ceiling over finished products without putting any ceiling on wages?

MR. UPP: I don't think the intelligent farmer would expect you to put a price ceiling on everything except farm products. I know that that has been discussed somewhat, but the farmer's going to insist, like every other group, on a fair basis of relative prices, and there, it seems to me, is the crux of the whole problem. If you put a ceiling on prices, who's going to say what is a fair basis to start from?

MR. MCCracken: That's why I haven't much faith in a ceiling on prices, because Congress is a political body, and they're elected—many of them—by agricultural votes; so the congressmen representing farmers won't want a ceiling on agricultural products; many represent labor, and they don't want a ceiling on wages; and so every time they've come up against this problem they've backed away from it.

MR. MALONE: Now isn't Congress, in time of war, supposed to transcend these pressure groups? Of course, we're always going to have them to a limited extent, but it seems to me that in time of war you're going to find your Congress becoming more national minded. I think there's a possibility that we can have some sort of uniform price-fixing on basic commodities and on labor, which it seems to me, will automatically regulate the price of your ultimate products. I agree with you, of course, that the price of the ultimate product isn't the thing that we want to regulate. That will follow once we regulate these basic commodities.

MR. HARRIS: But you agree with me, Mr. Malone, that we

A WORLD AT WAR

don't have a choice between no price control and price control, but that the choice lies between methods of control: shall we have monopolistic control of prices on a great number of consumers' goods, or governmental control, in the public interest, of the price of consumers' goods?

MR. UPP: Mr. Harris, that brings up one thing that I think a lot of us average consumers can't get over, and that is that in past wars we've created—I don't know whether it's the result of monopolistic controls or not—these war millionaires and multi-millionaires. To me, there just isn't any justification for that. Mr. McCracken, can that tendency be cut down or eliminated?

MR. MCCracken: Frankly, I have very little faith in government price-fixing. Now there is one way, I think, in which we can avoid inflation, or at least keep it down to a minimum, and that's by higher taxes and fewer bonds. If a man has to pay taxes out of his income, he can't take his tax receipts to the bank and put them up as collateral for a loan. You don't get inflation out of tax receipts. Therefore, the best way to avoid unnecessary inflation is to impose very high taxes and keep the sale of bonds to a minimum.

MR. UPP: You think that we ought to bear our taxes with grace, or the best grace that we can, eh?

MR. MCCracken: Certainly for the middle man, the great middle group who gets hurt the hardest as a consumer, high taxes will be better than the other.

MR. MALONE: In reply to your question, Mr. Upp, about the war profiteer: "What can be done about him?" you will remember that during the World War there was a very heavy excess profits tax put on the various persons whose business was highly increased by the war.

MR. UPP: I appreciate that, but that didn't prevent all the millionaires.

WHAT PRICE WAR FOR CONSUMERS?

MR. MALONE: It certainly didn't, and I don't know that our present excess profits tax is going to do it either, but the government did collect between three and one-half and four billion dollars on that excess profits tax, and I suppose that that means that three or four thousand millionaires were kept out of circulation.

MR. HARRIS: I think that we should bear in mind that we should fight this attack of runaway prices on many fronts, one of which may be a general ceiling on prices; others: increased taxation, forced borrowing, rationing of consumers' goods, and increased production.

MR. MCCracken: Expanded production is something that to my mind offers, perhaps, the greatest hope and possibility. Specific goods do not rise in price if they're not scarce. And the general level of prices will not rise if the volume of production expands as rapidly as the volume of money and credit. The time is now past to talk about short hours, short week, time-and-a-half for overtime. Monopolies must be spotted and curbed that seek to make goods scarce and prices high. Yes, the Triple A, with its program of scarcity and high prices, must be completely out for the duration.

MR. UPP: Now you know, Mr. McCracken, that any bunch of agriculturists would argue on that, but I won't take the time to interrupt your thought here. Go ahead.

MR. MCCracken: Scientific management must be pushed to the limit, so that all men who want to work are employed. Every factory, as far as possible, should be kept running full blast. If it is a peace-time industry that cannot be allowed raw materials and labor during the war, then we must move heaven and earth to use the capital and labor available for some kind of war work. We cannot sit complacently and let the little factory and the little businessman lie idle and go bankrupt for lack of orders or supplies. This is a mechanized war. The army

A WORLD AT WAR

will win which has the most and the best equipment and the fuel to operate it. If the democracies are to conquer the totalitarian dictatorships, they must put every man, shop, and factory, to work, and keep them at work. Such an achievement will demand all the organizing genius that America possesses, but it can be done. And anything short of that would be criminal negligence, and possibly mean military defeat.

MR. UPP: I'd like to hear a further discussion on that fellow we're forgetting, the consumer, and what he can do to help himself.

MR. MCCracken: All right, you tell us.

MR. UPP: I'd just like to bring out two or three little points. For example, in what we eat we can change from higher-price foods to cheaper. Any butcher will tell you that every housewife who comes in orders a sirloin steak and wants it just as cheap as she can get it. She forgets that the cheaper cuts of meat which she can substitute are just as nutritious, and can be prepared just as well as those high-priced meats. Now that's just one illustration. There are other changes in diet we could make that would keep down the cost of living. Also, consumers can use different goods. We can make better use of our clothes, wear them longer, use our cars longer, and probably we'll be using our automobile tires longer.

MR. STEETLE: Well, then, gentlemen, to summarize the results of this forum, we would say briefly that, according to the law of supply and demand, scarcity of goods causes prices to rise. The forum pretty much desires a ceiling on prices, but is not quite agreed on how that ceiling shall be determined. To finance this war we should buy bonds, but as a safeguard against inflation, we should buy those defense bonds out of our income rather than out of borrowed money. Taxes should be higher, and we should accept those taxes gracefully, because that is a safe way of collecting money. Production should be

WHAT PRICE WAR FOR CONSUMERS?

increased and made as efficient as possible, for, after all, this is a mechanized war. As far as the consumer is concerned, if he's a farmer, he should emphasize a live-at-home program. He should grow his own things for his table, as well as for sale, in order to obtain the maximum income. The farmer's going to feel a shortage in farm equipment and a shortage of farm labor, and he's going to have to take steps to counteract this. The businessman is likely to find trouble in getting materials for manufacture. That is going to have to be taken care of so that the little businessman is not thrown out. Labor, the highly organized skilled labor, will gain from the war economy from the standpoint of increased employment, increased wages, perhaps. Unskilled labor will secure more employment. The white-collar class, the great income-class whose income is fixed, will find that their salaries are buying less and less, and they're going to need to make that salary go as far as possible. Consumers in general should consider the fact that you can get food products—to take an example from Mr. Upp—that have the same nutrition qualities and still are not quite as expensive.

Rights and Duties of Capital and Labor

JOSEPH DAINOW
Associate Professor of Law

DALLAS DICKEY
Assistant Professor of Speech

EDGAR SCHULER
Assistant Professor of Sociology

ERVIN ZINGLER
Assistant Professor of Economics

MR. STEETLE

MR. ZINGLER: With the United States engaged at last in a full-fledged world war, all-out production is absolutely indispensable. Victory is our number-one problem regardless of the sacrifices that may be necessary. Labor and capital must do their share along with the rest. This raises the question, what are the rights and duties of labor and capital in time of war?

In time of peace the important rights of labor are the right of self-organization, the right to collective bargaining, and the right to strike. In time of grave national emergency, the above rights may conflict with the well-being of the nation. If labor puts its own interests above those of the nation by striking or threatening to strike, by loafing on the job, by lowering worker morale or by causing excessive labor turnover, national defense is seriously impaired. Yet this is no time to void the hard-fought gains of labor under the disguise of a national crisis, although, when national existence is threatened, all of us must sacrifice some of our rights. The acid test of democracy is whether the sacrifice will be made voluntarily or not.

A WORLD AT WAR

Along with our rights go certain duties and responsibilities. In time of peace we tend to forget these obligations, but in time of war they are paramount. Labor has the duty of settling disputes peacefully over the mediation table instead of resorting to strikes. It has the duty of trying to maintain worker morale, of keeping labor turnover at a minimum, of doing a fair day's work for a fair day's pay. It has the duty of aiding in the task of furnishing an adequate supply of well-trained and experienced workers. Finally, it has the responsibility of not making any unreasonable or impossible demands on business.

However, we must not forget that capital too has responsibilities and obligations. Failure to accept government contracts until the ceiling on profits on defense contracts is lifted and until additions to plant capacity can be amortized in five years, profiteering and speculative buying and hoarding of vital raw materials and basic commodities, are every bit as detrimental to the welfare of the nation as are strikes. We must remember that "business as usual" and "patriotism plus 20% profits," as in the last world war, must definitely be ruled out if all of us are to do our full share in this war. Management in disobeying the National Labor Relations Act or the Fair Labor Standards Act for selfish reasons is in the same class as the striker.

If capital wishes to keep its rights of freedom of enterprise, private initiative, private property, and the profit motive, it will have to do its part in the drive for national defense as well as labor, the consumer, and the soldier. Production instead of profit will have to be the goal of all business activity. In fact, it may be necessary for capital to accept a lot less than 6% profit, which was considered a fair return on investment in the period 1935-1939, instead of the present ten, twelve, and more per cent.

If labor voluntarily gives up its right to strike and accepts the principle of settling labor disputes by peaceful means, man-

CAPITAL AND LABOR

agement must be prepared to abide by our present labor laws and to solve differences over the discussion table. When our nation is engaged in an all-out war, that is no time to question the soundness and validity of our labor and social legislation. Moreover, management must give up its right of lockout and its right of "hire and fire" for purely discriminatory reasons.

The important question before us is whether labor and capital will voluntarily accept a limitation of their rights and will accept fully the responsibilities and obligations that go with those rights in order that our way of life may be preserved. Upon their answer depends the future of democracy. We hope that they will freely recognize and accept their responsibility, for that is the democratic way of doing things, and it is clear that far greater energy for human progress can be released through willing cooperation among free men than through the use of fear and force.

For our discussion tonight, there are three questions that need be analyzed. They are: (1) Shall we leave it to labor and capital to accept voluntarily their duties and responsibilities, or shall we compel them to do so by legislation? (2) If we compel them to do so by legislation, how far can we go and still assure reassertion of the rights of labor and capital on a peacetime basis after the world war is over? And (3) if we use legislation, how far should we go in the direction of conscription of labor and capital? These, gentlemen, are the issues for discussion. Let us examine the first one. Shall we leave it to labor and capital to accept voluntarily the duties and responsibilities or shall we compel them to do so by legislation?

MR. SCHULER: Well, Zingler, if employers and employees do everything they can to co-operate voluntarily, well and good; but suppose there are difficulties? It seems to me that if this all-out production doesn't take place on the part of employers and

A WORLD AT WAR

employees, then we're going to have to legislate it, whether we like it or not.

MR. DICKEY: To my mind, though, the question is whether or not we can afford to wait, Mr. Schuler. It will be extremely difficult to know just when the chance given to labor and capital has elapsed, and moreover it will also take time to enact legislation and set up necessary machinery in order to insure the continuous war production of industries. The fact is that memories of Pearl Harbor may fade in time if labor difficulties develop. Strikes on a really large scale may actually occur. There are some strikes now that raise this problem again, "Can we afford to wait?"

MR. DAINOW: What you say, Mr. Dickey, is serious. But can we solve such problems simply through legislation? It is true that throughout history legislation of one kind or another has been used to regulate human behavior in social groups, and it is true that, to a certain degree, legislation is an effective solution of problems. But the immediate problem of our discussion is rather special, and it really involves more than the mechanical routine of so many hours of work per week and of uninterrupted production. There is also involved the question of workers' morale. This is what accounts for the difference between just getting by and maximum output. I've heard the report that when France put her workers on a coercive basis their efficiency was decreased instead of increased. The forced labor, you know, may have to be flogged to death, but after all it's an inspired and responsible worker who will exhaust utterly his productive energy.

MR. ZINGLER: I wonder whether, in view of the experience since Pearl Harbor, the problem is really significant? With the outbreak of hostilities labor announced the policy of all-out production unimpeded by strikes. Moreover, labor gave its Christmas holidays in order to make December's production an all-

CAPITAL AND LABOR

time high. Of course there are still a few strikes in progress. During the last week in December there were some eight strikes in progress involving about 11,500 workers of whom approximately 9,500 were in defense industry. The AFL had three strikes involving about 1,700 men, the CIO had three strikes involving 1,800 men, but the vast majority, 8,000, came in connection with two independent unions. But in spite of that—11,000 men; that's an all-time low.

MR. DAINOW: Doesn't it necessarily follow that if labor and capital are to continue their give-and-take in industry a certain amount of that is necessary in an ordinarily healthy growth? Can the fact that an insignificant number of strikers are not at work during a short period be deemed to be interfering with a so-called all-out production?

MR. SCHULER: It seems to me that there's a question, not only of the workers themselves, but of the reaction upon the military forces of the knowledge that everybody behind the lines isn't putting out 100%. What do you think about that?

MR. ZINGLER: There's also the possibility that the Pearl Harbor enthusiasm may wear off. I read recently that within the next nine months or perhaps year it was anticipated that strikes would recur, that labor, although now enthusiastic about the war and willing to cooperate, might forget about it and then reintroduce questions of wages and so on. So we still may have the problem of the need for legislation.

MR. DAINOW: Then the previous question recurs: Can we really solve things by legislation? Legislation has its effectiveness, but it can draw the tension too tight, and then of course the law loses its effectiveness.

MR. SCHULER: It seems to me that legislation is about the only possible solution. We certainly don't want simply a series of out-and-out dictated regulations from any administration. If the solution is achieved through legislation, we have at least

A WORLD AT WAR

the possibility of more or less free-and-open discussion with give-and-take by various interests.

MR. DICKEY: I deplore the necessity of enacting legislation as much as anyone, but we must bear in mind, I think, that we are fighting a total war, and at least we must get set to enact any necessary legislation if the voluntary efforts of labor and capital are not satisfactory.

MR. SCHULER: Naturally, all this discussion of legislation is based on the assumption that volume output may fall short of what we need.

MR. DAINOW: But can we say that volume output falls short? We have just commenced this period of emergency, the number of strikes pending is not serious, and the labor unions have already indicated that they're adopting a policy of no strikes. Now, it's true that certain local unions acting independently may call out a strike. But I can't see that the voluntary basis of all-out production can be deemed to have failed.

MR. SCHULER: I agree that it certainly hasn't failed yet, but I wonder if it's really been tested. We haven't begun to feel the pinch. All we're getting so far, I think, is some slight suggestion of what the difficulties are going to be, and very little sacrifice. We've been pretty much interested in getting as much as we could, each in his way, out of the emergency, and dollars and cents I think have mattered a whole lot up to this point, at least.

MR. DICKEY: Of course, may it not be said that even anyone who favors legislation would have to admit that the outlook thus far is good, that strikes are at a minimum, that we are producing at a level which is most gratifying, and that while we raised the question of whether we can afford to wait, we probably do need to wait long enough to see whether the voluntary efforts are not going to be far more satisfactory than we might think.

MR. ZINGLER: Is there anything wrong with legislation? Isn't

CAPITAL AND LABOR

it the purely democratic way of doing things? As long as the people themselves see the seriousness of the situation and they decide that legislation is the thing that's necessary—as long as the legislation controls are in the hands of the citizenry instead of in the hands of some demagogue—it seems to me that there's no harm in legislation. You say we might give them a chance. Well, I agree with that; we ought to give them a chance, but at the same time it isn't undemocratic to go ahead and set up laws which bring about the type of action that we know we're going to give voluntarily.

MR. DICKEY: At the start I raised the question whether we can afford to wait. In other words, I think we do need to get ready to pass some legislation and to safe-guard all-out production.

MR. STEETLE: Gentlemen, as keeper of the clock I should like to recommend that we move on toward the second question. If legislation is used to secure the co-operation of labor and capital, how far can we go and still assure a re-assertion of the rights of labor and capital on a peace-time basis after the war is over?

MR. DICKEY: If legislation is necessary, and it may be so, certainly that legislation must be enacted for the emergency only. I think we assume that labor should retain after the war all the rights and gains that it has made thus far. I conceive these rights to be, of course, such things as the right of organization, of unionization, collective bargaining, and even the right to strike, feeling that there are good reasons for retaining the right to strike. In other words, if legislation is necessary, it should be for the emergency only, and we should make every effort to safe-guard all the gains of labor thus far, and see, after the war, that these gains shall not be lost.

MR. DAINOW: If we proceed now on the theory that some sort of legislation will have to be passed to assure all-out pro-

A WORLD AT WAR

duction, we have to keep in mind certain other factors as well. We have been told on reliable authority, and we can see for ourselves, that this war is going to be a long war, and if such legislation is passed, it will necessarily create a new kind of machinery for taking care of these claims and disputes that will arise between labor and capital, unless the legislation is such as to freeze the status quo, which, of course, would not be a healthy state of affairs. And, if there is going to be a new machinery for the regulation of industry and production, the entire organization of industry and production will be geared to that new machinery. Now, in view of the fact that the war is going to be long and that there will be a new organization of industry geared to an entirely new set-up, it is doubtful whether a return to the original pre-war situation will be possible.

MR. SCHULER: I'm not sure that the war needs to be long, but even if it should last a lot longer than we hope, it seems to me that the people in this country are not going to change overnight, or in a couple of years, with regard to fundamental values. One of those fundamental values, certainly, is the desire for freedom and independence of action, the assertion of the individual's right to think and speak and act with a good deal of latitude. I know that some of the machinery is going to change and that at the end of the war things are not going to be the same as before, but if I know anything about what we really want and what we regard as worth fighting for, and possibly dying for, if that's necessary, it is this freedom of individual action that we're going to retain if we possibly can.

MR. ZINGLER: All this raises another question, "What kind of legislation ought we have?" Now, in peacetime, certain laws have been suggested—for example, laws requiring incorporation of trade unions and perhaps auditing of union funds, but that won't do in time of war. The situation is entirely changed. At present, one important thing is the jurisdictional strike. It is

CAPITAL AND LABOR

very costly, and the Supreme Court has recently ruled that it does not come under the Anti-Trust Laws. It seems to me that we might start by outlawing all jurisdictional strikes. A second thing might be the War Labor Board, such as we had in the first World War, which we may get rather soon. I believe a twelve-man board is contemplated—four representatives each from labor, management, and the general public. Another possibility is compulsory arbitration of disputes in defense industries. Disputes in non-defense industries would, of course, be settled by our present machinery—the Conciliation Service, the Mediation Board, and so on. But certainly, in defense industries, where we can't afford prolonged strikes, it seems to me, there is a strong case for compulsory arbitration, so that settlement will come soon. If the situation becomes desperate enough, we may have to go beyond that. It might even be necessary to outlaw all strikes and lock-outs and to freeze the status of all labor and industry. In other words, we might have to end the organization of labor throughout the war. Most of us hate to think of this sort of thing. In the last war we never got to the point of outlawing strikes or preventing further self-organization by labor, but if the situation gets desperate we might have to do that. I hope we don't.

MR. STEETLE: Gentlemen, speaking of legislation and its implications, how far do you think we should go in conscription of capital and labor?

MR. DAINOW: Well, if there is a need for regulatory legislation to obtain 100% efficiency in production, I suppose there's no alternative to conscription of both labor and capital.

MR. DICKEY: But, Mr. Dainow, just what do you mean by conscription? It may mean something far more drastic than we conceive of. Won't it mean, for instance, moving labor from point to point almost overnight; taking labor, say, from Detroit to California, or anywhere where it may be needed, simply

A WORLD AT WAR

ordering them to move? Isn't it going to mean limiting, or maybe abolishing entirely, all profits of industry, and may it not mean the total conscription of women? And if we conscript labor, then, certainly, we are going to have talk about conscripting capital as well. We've been talking far more, I think, here, about labor than we have about capital. Personally, I'm not forgetting the fact that we have produced over 22,000 millionaires and made many other people wealthy, too, and I'm not forgetting that profits to capital in the past year have been very good and promise to be very good during the next year.

MR. SCHULER: Those are perfectly good questions, Dickey. But, Dainow, another question is suggested by your statement that if the need is great enough, there is no alternative to total conscription. How do you determine when the need is great enough? My answer is: only when it becomes perfectly clear to people throughout the country that we're not going places as fast as we need to. We can depend on the usual democratic methods of indicating our desires to the authorities, to Congressmen, and to the President; on letters to the editor; and on any way that we have of expressing our opinions. I don't see that the decision ought to be made by anyone but the people throughout the country, and that, of course, may take some time.

MR. DAINOW: Mr. Schuler, do you think that we can leave such a decision to the people of the country? Isn't it rather a decision that will have to be made and, as far as I can see, can only be made by those who are leading our military and governmental operations at the present time? They're the ones who are in a position to judge best whether conscription of labor and capital is necessary and, if so, how far it should go.

MR. SCHULER: Of course in a situation like this it's necessary to have a good deal of faith in authorities, but even so it seems

CAPITAL AND LABOR

to me the people generally ought to have a good deal to say as to how far we go in the way of sacrifice.

MR. STEETLE: In brief, then, gentlemen, we have posed several questions and suggested various answers. Shall we leave it to labor and capital to voluntarily accept their duties and responsibilities or shall we compel them to do so by legislation? Would legislation solve these particular problems when you consider the question of morale? A present all-time low in strikes suggests that labor and capital are working right now for defense and may not need regulatory legislation. If legislation is used, how far can we go and still insure the re-assertion of the rights of labor and capital on a peace-time basis after the war? The forum seems generally agreed that the gains of labor should be safeguarded if legislation is used to obtain maximum productive effort. The freedom of the individual, according to one member, will be re-asserted because the American people are constitutionally and personally addicted to the exercise of freedom. Legislation, if it be needed, might possibly embrace compulsory arbitration in defense industries. As for the conscription of capital and labor, if that is a sacrifice, if that is something that's needed, perhaps it should be used, since for complete efficiency in our war effort we need to expend every effort.

III

SOME PROBLEMS ABROAD

Our Relations With South America

ROBERT W. FRENCH

Associate Professor of Business Administration

DONALD H. MORRISON

Assistant Professor of Government

T. LYNN SMITH

Professor of Sociology

HARRIS G. WARREN

Assistant Professor of History

MR. STEETLE

MR. WARREN: Memorable in history because of the treachery of Japan, the month of December, 1941, also marked the culmination of a new hemispheric solidarity. As soon as the news of Pearl Harbor had been received, many Latin-American nations jumped to the support of the United States. Even before Congress had voted the declaration of war, Central American and Caribbean nations had declared war on or severed diplomatic relations with Japan.

A comparison of the situation in 1917 with that of 1941 reveals significant differences. During World War I, seven Latin-American nations were neutral, and some of them were even hostile to the United States. Now only four South American nations may be counted as neutral [January 28, 1942], and even they are cooperating with us. Not one of the republics to the south is hostile toward the Allies.

Immediately upon the outbreak of war, expressions of friendship and support poured into Washington. Definite action followed. Several countries froze Axis funds. The Axis-subsidized

A WORLD AT WAR

press was subjected to rigorous control in Brazil. Special measures were taken to safeguard vital United States properties, such as oil wells and mines. Increasing of armaments, instituting of compulsory military training, and other steps were taken by countries whose striking power and defenses are still woefully inadequate in a world where the only weighty argument is that of force.

We are now enjoying the first fruits of an intelligent Latin-American policy. With one or two possible exceptions, public opinion in Latin America is overwhelmingly favorable to the United States—at present. Just as prevailing anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States aided in crystallizing hostility to the Rome-Berlin combination, so also in Latin-America was there a broadening of anti-Japanese sentiment into a general anti-Axis attitude. The friends of democracy are vociferous and emboldened in Latin-America for the time being, while sympathizers with totalitarianism are steadily becoming less apparent and active. But they are not yet defeated, although their strength, flowing from Rome and Berlin, is slowly declining. If the United Nations waver in this great crusade against brutality, Axis agents will rise like a swarm of locusts to darken the sky beneath the Southern Cross.

World War I closed with the principal industrial nations of the world poised for a continuation of their struggle for supremacy in Latin-American investments and commerce. Great Britain, Italy, the United States, and Germany were anxious rivals in this contest. The United States was handicapped in this contest because of our refusal or inability to import agricultural products that might compete with domestic output. Moreover, European nations made capital out of the distrust with which many of our neighbors regarded us. Our history since 1823 was searched for fuel. Purveyors of propaganda dragged smoldering faggots from the ashes of the past and tried to make them blaze

SOUTH AMERICA

again. Many labels like "Colossus of the North," "Yankee imperialists," and "dollar worshippers" were tied to Uncle Sam. European propagandists were aided by our own parlor pinks and professional handwringers whose major premise was that the United States was always wrong. Aside from any element of truth that may have bolstered these charges, they served to intensify suspicions that already existed and to spread the virus into uncontaminated quarters.

The Havana Pan-American Conference in 1928 marked the high point of United States resistance to the clamor for change in our Latin-American policies. The election of Herbert Hoover brought with it a promise of the new era of the Good Neighbor Policy. As president-elect Mr. Hoover made a good-will trip to Latin America. After his inauguration he took positive steps to show that expressions of friendship were to be translated into action. Marines, in and out of Nicaragua since 1912, were withdrawn, and steps were taken to make possible a similar withdrawal from Haiti.

President Roosevelt brought the Good Neighbor Policy to a higher level. Our occupation of Haiti ended. The customs receivership of the Dominican Republic was terminated. And the Platt Amendment allowing great intervention in Cuban affairs was abrogated. Trade agreements were negotiated with well over one-half of the Republics. The Export-Import Bank began to make loans for internal improvements. When the seventh Pan-American Conference met at Montevideo in December, 1933, it was marked by a feeling of friendship toward the United States. Three years later the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace met at Buenos Aires, with President Roosevelt present. From this conference came the pact promising consultation of foreign ministers, should the peace of the Americas be threatened; "a plan to consult together on a common neutrality policy in case of war anywhere"; and an

A WORLD AT WAR

agreement that effectively internationalized the Monroe Doctrine.

The Eighth Pan-American Conference, which met at Lima in December, 1938, was the occasion for violent totalitarian propaganda. Little was accomplished beyond the Declaration of Lima, which provided for "mutual cooperation and collaboration to prevent foreign intervention and threats to the peace, security, and territorial integrity of any American state." The neutrality conference at Panama in 1939 established a neutrality zone around the continents of south of Canada, a zone that speedily became a pious hope rather than a reality. The Conference of Foreign Ministers at Havana in July, 1940, met when the German arms had reached new successes and fears of the Axis nations were mounting. With surpluses of corn, wheat, cotton, beef, coffee, sugar, and other products piling up in Latin America, there was a real danger that Axis barter trade would be renewed. The Conference agreed that the United States should try to relieve economic distress in Latin-America, that each country would endeavor to prevent subversive activities, and that American states could take into custody any foreign colonies in the Hemisphere that were in danger of falling into Axis hands.

All of these events in Pan-Americanism contributed to the support of the United States when the attack upon Pearl Harbor formalized our war with the enemies of democracy. The conference in the queen city of Rio de Janeiro has just come to a successful conclusion. Although we lack a full report on what has been done, it is apparent that the political and economic agreements which have been signed are vitally important. The Americas are united more firmly than they have ever been. But that union is a structure which must be cared for with tact, consideration, and even sacrifice.

MR. SMITH: Mr. Warren, you have stressed the competition

SOUTH AMERICA

between our agricultural products and those of the other American republics. And you have indicated that this has constituted an obstacle to inter-American solidarity. To a certain extent, this is true. But it should be pointed out that many Latin-American products complement our production, rather than compete with it. For example, the coffee from Brazil is an essential. What would we do in these days were it not for the added sugar that we secure from Cuba and other neighbors? How about the possibilities of rubber in Brazil and other countries? Chocolate, quinine, and many other products that we cannot produce ourselves, are, it seems to me, absolutely essential to our welfare.

MR. FRENCH: It seems to me that the question, Mr. Smith, is not "Can we buy those things?" but "How much can we buy?" I'd like to raise a question: is there much possibility of enlarging our market for such complementary products as coffee and sugar? Enough to give us much satisfaction as far as our future trade relations with the Latin-American republics are concerned?

MR. SMITH: That is a very large question; it's one to which the various agencies of the United States government, and particularly the Department of Agriculture, are addressing much of their best efforts these days.

MR. WARREN: It seems to me, too, that our problem has less to do with the complementary products than with the competing products. The complementary products don't give us very much trouble, do they?

MR. FRENCH: I didn't say that they do. But if we are relying upon our trade in those complementary products to produce the quantities of dollar exchange that these Latin-American countries are anxious to get, we may discover that the situation isn't altogether satisfactory from their standpoint or ours.

MR. SMITH: Don't you think there is a great deal of danger that we will overstress the competition of Argentine beef with

A WORLD AT WAR

our own product instead of giving proper importance to the long-continued friendship between the United States and Brazil, a friendship which I think is due in a large measure to the very large extent to which our products and their products complement one another rather than compete with each other?

MR. MORRISON: When we try to distinguish between the diplomacy of two periods and call that of the pre-Hoover era "dollar diplomacy," and refer to Mr. Hoover's and Mr. Roosevelt's policy as being the "good neighbor" policy, haven't we made a false distinction? Both might be characterized accurately as "dollar diplomacy." We are in effect trying to bribe South American countries into better relations with us. You, I think, have put your finger upon a very important point, Mr. Smith, when you say that long-range relations may depend more upon cultural matters than upon complementary and competing economies.

MR. WARREN: Isn't it true, though, Mr. Morrison, that the very basis of the friendship between the United States and Brazil is largely commercial, and that one of the principal reasons for what hostility or tendency towards misunderstanding that might exist between the United States and Argentina arises in part at least from the competition of two great agricultural nations?

MR. FRENCH: I'd like to raise a point in here, Mr. Warren. It seems to me that our present trade with Latin America cannot continue forever on its present basis. That is, as far as the Argentine is concerned, a considerable amount of American credit has gone there. Then in our buying from these Latin American countries, at least through this war period, there's been more than a hint of what is sometimes called "preclusive buying," that is, taking a sufficiently large quantity of a given thing produced in a given country to make it virtually impossible for that country to trade with an enemy nation. Now I think it

SOUTH AMERICA

comes to this finally, that the United States has a definite interest in bringing about some re-establishment of the trade relationships of European countries with Latin America after this war is over. That is, since we do have these competing products, the only way out of the situation is to try to re-establish the triangular, or multi-angular, trade which existed in the days before the last war.

MR. SMITH: Would you mean by that that we should revert to the situation which has prevailed till the present time, more or less refuse to take tin directly from Bolivia, get our tin from Malaya by way of England, and therefore put ourselves in the very weak position in which we are at the present moment? Or should we continue our present efforts to build refineries in the United States, import the ore directly from Bolivia, and refine it ourselves?

MR. WARREN: After all, we haven't refused tin from Bolivia. We made an attempt to import tin during the first World War; the Phelps-Dodge Corporation, I believe, actually had some experience in smelting the Bolivian tin. The difficulty is not that we want to import the Malayan tin, but that the Bolivian tin is so much more difficult to refine than the Malayan that it's necessary to mix the Malayan with the Bolivian in order to get the product that we need.

MR. MORRISON: Besides, the tin mines in Bolivia are on the decrease as far as production is concerned, as I understand it, and the most tin that we expect from Bolivia is about 25,000 tons per year, which normally is about one-third of our tin imports. Of course, 25,000 tons might be suitable, it might satisfy our military needs, and we might be able to supplement that with substitutes for non-military uses, but it would necessitate the construction of very expensive smelting and manufacturing processes here, and perhaps we're not willing to do that yet.

MR. FRENCH: I see another danger in this picture that I'd

A WORLD AT WAR

like to bring out. I was talking with a South American recently, and he said that his country should not go on indefinitely in trade relations with the United States, buying more from this country than it was able to sell to this country. What was behind his conversation was an idea of bilateral balance and barter and recent interferences with the larger trade relationships which we enjoyed in the twenties. I don't know which of you gentlemen would like to take a whirl at this—but, are we then facing a future where these bilateral balancing arrangements, these barter arrangements, are what we are going to be forced into in our trade with Latin America?

MR. WARREN: I'd like to take the first whirl there, though I'm not sure that I won't get dizzy with the answer. Perhaps we are tending toward something remotely similar, at least comparable, to a type of free trade. The rather unsatisfactory newspaper account of the Rio conference, which ended not more than an hour or two ago, states that the American delegation was able to obtain signatures of some sixteen or more foreign ministers to an agreement to abrogate further inter-American trade barriers, and, as I understand it, the tariffs which have been standards. I don't know the details, but if that actually has occurred, it might have a great influence on any future trade policy, particularly any future tariff policy, of the United States and of the Latin-American nations, and it would also affect the trade relationships between Latin America and the European nations.

MR. FRENCH: I quite agree with you. Now, what role we are to occupy as we move on into the future has concerned me. I'm wondering, particularly with respect to Argentina, Mr. Morrison, whether we're going to be able to step in where the British left off, or whether we are going back into some kind of competition among Great Britain, the United States, Italy, Japan, and

SOUTH AMERICA

Germany, which Mr. Warren talked about in his opening remarks.

MR. MORRISON: I, of course, spend a lot of time in talking about that very thing in class. But it is a problem that can't be treated adequately at all. The question is whether we will revert to a League of Nations or develop some form of regional organization. Some people have spoken of a union of the countries with the Anglo-Saxon tradition, with common cultural background, etc., or the United States might absorb Canada and the South American countries in some form of hemispheric organization.

MR. WARREN: I don't like that expression, Mr. Morrison,—“absorb Canada and the Latin-American nations.”

MR. MORRISON: There's a lot to be said for it. [*On second thought*]. Well, it's deleted. But it seems to me that all this discussion about the economic aspects of our relations with South America is really discussion of an incidental point. Our primary concern here is a military problem, that is, the military defense of the western hemisphere—defense against possible extension by foreign powers of their influence, political, economic, and military, over countries which might be used as bases in striking against the United States. I recognize, of course, that the economic aspects of it are extremely important. They operate, for instance, to enable us at least to count upon the South American countries not to cooperate effectively with other countries.

MR. WARREN: I have yet to find anyone who's been able to answer to my satisfaction the question, “Just how can the United States defend the entire Western Hemisphere, and particularly the Latin American portion of it?”

MR. MORRISON: I can't pose as a military expert, but I think there's one very clear answer to your question. If by hemispheric defense you mean having a Marine stay on every square foot

A WORLD AT WAR

of territory in the South, that obviously is impossible. But if you mean the establishment of naval bases from which our fleet can operate to break up any forces which the enemy might send against our shore, that, of course, is possible. And President Roosevelt's destroyer deal, by which we acquired a number of naval bases in the Atlantic Ocean, is an extremely important step in that direction.

MR. FRENCH: Mr. Morrison, I'd like to suggest that perhaps the best approach to hemisphere defense is not military at all. It seems to me that we can best defend ourselves or Latin American republics by trying to promote some grounds of common understanding.

MR. WARREN: That's true, Mr. French, but you can't sink submarines or drive off dive-bombers with common understanding.

MR. MORRISON: Nor are we trying to defend ourselves against attack from our southern neighbors. We are attempting to defend ourselves against attack from totalitarian powers both in Europe and in the Orient. And for that reason I think this question of naval bases is one that we might look over for a couple of minutes. For the west coast of South America, of course, we have adequate bases in Alaska and in the Hawaiian Islands. The protection of the Caribbean and Panama Canal section is taken care of rather adequately through the acquisition of bases in Bermuda, Jamaica, Cuba, and Panama itself. But there is a very important deficiency there; that is a naval base on the coast line of South America itself, preferably, I understand, on the bulge of Brazil, one which would enable our navy and our air forces to protect, say, the 1200 miles which separate South America from the important points of departure for an invasion.

MR. WARREN: That's all very true, of course, about naval bases; they're certainly a very important aspect of hemisphere

SOUTH AMERICA

defense. I don't know, but it seems to me that a great many of us in this country make the mistake of emphasizing too much the role of the United States in that hemisphere defense, and perhaps we don't appreciate the necessity, as the Latin Americans themselves certainly appreciate it, of that hemisphere defense coming from within each of the Latin American countries. In the final analysis, isn't hemisphere defense to a great extent going to rest on the determination of each Latin American country to defend itself against any threat to its political and economic system?

MR. MORRISON: I think you're underemphasizing the importance of military machinery; that is, good intentions and desire, and so forth, are not adequate protection against invasion, against some strong navy, or against a heavy bombing attack. There's very little, in fact, that we can count on from South America in the way of military operations. Argentina, of course, is the strongest military power in South America, and it has a small, rather well-trained navy. It also has man-power, with some military possibilities. But on the other hand, its industrial establishments are not adequate for the development of any military power of real importance in hemisphere defense. And so we might go through the whole list of the South American countries.

MR. STEETLE: In summarizing the statements thus far made, I find them falling into two divisions, those concerning economic and business relations with South America, and those concerning the military aspects of hemisphere defense. From the standpoint of our hemisphere solidarity, we're in a much more favorable position in this war than we were at the beginning of World War I, and in the present show of Pan-American cooperation, we are reaping the results of a consistently growing good-neighbor policy. The Americans, the Americas, are united more firmly than they have ever been. But that

A WORLD AT WAR

union must be carefully nurtured and guarded. And the forum seemed to realize that there are problems to be worked out with regard to trade among the Americas. One of them is, "Can we enlarge our markets for products of the Latin Americas that do not compete with United States products?", and then, "What can we do to help Latin Americans in products which do compete with our own?" According to preliminary reports, perhaps some of the trade barriers between the Americas have been abrogated by the Rio conference. As far as military hemispheric defense is concerned, how far can the United States depend upon Latin America? The forum seems to think that while the other countries of the Pan-American hemisphere are not particularly strong in a military way, they do have the power to defend their own systems of government, their own economic structure. But while we cannot expect to have a Marine base on every square foot, as one of the members of the forum put it, it would be a good idea to increase the establishment of bases from which the fleets can be operated. While some areas are adequately covered, there are other areas where additional bases would be useful in the implementation of hemispheric defense.

The Durability of Japan

ROY A. BALLINGER

Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics

CARL ROSENQUIST

Visiting Professor of Sociology

CHALMER J. ROY

Assistant Professor of Geology

H. LYLE SMITH

Professor of Mathematics

MR. STEETLE

MR. ROY: When this war started over in Europe, there was considerable speculation about how long Germany could fight an all-out war. Since December last there's been more speculation, this time about how long Japan can fight. As most of the 1939 predictions about Germany have proved to be too optimistic, I think we should consider the Japanese situation rather carefully. I would suppose that Japan's lasting power depends largely on the following factors: first of all, her determination to win, or perhaps her determination not to lose; second, the man power she has available, both at home and at the front; third, the supply of food, and fourth, although perhaps not least, the supply of mineral raw materials. Of course, her military strategy and tactics will be important, but the war isn't being decided in the general staff map room. It's an old saying that an army travels on its stomach. It probably travels best on a full stomach, and since the food supply is certainly one of the vital issues, I'd like to ask Mr. Ballinger what he thinks about the food situation of the Japanese.

MR. BALLINGER: If it is true that an army travels mostly on

A WORLD AT WAR

its stomach, the Japanese army can probably keep on traveling indefinitely. The Japanese Empire, as a whole, is approximately self-sufficient with regard to food. In years of poor crops they have some shortage; in years of good crops they have normally exported a little bit. However, the islands of Japan proper for the last two or three decades have become a deficit food area to a certain extent, principally to the extent of importing about 20% of their rice and 70% of their soy beans.

MR. ROY: Where do they get most of the rice that they import?

MR. BALLINGER: Largely from Korea, or Chosen, as the Japs name the place; the soy beans principally from Manchuria. There is no possibility of cutting off those exports from such areas to Japan except first to occupy the areas, and if you can do that, the war is already won anyway.

MR. ROY: That is, if you can occupy China.

MR. BALLINGER: If you can occupy China and the main coast of Asia, there's no chance of the Japs continuing to fight very long. But, short of that, food can hardly be a major factor, although it is apparent from some of the recent news from Japan that the main islands are somewhat short of food and have resorted to a certain amount of rationing. Probably the shipping shortage caused by a military campaign in the South China Sea may do much more towards accounting for the rationing than any actual shortage of food within the total area controlled by Japan.

MR. SMITH: Is not fish the major element in their diet?

MR. BALLINGER: Fish is the principal, and for many of the people almost the sole, animal food, and Japan is probably the principal fishing nation of the world. But I see no particular way to cut Japan off from her supplies of fish.

MR. SMITH: I understood that some of that had already been cut off.

THE DURABILITY OF JAPAN

MR. ROY: Don't they get a lot of their fish from our own Alaskan waters?

MR. BALLINGER: They have, of course, fished in the Western Hemisphere, but no very important proportion of their supply comes from there; the only real possibility of cutting very seriously, I think, into Japan's fishing would be by the Russians, because the coastal waters near Siberia are among their most important fishing grounds. As a matter of fact, the United States had more or less stopped Japanese fishing in Alaskan waters three or four years ago.

MR. ROY: The taking over of large portions of China must have had some effect on the food supply. Do they get appreciable quantities of rice from China?

MR. BALLINGER: Before the war they did not take any rice from China. In the years of short supply they might take some from French Indo-China or Siam. One thing that must help out the Japanese military operations in the South China Sea is that those countries are normally great exporters of rice; the Japanese should therefore have no trouble feeding their troops.

MR. ROY: Well, Mr. Rosenquist, you've been over to the Far East and to Japan. Going back to this first thing I mentioned here, what do you think might be the Japanese determination to win?

MR. ROSENQUIST: I used to encounter what might be called two schools of thought in regard to the Japanese. One was that they were totally lacking in military skills and abilities, and that at the first sign of any opposition they would quit. The other school of thought was that the Japanese were hardy and patriotic and altogether of such a character that they would keep on fighting indefinitely. Now it seems that in waging a war technique is of about as much importance as anything else, and that the Japanese are pretty well provided with the means of waging a modern war. It may be pointed out here that they learned

A WORLD AT WAR

how to operate their navy from the British by engaging British officers to come to Japan to help them; that they learned how to operate their army from the Germans by hiring German officers to come to Japan to organize their army. I wonder if Mr. Smith might not have some impressions of the Japanese military machine, he also having lived for a considerable time in the Far East?

MR. SMITH: I, of course, never saw anything of their machine, but I do know something of their scientific work. I stopped at a small bookstore in Yokohama on my trip there, and in that small compass I found the best selected library of mathematics books that I had seen anywhere. They knew from exactly what books they could get the information they needed in the shortest possible time. I think that's one reason why they have done so well with their limited material.

MR. ROY: Back on December 7, when most of us were trying to hear the Philharmonic and got news bulletins scattered through it, the reports from the Pacific coast speculated as to whether this was a popular war in Japan, and you gentlemen—you've been over there, Mr. Rosenquist, Mr. Smith—do you think this may be a popular war in Japan?

MR. ROSENQUIST: I shouldn't be at all surprised if it were. The Japanese, along with all of the other people in the Orient, have been under the heel of the white man for a considerable time. It's quite likely that there may be built up a great deal of resentment against the domination of the whites, and that nothing short of very greatly superior military power will compel the Japanese to submit. Not only that, it may be a fact, also, that they will find considerable sympathy among some of the non-white peoples among whom the war is now going on. There is, or was, in the Philippines, a rather strong pro-Japanese party, particularly around the southern end of Mindanao and the port of Davao, which the Japanese occupied very shortly

THE DURABILITY OF JAPAN

after attempting it. Mr. Smith, perhaps you could add something to this, particularly as regards the activities of the Japanese in the Philippines.

MR. SMITH: My stay was confined almost entirely to Manila itself, and the Japanese population is rather small there. I didn't observe any pro-Japanese sentiment in the part I was in.

MR. ROY: To get back to agriculture. The other day I said something about my farm, which consists of two city lots, and someone laughed. Now, if I'd said that in Japan, would they laugh quite as much, Mr. Ballinger?

MR. BALLINGER: I think they would consider that you hold a very large farm. Only about 16% of the land area is cultivated, and that includes some very steep mountain slopes. The average-sized farm would run, in most of those areas, only very small, many of them less than an acre.

MR. SMITH: Isn't it true that in Japan proper only about half the population is supported by agriculture?

MR. BALLINGER: I think the percentage is perhaps somewhat higher than that. Of course, the percentage of farmers in Japan proper has been declining steadily for the last fifty years or more.

MR. ROY: Was that in spite of the reclamation program they've had going on?

MR. BALLINGER: Yes. The reclamation program within Japan proper has been largely confined to one of the islands where they thought they had some possibility of finding more land they could cultivate.

MR. ROY: Didn't that program run down about 1930? They had progressively reclaimed more up until that time, and then the amount that they let go back began to equal the amount reclaimed each year.

MR. BALLINGER: Yes, that's true, partly because industries

A WORLD AT WAR

took a little more land, and partly because they turned their attention more fully to Korea and Manchuria as possibilities.

MR. ROY: Industry brings up another point about their staying power in this war that we ought to consider.

MR. ROSENQUIST: Mr. Roy, we've heard a good deal about American scrap-iron going to Japan, and that relates to your field. Perhaps you could tell us what their chances are of staying, so far as their mineral resources are concerned.

MR. ROY: In Japan, of course, the mineral industry has never been particularly big. During their best years the total production of minerals was equal to about a fifth of the value of the rice crop. The only minerals that they have in sufficient quantities are coal, sulphur, chromite, and tungsten. Those four aren't enough for an industrial civilization such as we know. It's not so much that they only have the four, but they don't have enough of the first two—iron and coal. In the islands themselves they have very little iron, most of the iron ore coming from Manchuria and adjacent parts of Asia. There are rather large resources of coal, but the Japanese have another handicap with regard to industrial development, and that's labor. We hear a lot in this country about the necessity for 16 men at home in industry for every man at the front. Now, under the system of Japanese labor, can they get by with only 16 at home for every one at the front?

MR. ROSENQUIST: That would depend, Mr. Roy, on the extent to which their industry is mechanized. Can you tell us something about that?

MR. ROY: Well, that and skilled labor. The Japanese, at least by reputation, are notoriously lacking in skilled labor such as we know it. As you remarked a while ago, they've got most of their industrial push-off from European and American experts.

MR. ROSENQUIST: So far, Mr. Roy, you haven't said any-

THE DURABILITY OF JAPAN

thing about oil. We're all of us very much interested in that question because it's supposed that one of the objectives of the Japanese attack on the Dutch East Indies is to get an oil supply. Can they get a sufficient oil supply from that area?

MR. ROY: If the Japs get the Dutch East Indies, they're well-fixed for the oil they need. They produce about two and one-half million barrels of oil a year, that is, within the main island group; and from us they imported about 25 million barrels in 1942. And that's, of course, not all of the requirements, because they were at that time importing almost equal amounts from the Indies.

MR. ROSENQUIST: Here again their shortage of skilled labor might put them at a disadvantage. Apparently the Japanese have had comparatively little experience in drilling oil wells and keeping good production of oil or even in refining.

MR. ROY: Of course, our news reports say that the Dutch are destroying their oil fields as they retreat—the scorched-earth policy—and that means that the Japanese are either going to have to become friendly with the Dutch and get the Dutch to put their fields back in operation, or put them back in operation themselves, and there is certainly a question as to whether the Japanese are technical enough to get the job done. Of course, they had one sneaker in this whole oil proposition. About five years ago they established the principle that all petroleum-importers had to maintain in storage in Japan an amount of oil equal to one-half of their annual imports; so that means that last summer, when we cut off oil exports to Japan, Japan had a quantity of American oil equal to one half, at least, of the 25 million barrels that we had shipped to her the year before. So that's six months' supply of oil, perhaps, in storage when the war started. Since they can stretch that by conservation, the most optimistic we could hope is that they have perhaps no more than a year or a year-and-a-half's supply of oil. But if they get

A WORLD AT WAR

the Indies and can effect production there, their oil situation will be largely solved.

MR. ROSENQUIST: One other product comes to mind when we speak about the Far East, and I'm wondering if Mr. Ballinger could tell us something about that. I have in mind rubber.

MR. BALLINGER: Prior to the outbreak of the present war Japan imported all of her supply of rubber, and in recent years the imports had apparently been about 10% of the imports into the United States. Of course, the rubber situation is probably much easier for Japan than it is for the United States at the present time, since their civilian use of rubber is very unimportant. Also, the Japanese are taking over rubber plantations, and again, if they can secure the factories to make the rubber goods for the military machine, they ought to be very well-fixed for rubber, although the raw material must be transported a few thousand miles.

MR. ROY: Is the destruction of the Malayan rubber plantations going to have the same effect on Japan that it's going to have on the rest of us after the war is over?

MR. BALLINGER: In the first place, I wonder how well those rubber plantations are being destroyed? It takes time and labor to cut down a good many hundred thousand rubber trees, and I'm not sure that the natives are doing this, are enthusiastic about doing it; there aren't enough white people left to do it.

MR. ROY: I suppose Japan has none of our prospects of creating an artificial rubber industry.

MR. BALLINGER: Presumably no, since most artificial rubber is made of petroleum, and they're short of petroleum.

MR. ROY: And they're short of technical skill. I suppose the Germans are sort of hard-up for extraneous experts to send over to them at the moment, and certainly we're not going to help them out much, nor the British, nor the Dutch. They're sort of hard-up for the chemists to develop these industries.

THE DURABILITY OF JAPAN

MR. BALLINGER: That may be true. Of course, I don't know whether anybody has an accurate count of all the good chemists and technicians in Japan. Maybe the Japanese have, but I don't think we have.

MR. ROY: Of course the Japanese have developed a great many technical professions in the last 30 or 40 years, but prior to that practically everything was done by imported foreign experts, including a lot of Americans.

MR. ROSENQUIST: Mr. Smith, I wonder if you could tell us something about the adaptability of the Japanese to life in the tropics, as compared to the adaptability of Europeans and Americans. It would seem that they have something of an advantage there, and I wonder if that has any military significance.

MR. SMITH: I doubt very much whether they have that advantage. I believe they're just as sensitive to intense heat as the average European. In fact, I believe they're more so.

MR. ROY: Isn't it in the Far East that we got the saying that only mad dogs and Englishmen go out in the mid-day sun?

MR. SMITH: That's right.

MR. ROY: Well, obviously, the Japanese don't.

MR. SMITH: They do not. They, in fact, do not like to live in tropical climates.

MR. ROY: What effect is that going to have on their fighting in the tropics? Do you suppose they'll be the same vicious military machine in the tropics that they've been in China?

MR. SMITH: I think they'll do very well. Anybody can fight in the tropics if he has to. But I don't think they have any advantage over the white man in that respect.

MR. ROSENQUIST: I wonder if they don't have the advantage of being better adapted to the tropics, if they don't have an advantage by reason of the fact that an enormous percentage of Japanese population has had seafaring experience. A comparatively small proportion of Americans have ever been off dry

A WORLD AT WAR

land, but almost every Japanese has been on boats. And since the war seems to be taking a naval turn, might that not be a factor that needs to be given some consideration?

MR. SMITH: I had thought of that when you were talking about the people who regard the Japanese as extraordinarily good fighters. It seems to me that as seamen, as naval fighters, they are excellent. As land fighters, they're probably not quite so good.

MR. ROY: There's a certain amount of irony in the fact that they are pretty good seamen and naval fighters. They got their first naval vessel as a gift from the king of the Netherlands, and their first shipbuilding yards were superintended by twenty-two experts from Holland, and now the Dutch are reaping that which they sowed almost a hundred years ago.

MR. ROSENQUIST: Of course, most of the oil they're using and the iron out of which their ships and guns are built has probably come from the United States.

MR. ROY: Yes, about 60 or 70% of the steel they make is made from scrap iron, and there's only one part of the world that can supply scrap iron in such large quantities, and that's the Western Hemisphere, and particularly the United States. The European countries are a little inclined to conserve their scrap. We are not. We're not even making ready use of it, as yet [January 21, 1942], for our own purposes.

MR. ROSENQUIST: Mr. Smith, I wonder if you would care to comment on the ability of the Japanese cities to resist an air attack.

MR. SMITH: Well, at the time I was in Japan, the Japanese cities had been laid waste by an earthquake. I don't know just what condition they are in now. At that time, they would have been in very bad shape, indeed, to stand—

MR. ROSENQUIST: That would be my impression also, from having seen some of them a little more recently. Their structure

THE DURABILITY OF JAPAN

seems of such character that one incendiary bomb would burn up practically all of Japan.

MR. ROY: They were rebuilt largely in the same way, except for the commercial buildings, which were probably earthquake-proof, at least some of them, in addition to the Imperial Hotel.

MR. BALLINGER: I wonder if the question of air attacks isn't particularly important with reference to factories of various sorts. Are these built out of the same bamboo and paper as the houses, or are they more substantial?

MR. ROSENQUIST: Such of the factories as I saw I would say aren't constructed as substantially as the factories of America. I was thinking, particularly, of course, of the tightly packed residential areas of the large cities; it might be a serious blow to Japanese morale if there should be destruction of these areas.

MR. ROY: I know many pictures of the factories, steel mills, and various heavy industrial plants; most of them are built out of galvanized iron.

MR. SMITH: And textile mills are frequently built out of even less substantial materials.

MR. ROY: Those are ordinary frame construction.

MR. SMITH: Many times textiles are manufactured in just private houses.

MR. ROY: I know a lot of it is still domestic industry, only on a rather small scale. Outside of the iron and coal that we've already mentioned, and the oil, Japan has nothing in the way of minerals which would justify the dream of industrial empire from which she seems to have been suffering the last fifty years.

MR. ROSENQUIST: Mr. Ballinger, the Japanese used to make a good deal of money selling silk to the United States, and that market seems to have disappeared entirely, with no possible substitution. I wonder if you have any notion what kind of dis-

A WORLD AT WAR

location in the Japanese economy the stopping of that market might have and its effect upon their staying power in the war.

MR. BALLINGER: The disruption, not only of the silk industry of Japan, but of their whole textile manufacturing industry, was very great, even before the outbreak of war, as the United States had for many years been the principal importer of Japanese silk and our imports had dropped greatly. Japan, also, in order to maintain some foreign exchange and buy war supplies, for a good many years had refused to permit the sale of cotton cloth domestically. Japan had always imported her raw cotton primarily from the United States and India, supplies from both of which places seem rather permanently cut off, and the cotton textile industry is the principal industry in Japan. Therefore, the industrial dislocation and the amount of unemployment caused must be a very major factor in disrupting the domestic life of the country at the present time.

MR. STEETLE: Gentlemen, in summary, the question, "How long can Japan last?" seems to fall, as Dr. Roy suggested, into four parts: First of all, what is the determination to win? Here it seems definitely a possibility that the support of the Japanese people for the war may be forthcoming, perhaps because of the previous acts of the white man himself. And the second point, about man power available; there's a lack of skilled labor, for Japan doesn't have the machinists and mechanics that we have in this country. Too, there is the point that the Japanese are imitators, and when we cease giving them models, they will be at a disadvantage. As far as food is concerned, we probably should not depend a whole lot on the Japanese being stopped because of lack of food. They're pretty much self-sufficient because of fishing and rice-growing, which are rather difficult to stop. It becomes a bit more cheerful a picture when you look at minerals, because in an industrial war, as all modern warfare

THE DURABILITY OF JAPAN

is, minerals are important above all else. You find no oil to speak of in Japan, and there's going to be a difficulty in remedying that without further conquest, which will extend their forces even further. A shortage of rubber in Japan, again, must be overcome; a lack of scrap iron, the base of all steel, is another problem which they will have to solve.

IV

THE SOUTH AND THE WAR

Southern Farms Produce for Victory

ROY L. DAVENPORT
Professor of Agricultural Education

HAROLD C. HOFFSOMMER
Professor of Rural Sociology

H. C. SANDERS
Director of Agricultural Extension Work

M. D. WOODIN
Assistant Professor of Agricultural Economics

MR. STEETLE

MR. SANDERS: Farmers of the South, along with farmers in the rest of the nation, are producing for victory. And in that production program they are having difficulties, some rather surprising. One which I have heard a good deal about recently is labor. No one ever expected that the South would experience a labor shortage, and yet people are talking about it every day. Mr. Hoffsommer, you have made some studies on this labor problem, and I wonder if you could throw some light on this situation.

MR. HOFFSOMMER: I think that possibly we have enough labor to manage if we manage carefully, but we are going to have to use our heads as well as our hands to make out. One of the big labor problems in Louisiana is that the demand for farm labor is bunched in certain seasons. That is, there is a heavy demand in the spring and also in the latter part of the year for sugar-cane farming. For example, we will need about 50,000 agricultural laborers next January to produce what we would normally produce and, in addition, to produce what has been

A WORLD AT WAR

pledged by our farmers in the victory campaign. But in the month of May, which represents our peak labor season, we need about 250,000. Now, if we could do something about ironing out these peak demands for labor, we would have solved one of our most serious difficulties.

MR. SANDERS: Have you any suggestions as to how that might be ironed out?

MR. HOFFSOMMER: It's a rather complicated problem. One of the difficulties is that the peak demand for labor comes at different times in different sections of the state. In the cotton delta, of course, the peak demand comes during the picking season. There is also a heavy demand in the early part of the summer in the cultivating season. In sugar, the demand comes in the latter part of the year, and in the strawberry area, in the early spring. Now there is a possibility of transferring these workers from one area to the other. There is a difficulty, however, that not all of the cotton pickers, for example, would make good cane-cutters.

MR. SANDERS: And you're picking cotton at the same time in some sections.

MR. HOFFSOMMER: That's quite true. We do have some sources of labor that we haven't exploited quite fully as yet; that is, we have the under-employed and the unemployed. But just when we need these groups, they would scarcely be available, because the under-employed would usually be employed at the peak season, and if the unemployed were going to be employed at all, why, they would probably be employed then. There are quite a few people on the W.P.A. that would apparently be available for farm labor, but closer scrutiny of the records shows that most of them are not farm-workers. Quite a heavy percentage of the people on W.P.A. rolls are in New Orleans and vicinity. Then, there's a great deal being said these days about utilizing female labor on the farm. In Louisiana we

SOUTHERN FARMS

have used some female labor, practically all of it colored, and possibly that source of labor might be used more extensively. This last cane-cutting season some of the large cane-farms didn't use female labor at all, because the introduction of the cane harvester had made it unnecessary to use female labor. Besides, they thought that they shouldn't use women because they might displace some of the males.

MR. STEETLE: Don't you think that some of our ladies might succeed in reducing a little with a little bit of field work?

MR. HOFFSOMMER: Possibly that's a good suggestion; I'm sure that it is.

MR. SANDERS: Would the use of machinery enable us to use less labor?

MR. HOFFSOMMER: I'm sure it will. That brings up the rather interesting point, however, of the availability of farm machines. I believe I heard only today that priorities were being granted for machine repairs, but I'm not sure as to the availability of new machines for farm work. And to the extent that those machines are not available, more men are required.

MR. SANDERS: We've also had the problem of finding the more skilled persons necessary to handle machinery. We've had a good many complaints about the scarcity of tractor-drivers. They must be trained, and this takes some time.

MR. HOFFSOMMER: That's particularly true because of our defense industries, which take some of our more skilled workers. But so far, I understand, taking the country as a whole, farm labor has not been called upon to a very great extent for the defense industries. The latest figures that I have heard are that only about 5% of our defense industries have been manned by farm labor, and also that there were relatively few negroes in defense labor.

MR. WOODIN: Isn't that because most of that labor is drawn

A WORLD AT WAR

from the East and the North, the industrial areas, rather than from the South?

MR. SANDERS: We haven't had the industries in the South. However, construction projects are using thousands of people that normally would be employed on the farm.

MR. HOFFSOMMER: I suspect that as the defense industries develop, we will have greater demands on our farm labor.

MR. WOODIN: Won't the weather conditions, affecting the amount of crops, determine to a great extent how much of a labor shortage we have?

MR. STEETLE: That's a good point, Mr. Woodin. If we have a good crop, we are going to be sorry because of a shortage of labor, and if we have a bad crop, we're not going to be producing to our utmost for victory.

MR. SANDERS: If we have a good crop, we'll probably have an all-out effort to harvest it. There's another angle of this labor situation that's beginning to be felt, and that's the scarcity of trained agricultural workers—teachers, extension workers, and others. The University has recently modified its program accordingly, as Mr. Davenport can tell.

MR. DAVENPORT: In this food-for-victory program we find some new crops, which means that we must provide an adequate supply of information on the new crops. Our agricultural experiment stations are busy securing the facts, and our extension workers and teachers of vocational agriculture are taking them out to the farmers and farm women. But all of our agricultural agencies need more trained workers to replace those that have been lost to the armed forces and to other activities. During the past year nearly a third of all the white teachers of vocational agriculture left their work. About a third of these went to the armed forces; about 30% went to other agricultural agencies, and strange to say, 9% of them went back to farming. Another alarming thing is that last year 60% of our newly-

SOUTHERN FARMS

trained teachers were taken directly into the armed forces. This year the decreased enrollments in the agricultural colleges indicate that there'll be only about 50% as many teachers available this year as there were last year in the South.

MR. STEETLE: Isn't the point there, Mr. Davenport, that our local boards might well consider what a key man is?

MR. DAVENPORT: Yes, that's very true, and there is some hope. General Hershey, director of the Selective Service System, has sent out a memorandum pointing out that there is a major shortage of vocational workers, and that their deferment should be seriously considered. At L.S.U. we are trying to help supply trained workers by speeding up our program of training, so that next year we will be turning out three groups instead of the usual one.

MR. SANDERS: As I understand it, local boards have the authority to defer individuals that are in key positions, and should keep in mind that there are key agricultural workers and key places on farms. One other thing that I'd like to ask about, Mr. Hoffsommer, is the agency that is trying to place this labor and get it to the place it's needed at the time it's needed.

MR. HOFFSOMMER: I suppose that the most important, the most interested, agency is the United States Employment Service. It has been functioning for some time, but it has been streamlined in the last year or so, and its powers and functions have been very greatly expanded, so that it can now render a very great service, I think, in placing labor where it is needed. The U. S. Employment Service also works very closely, as I understand it, with the W.P.A.; that is, before anyone is put on the W.P.A. rolls, he is also registered with the U. S. Employment Service, so that if anyone looking for labor goes to the Employment Service, the W.P.A. rolls are automatically canvassed for labor such as he is looking for. Then of course, there are several other organizations interested in one way or another

A WORLD AT WAR

in handling the labor situation. The Farm Security Administration is interested in several different ways, partly by stimulating its own clients to better production, and partly by establishing camps for handling migratory laborers.

MR. SANDERS: I wonder if part of our trouble may be due to wage rates on the farms. We can't even compete with industry as far as wages are concerned.

MR. WOODIN: I think the trouble's not going to be whether one group or another can keep labor; I think there's going to be a general labor shortage.

MR. SANDERS: I wonder, though, if it might not be necessary for farmers to pay more for their labor, and if it is necessary, how are they going to do it? How can they pay more than they have paid in the past?

MR. WOODIN: That gets over into the price question, among other things. The *Journal* of the Department of Agriculture has been interested in farm prices. It recognizes that the farmers are businessmen and have to produce the things most profitable to them. And by stimulating or discouraging production by using price, they are trying to get those things that we need. Price always has been, and probably always will be, one of the most important forces that will stimulate or discourage production. Because of a present scarcity we are attempting to stimulate production in some of the dairy products, such as eggs, and some of the various crops that go into fats and oils, like peanuts and soybeans and hogs. The recent price-control bill, which was primarily for the purpose of preventing run-away prices, establishes certain minimum prices. But it doesn't set maximums on some things, so that at present, prices for products like soybeans and peanuts have been set rather high in order to encourage production. We are expanding acreage all over, not only in the old peanut belt and the soybean sections, but even in Louisiana.

SOUTHERN FARMS

MR. SANDERS: Louisiana has been asked to plant 50,000 acres of peanuts this year. Last year it was about 1,000 acres.

MR. WOODIN: The same with soybeans. But on some products, the prices are being held down because we have adequate supplies for the present and for the immediate future, at least. Of things like wheat and cotton and tobacco the government holds large surpluses, and by its buying and selling activities in the market it can almost control the price. Cotton, for instance, is about 18¢ at the present time. Prices have been supported in the past with a loan of about 85% of parity, but since they have been rising, it is at least threatened that the government will step into the market and unload some of its cotton surplus to hold the prices down, if that's necessary. With tobacco and wheat they can do the same thing, because they do have a large government-held stock.

MR. SANDERS: Why is there so much emphasis on these oil-producing crops now? Where were we getting our vegetable oils?

MR. WOODIN: We were getting quite a bit of our supply from foreign sources. The next thing that's going to be cut off is cocoanut oil, which is important and has to be made up for. Then there are some minor oils that aren't extremely important, though the vitamins are great, such as tung oil and oils that went into paints. And in addition, some of our Allies—Great Britain, for instance—require lots of fats and oils, and their supplies have been curtailed considerably.

MR. SANDERS: There are other things which are scarce and which our farmers are having difficulties with. Fertilizer is one of them. It appears now that we will have adequate supplies of super-phosphate and potash, but there's an extreme shortage of all nitrates, the nitrogen-carrying fertilizers. Recently I talked to one dealer who received a shipment of just a little more than 46% of the nitrate of soda he received last year, and there's a

A WORLD AT WAR

mad scramble for it all over the state. Mixed fertilizers will probably be available in about the same quantities as last year. A good many of our farmers are also worrying about insecticides. The biggest problem there will be with the arsenicals. And in our section here in Louisiana that is the one in which we are the most interested. Calcium arsenate, and materials of that kind. There's another phase of this matter that has been quite interesting to me. Of course, we have been called the "Land of Cotton." And now there's a great deal of emphasis on poultry and eggs, beef, pork, sheep, and products of that kind. Do you think that this emphasis will have any permanent effects on our agriculture?

MR. WOODIN: I'm sure that some of these new enterprises will stay on a good many farms. I think that the extent to which they stay will depend on how well their prices hold up in the future compared with the prices of such things as cotton and sugar cane. If cotton acreage is held down permanently, then we'll be forced into something else, and maybe some of these new products will be a solution to that problem.

MR. HOFFSOMMER: I should like to comment on a further aspect of the labor problem. If a number of farm laborers go into defense industries in the villages and cities and stay there any length of time, the question arises whether they will be satisfied to go back to the farm, to their old jobs again.

MR. DAVENPORT: Isn't it a fact, too, that we can use our labor to better advantage on farms with livestock than on most one-crop farms?

MR. HOFFSOMMER: I think that's very true; it's part of the whole picture of the very uneven demand for labor which we have on our farms: 50,000 men needed in January and about the same number in July, whereas we need about 250,000 in the busiest month of May.

MR. STEETLE: In general, then, gentlemen, we find that if

SOUTHERN FARMS

the southern farm is to go through for victory, our manpower must be used carefully in order to achieve a maximum agricultural production. We have the problem here of the demand for farm labor, and of an irregular seasonal demand, with 50,000 needed at one time and perhaps 200,000 at another. There are several agencies at work on the problem, notably the U. S. Employment Service and the Farm Security Administration. There's a need for information on new crops as we plan crops which are somewhat different from the traditional southern ones, and this need for information must be met by a continuing supply of trained agricultural workers and teachers. There's the question of prices, and the forum seems in general agreement that price is a big stimulus to production; that while the farmer will produce out of patriotic fervor, he must have a fair living to allow him to exist while he is producing; that a change of crops might be encouraged by price control. Louisiana is attempting, for example, to increase the supply of peanuts for fats, and farmers will be encouraged to grow peanuts. There's a possibility of a shortage of materials; fertilizer was mentioned as being scarce, and particularly the nitrate fertilizers; mixed fertilizers can still be obtained. The forum discussed, shortly, the influence of war on southern agriculture, and I think the general idea came forth that perhaps a more diversified southern agriculture would result from our widening the traditional agricultural pattern of the South, but that, too, will depend on whether or not prices for new commodities are kept on levels that will encourage their production. In conclusion, we can also say that armies still move on their stomachs, and those who are concerned with agricultural production are definitely on the front line of defense and victory.

Industrialization: The Old South Fades

CONRAD ALBRIZIO

Assistant Professor of Fine Arts

PETER A. CARMICHAEL

Professor of Philosophy

JAMES B. TRANT

Dean of the College of Commerce

ROBERT PENN WARREN

Associate Professor of English

MR. STEETLE

MR. TRANT: The magnificent civilization which grew up in the South prior to the Civil War was characterized by romance and beauty, by wealth and brilliance, by splendor and kindness, by love and sincerity, by courage and gentleness, and by all those things which make life cultured, refined, artistic, and lovely. The wealth and the leisure which had made it possible were destroyed by the Civil War. But that conflict did not destroy the ideals or the memories of the South's gentle folk. Since the former glory had been built in an agricultural setting, they believed in the possible restoration at an early time of the splendor of the ante-bellum days.

But that was expecting too much. The South now had no capital with which to operate. Its principal industry was that of agriculture, the profitableness of which had been greatly reduced by the increased cost of operation. The shortage of capital made it impossible to develop other industries for a great many years. Toward the end of the last century, however, the

A WORLD AT WAR

industrial development of the South began, either from newly accumulated capital or from capital which flowed in from other sections of the country. In recent years the industrial development of the South has been given added momentum by favorable legislation, by tax exemption of the new industries, by proximity to raw materials, and by low cost of operation and maintenance as compared to those sections of the country with a harsher climate. This development has reached the point now where the South's wealth is no longer predominantly agricultural.

The value of manufactured products in the South in 1940 was more than twelve billion dollars. There were approximately thirty-nine thousand manufacturing establishments in the South. There were more than a million and three-quarter wage earners working in these manufacturing plants. The total wages amounted to more than a billion and a half dollars. This showed more than half a million increase in the number of wage earners since 1909, and showed more than a billion dollars increase in wages since that time. The cost of material, fuel, electric energy, and contract work was approximately 1.8 billion dollars in 1909 and 6.8 billion dollars in 1939. The value of products increased from slightly more than 3 billion in 1909 to slightly more than 11 billion in 1939, and the value added by manufacture increased from 1.3 billion in 1909 to 4.4 billion in 1939.

The rapid development of the recent years has come about as a result of a number of things.

1. A realization of the interdependence of agriculture and industry. This is particularly true in the South, where we produce a large quantity of surplus commodities which can be made profitable only by their sale either in foreign markets or at home. Many of these can be consumed only by a local market, which can be built only by the development of industry.

SOUTHERN INDUSTRY

Industry on the other hand can operate more economically in the South only by the production of adequate agricultural products to supply the raw materials and foodstuffs necessary to industry.

2. Recognition of the South's great opportunity as the gateway to foreign southern markets has given added impetus to the development of manufacturing. The South finds itself in the position of not only producing raw materials, but of manufacturing products for sale to neighboring countries in exchange for their surplus goods. The value of goods exported from the South almost doubled between 1900 and 1940, when the total exports amounted to more than 835 million dollars. Since 1900, imports from other countries to the South have increased from 52 million to 344 million, which is now less than half our exports. The development of rubber and tin in southern countries may make it possible for us to import much larger quantities of the things that are essential to war and pay for them with the surplus exports.

3. Research and technology. With the development of greater technological skills and with scientific and business research, the conversion of the raw materials, of the minerals of the South, has become of increasing importance. This is particularly true of the non-metallic minerals, with which the South is abundantly blessed, and the foreign supply of which has been greatly curtailed because of the war. The production of petroleum, sulphur, bauxite, lime, phosphate, limestone, glass, clays, stoneware, carbon black, natural gas, etc., and various plastics, has shown tremendous increases in the last few years. The war has greatly encouraged new construction, which has brought great development to the South. Construction in the South in 1940 amounted to one and one-half billion dollars. In 1941 the construction amounted to approximately three billion dollars.

The increased manufacturing, the increased markets, the in-

A WORLD AT WAR

creased production of minerals, and the increased construction together with an adequately expanding agricultural base to provide raw materials are restoring to the South its former wealth.

That, gentlemen, is the background and basis for this forum tonight. As to whether the picture as drawn is desirable or whether some other course would be better is the problem confronting us at this time.

MR. STEETLE: Mr. Warren, you have the look of a man who has something to say. Are you ready to chip in at this point?

MR. WARREN: Yes, I'll chip in at this point. Dean Trant, you're a professional and you have plenty of facts and figures on this matter, but we're not burdened by those, so we can approach it with entirely unprejudiced minds—unprejudiced information, that is. I don't want to begin with the end of your paper, but with the first paragraph, if I may say something about that. This wealth which made possible the love and sincerity, the courage and gentleness, was a colonial wealth, even then, I seem to recall from my slight reading in American history. We were always a colonial section, we fought a war under English colonialism, and then we fought a war against northern colonialism. We won the first, swapped the devil for the witch, and then fought against the witch. We're still fighting against the witch, to my mind. So later, we'll have to come back to colonialism again.

MR. STEETLE: Mr. Carmichael?

MR. CARMICHAEL: I see in the second paragraph a number of points which I think are very significant, but at this moment I would like to cite just one in particular, and that is the one, Dean Trant, where you speak of favorable legislation and more particularly of tax exemption for new industries. Now I wonder whether tax exemption is really the wisest policy. I'm acquainted slightly with the policy in one or two other states, particularly

SOUTHERN INDUSTRY

North Carolina, where they experimented with that fifteen or twenty years ago and after some five or ten years abandoned it, on the principle, I believe, that every industry ought to be able to pay its own way. Now, I wonder whether this tax exemption policy is the wisest that might have been adopted?

MR. TRANT: There are a great many significant factors that would have to be taken into consideration in connection with the whole program of building the South industrially, one of which is the unfavorable freight rate. This structure has been built up over a number of years. There are other sorts of legislation—the tariff policy—that have been favorable to northern industry rather than to southern development. When you take all of these factors together you come to a realization that if, with our enormous resources, we had industrial development, the wealth of the South would be tremendously increased. With this increase in wealth our people would be much more able to pay the taxes that they do have to pay. And this tax exemption program usually covers a period of five to ten years. Afterwards we are so much more able to pay taxes that it seems to me that we are more than benefited.

MR. ALBRIZIO: It seems to me that the balance is all on one side if we give industry tax exemption. Since we follow that up with favorable conditions, low cost of labor, and favorable climatic conditions, I don't see why industry needs a further inducement in the way of tax exemption to come down here. And, furthermore, just where does this so-called wealth go after the industry has created it? How much of it does remain in the South?

MR. WARREN: Yes, money is being made, but who's getting it?

MR. ALBRIZIO: Yeah!

MR. CARMICHAEL: May I offer a point in that connection? It seems to me very significant that right here in Louisiana, to take

A WORLD AT WAR

a local example, we sit on immense wealth—oil, I mean—but we don't own it, we don't possess it. It's true we do labor to get it out of the earth and treat it, turn it into kinds of products that are useful, salable, and all that, but it seems to me that the proceeds go elsewhere just as Mr. Albrizio says. For instance, we speak about a new pipe line from here to North Carolina. It seems to me we've had a whole network of pipe lines of different kinds going north and east for years. I mean pipe lines carrying dividends. Now it seems that there's something lacking if we have to send away the profits and are not able to hold them here. I wonder where the breach, the gap, is? Why don't we possess our own wealth?

MR. TRANT: To a very great extent, Mr. Carmichael, we do possess our own wealth. When our oil goes out, something else comes back in place of that oil or in payment for that. It may be machinery, it may be automobiles, it may be bicycles, it may be shoes, it may be flour, it may be any of the good things of life that we so much enjoy—

(Others all try to speak.)

MR. WARREN: They made me pay for my automobile!

MR. ALBRIZIO: And it cost a lot more to get it here than it costs to export the goods that these benefits supposedly come back on.

MR. TRANT: Gentlemen, if you examine the freight structure, you will find that it has been built up to provide a low rate for the export of raw materials from this part of the country, which was favorable to us when we were a raw producer completely. You will find that the rate on manufactured goods has been made low from the other parts of the country to the South or from the East, from the so-called northeast section to the South. We have low rates on our raw materials. Where the rate is unfavorable is that we have high rates on shipping out manufactured goods, which has prevented a further develop-

SOUTHERN INDUSTRY

ment in southern manufacturing. With reference to what we get, if you will look into the total amount of wages paid in the South to the people working here, you will find we get tremendous wealth. And those of you who get oil checks—regularly—on the production around town here should appreciate the fact that you are really getting yours.

MR. ALBRIZIO: A propos of that wealth, would you say that the chain stores, Sears-Roebuck, and all these chain stores, represent southern capital? And don't you think that the majority of the wage earners, the people employed in these new industries in the South, spend their money, the majority of it, at least, in these chain stores, and doesn't that find its way north again?

MR. STEETLE: Mr. Albrizio, no free commercials here! In the previous discussion, Mr. Carmichael brought up an interesting point. Who should take the initiative for exploiting the South's resources if outside capital doesn't take it? What do you have to say to that, Mr. Carmichael?

MR. CARMICHAEL: Why, I say, the South. I say southerners ought to do it. By that I don't mean some idealistic or fantastic conception or other; I mean something actual. We have sent north and elsewhere quite a number of people of inventiveness and originality, people who have become leaders in their various pursuits in other sections. Why is it that we have to send them away? Why can't we hold them here? Why don't we initiate our own industries? Why do we have to beg and lure people from elsewhere to come and start things here? Now, I don't want to take too much time on this particular point, but it seems to me there is a connection there with education in the South. Perhaps we'll return to that a bit later. What I have in mind here is this, that if we're to get the proceeds and not send them away—really getting the dividends is what I'm speaking about, not the machinery, etc.; that's all to the good, but it's the dividends I have in mind—if we're to get them, then we've got

A WORLD AT WAR

to possess the resources and we've got to exploit them ourselves and not get people to come in here and do that and take away all the profits.

MR. WARREN: May I break in at that point and read a few sentences from Mr. Benjamin Hendrick's inaugural address at the Southern Historical Association this year? On that point: "The articulate political people of the South are the businessmen. To them the press and professions are largely subservient. In maintaining their ascendancy they are greatly aided by all of the national associations. The policies promulgated by such organizations emanate largely if not entirely from the great centers of finance, capital, and imperialism. The burden of their propaganda is that the interests of all businessmen are parallel and identical with that of financiers. On a national scale the magazines, movies, and radio carry the propaganda of the vested interests into every nook and cranny of our land."

MR. TRANT: Gentlemen, in the early part of my paper I stated that the Civil War destroyed the wealth and leisure of the South; thus it became necessary that we obtain where we could the funds with which to develop our undeveloped raw resources. We have in general obtained those funds and the equipment on a very favorable basis, and it is nothing but fair that we pay the lenders a reasonable rate on their funds. By so doing we are developing the richest resources the world has ever known, we are obtaining from that our share as a general proposition, and we are in general accumulating enough to become the stockholders, the owners, of a great many of these enterprises. In one after another the ownership is purely local. Many of those that are national are owned by people from all over the country. A great many people here in Baton Rouge own shares of the companies to which you recently referred—as much so as people in any other section of the country. And one of the fine things in a great democracy like America is that

SOUTHERN INDUSTRY

people from all sections of the country can join in equally in providing the help that is necessary to any one group to develop those things that are most desirable in rebuilding their wealth.

MR. ALBRIZIO: It seems to me, Mr. Trant, that you are putting your emphasis on the material wealth of the South. And it seems to me that material wealth is only a kind of wealth, and I measure that by certain standards that are not achieved here. In other words, the South is exploiting some of its material wealth, but while so doing it cannot quite afford to support its talent. Its talent is exported. The best brains of the South, the most talented people of the South, must go elsewhere, in spite of this material wealth which you say is coming to the South.

MR. STEETLE: What can we do to keep those people in the South, Mr. Albrizio?

MR. ALBRIZIO: It would seem to me that if some of the other things were stressed—the culture that Mr. Trant spoke about in the beginning of this discussion, and the refinement, and the artistic element, and all those things that make life perhaps not luxurious, but more substantial—if the emphasis were placed more on that and not so much on material development, a person with creative ability, let us say—and I speak about creative ability very naturally, since my interest lies more in artistic things than material things—would be less likely to leave. There is a place for the creative element in the South, but all that creative element goes out of the South.

MR. TRANT: My emphasis is not intended to put the material ahead of the artistic, of the beautiful. In fact, I began my paper with the beautiful life of the old South. For many years after that had been destroyed we hoped, because of the refinement and culture and the lovely life that could be lived in the South, that we might restore somehow our prosperity and keep our people at home. After losing a great many to other sections of the country we came to a realization that it was necessary

A WORLD AT WAR

to develop the raw resources that had been going idle or to waste in the South. And we have used the best method that was at hand to get aid to develop these things so that we might keep our greatest artists, our greatest creative ability, our finest scholars, our finest musicians, our finest of everything. Along with this, in the past ten or fifteen years, the South has made tremendous strides in aid to educational institutions, in helping them to train its best young men so that they would not have to go elsewhere to school; there is still a great deal to be done in developing the finest educational facilities that could be had anywhere in the world, but it is my belief that we are headed in the right direction and that within a few more years you will find here in this great southland the finest universities that can be had, the greatest research departments, the greatest art departments, music departments, and all of these others. The thing that I'm emphasizing is not one but all. The thing that I believe is necessary to the happiness, to the refinement, to the welfare of the people, is the complete development of its manpower in all of their abilities as well as of the economic resources that are available.

MR. WARREN: Dean Trant, I believe that probably our colonial mentality in other aspects of our life is more vicious than our colonial mentality in our economic life. In education, for instance, we tend to tail a kite after the kite has been pulled to the ground elsewhere, and new kites have gone up. We trail by a kind of blind imitation of educational methods to a large extent; the pioneering of education is being carried on elsewhere while we are trying to catch up instead of doing our own pioneering.

MR. TRANT: Pioneering has developed in those countries which have developed their resources early. Those of us who because of poverty or destruction or disaster have had to wait to a later date have inevitably had to trail until we could catch

SOUTHERN INDUSTRY

up and move forward into greater grounds. In other words, we have to learn something of our elementary reader before we can read advanced literature.

MR. WARREN: I don't accept that analogy. I believe there have always been some intelligent people around, even if they were poor.

MR. TRANT: The question of intelligence has not been raised. The question of education is what we were talking about.

MR. WARREN: I don't think the intelligent people in general define our policies here.

MR. CARMICHAEL: May I?

MR. STEETLE: Go ahead, Mr. Carmichael.

MR. WARREN: I'll have to rest on that as a piece of dogma.

MR. CARMICHAEL: [*To Mr. Trant*] Now, you speak of a great new day in the near future. Now, I think that we have to admit, with regret, that perhaps we haven't the foremost institutions or the foremost provisions for art and education on all levels, etc. Now if it's not too much to ask, I wonder if you would say what is it that you expect to take place to cause us rather suddenly to catch up with other parts of the country in these respects?

MR. TRANT: These people whom you were talking about as going to other sections because of greater opportunities will remain in this section as the opportunities become sufficiently greater.

MR. CARMICHAEL: Well, what's going to hold them?

MR. TRANT: What's going to hold them will be the economic conditions that will enable the South to pay salaries, to offer living conditions, to offer luxuries, to offer leisure. That, you will find, that is going to take place through the integration or the balancing of agriculture and industry.

MR. ALBRIZIO: Yes, but the wealth doesn't remain here.

MR. TRANT: The wealth remains here as it remains any-

A WORLD AT WAR

where. Wealth is of two different forms. You may have wealth in a fixed form, in the form of factories which we keep here, wealth which grows here all the time. Wealth in the form of liquid capital flows from one section of the country to the other, depending on the interest rate, and flows without effort through our great banking and financial system. It is of no particular consequence whether it goes through the pushing of a button or through the debit-and-credit practice of the Federal Reserve System, or whether it is shipped.

MR. STEETLE: Gentlemen, can I pose this question: Is this war, in its effect on the South, going to increase the rate of industrialization? Is the demand for increased growing of farm products and a diversified agriculture going to neutralize that increased industrialization? What do you think are the immediate, and perhaps the long-range, effects of this present crisis on the southern pattern?

MR. TRANT: With regard to our resources in plastics and the non-metallic minerals, etc., I think you can expect the war period to develop them rapidly. They are necessary in a great deal of our aviation work and in our production of war materials. For instance, sulphur is produced in Texas and Louisiana, and that has had tremendous development, without regard to priorities or any such thing; it's actually met the needs, so far, the demands of the country as a whole and no doubt will continue to do so as long as we are able to extend production.

MR. ALBRIZIO: Mr. Trant, are you aware that where industry is heavy there are other kinds of evils which do not exist for the present in the South? If industry is developed down here to the extent that so many people hope it will be, what about the evils such as are found, let us say, in parts of West Virginia and Pennsylvania—the unions, and all that sort of thing?

MR. TRANT: Evils are not necessarily a matter of unions. Evils are not necessarily a matter of industry. Evils are not

SOUTHERN INDUSTRY

necessarily a matter of agriculture. Evils are primarily a matter of the ideals of the people, the religion, the finer things that communities build up, and that is dependent upon the direction given by the leaders of the community, no matter what particular group they may come from.

MR. CARMICHAEL: Would you say that some evil is at work, then, to cause the labor troubles that we have in the South, even in respect to legislation? I notice that in a neighboring state—I guess I'd better not name it; it's close by, directly to the east—they're passing a law restricting labor, for example, stopping picketing. Now, I don't know whether picketing is the right thing or not. But in the same place they expelled a woman, I understand, of position, of refinement, etc., a lady such as you were no doubt contemplating in your opening remarks here; some years ago they drove her out of the state two or three times. Now she was a person trying to do something for the good of labor and I should say for society in the state. Are we behind the times, or are we wrong, or are we, to use your word there, are we somehow a bit evil in our labor policies in the South?

MR. TRANT: That was not my word; that was Mr. Albrizio's thought with reference to these various organizations. I don't think they're evil, myself.

MR. ALBRIZIO: I say evil because even up North where these industries are highly developed, this culture, this refinement that you're talking about and that the South had at one time is in a great many places sorely lacking. So if it can't be found where industry is heaviest, why do we hope to achieve culture and refinement by bringing industry down here?

MR. STEETLE: Isn't there a place for us to do some long-range planning if this industrialization and its attendant circumstances are coming upon us? Isn't there room for a planned program

A WORLD AT WAR

to take advantage of it so as to integrate it into the South for the benefit of the South?

MR. WARREN: There ought to be. The South's got two wars, I believe—one against Hitler and Japan and one against Mr. X.

MR. TRANT: Mr. X might be some peculiar something that I don't happen to know anything about. I do know that it takes wealth, it takes leisure, to produce the culture and refinement that we're all so much interested in, and I do know that it can not be had unless we develop the resources that we have.

MR. STREETLE: Well, thank you, gentlemen. In summing up the numerous ideas expressed in this forum we can include the point that the South's wealth is now more strongly industrial, as Mr. Trant's figures go to show; that change has come about as a result of several factors: realization of the interdependence of agriculture and industry, recognition of the South as a gateway to Latin American markets, and research developing the uses of non-metallic southern minerals. The point has been stressed here that the South partakes somewhat of the quality of a colony, and that, to avoid sending our wealth out, we need to do some planning to utilize our ideas and our minds and our own capital. In keeping with that, the point was stressed that we should not export all our scholars, all our trained men, but should keep them in the South when we can, and make the South attractive enough to keep them here. And another point that was brought up—I thought it was timely—is that war will accelerate these developments in our region, and it might be well for us to do some planning for a bigger and better, and, Mr. Albrizio, more cultured South.

V

THE ARTS AND THE SCIENCES

War and the Scientist

W. RIGELEY EDWARDS

Professor of Chemistry

MAX GOODRICH

Assistant Professor of Physics

JULIAN C. MILLER

Research Professor of Horticulture

ALLAN J. STANLEY

Assistant Professor of Zoology

MR. STEETLE

MR. STANLEY: Our subject has probably in some form or another been one of the chief topics of discussion among all groups of people for the past twenty years. We began hearing about science and its destructive powers even before we entered the World War in 1918. During the past twenty years it has been said by someone that the strides of scientific discovery have been so great and scientific research has caught the imagination of so many of the younger inquiring minds, that other fields of human endeavor have not attracted their fair share of thinkers and workers. This one-sided development might with all fairness be said to be responsible for the position in which philosophy, theology, letters, and the social sciences found themselves at the outbreak of the present war in 1939. Minds that perhaps should better have been trained in these disciplines for the sake of a better balance in the fields of learning were attracted to the sciences, and once wedded to them, forgot to a great extent that the others existed at all. We, as scientists, have been assailed rather bitterly of late for having forsaken our obligations to the social order by our lack of understanding

A WORLD AT WAR

of and interest in the other fields of human thought and activity. We are accused, among others, of the sin of permitting our political system and educational institutions to fall into the hands of unscrupulous men whose chief quest was and still is for power alone. We have failed as scientists, we are told, for not pointing the way out of our economic difficulties, which we, through the advance of technology and invention, have been instrumental in creating. We are further accused of contributing to the delinquency of morals and ethics by refusing to be interested in our full duties as citizens and teachers of the young. To what extent these evils of our time are truly the fault of the scientists, I cannot attempt to state. Many able men of science do not believe that we are to blame at all. "The principles of science, and their application to modern technology," say the men of science, "constitute one of our great contributions to modern culture." Our critics complain that this is an age of gadgets; that the real values of life—honesty, justice, the love of truth, in short, the building of character—have been no concern of ours. They say these things of the spirit have been forsaken to the extent that science and pseudo-science have been embraced. Norman Purser, writing in *The American Scholar*, said, "I do not see how anyone can wilfully reject the rational spirit of science," as he paid tribute to the simple honesty of science, its wholesome doubt, its boundless curiosity, its passion for knowledge, its patient accumulation of evidence, and its strict method. Professor B. R. Lindsey, of the Physics Department of Brown University, says that our critics have been guilty of the fallacy of unwarranted personification. He points out that the evils of the age are the results of the failures of all men everywhere, in all walks of life. The contributions of science, he says, have been used and are being used by wicked men to accomplish their aim of enslaving the human race, but we in turn shall have to use them in order to keep men free. Many

WAR AND THE SCIENTIST

other thinkers of our time, among them some of our leading scientists, are thoroughly convinced that we are on the brink of another dark age, which by the end of the war will be upon us as certainly as time passes. Mr. H. G. Wells, at a recent meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, said that unless man adapted himself to the cataclysmic changes he is now facing, he might become extinct. There is no question of man's remaining as he is. The question is whether he can adapt himself with sufficient rapidity to become a progressive ascending species, or one of a series of degenerating sub-human species, or whether he will fail to adapt himself and end altogether. The record of the past, Mr. Wells concludes, is on the whole against the idea of any survival whatever of the human strain. A leading American professor of philosophy recently has made the statement that the new dark ages are already here. Whether this pessimism is completely warranted, only time will tell. Certainly many of our scientists do not feel that way. On the contrary, says Mr. Bruce Bliven, after extensive interviews with the outstanding research scientists in the United States, Nobel Prize winners, heads of departments in leading universities, and research directors for big industries, "On the contrary, the scientists are optimistic, markedly more so than any other group in the country. They think that mankind is on the threshold of a new and better existence. They feel, for example, that most wars have been caused by the struggle for natural resources, many of which we are now able to produce artificially in the laboratory. It is always stupid for men to kill each other, but it becomes doubly foolish when they do so for things that they can abundantly obtain in other ways." Thus wrote Mr. Bliven in 1940. Today, we are actually at war. A great many problems are facing us now. We must win the war, and, as scientists, we want to do everything in our power to help in the gigantic task. Pure science in some way

A WORLD AT WAR

must also be kept alive, and we must have something to say about the peace that will be established after the war is over.

MR. STEETLE: Well, Mr. Stanley, you have placed some interesting questions before us, and I think that the forum might well be guided in its discussion by three questions based on your introduction; first of all, how can a scientist best serve in the war effort? second, what is the scientist's responsibility in the utilization of his discoveries for the good of mankind, in maintaining a system under which free scientific enterprise may be pursued? and third, what is the scientist's view of the peace that should follow the war? To go back to that first one, how can a scientist best serve in the war effort? Mr. Edwards, would you like to tell us something about what is being done and perhaps should be done?

MR. EDWARDS: We might consider first the contributions that science has already made to the war effort. In this war, as never before, the vital nature of materials other than weapons is becoming generally realized—materials essential for such things as nutrition, clothing, medicine, fertilizers, means of transportation, and so on. We are all acutely conscious at the present time of the fact that we are completely, or very nearly completely, cut off from the products of eastern Asia—rubber, camphor, quinine, silk, and a number of other things. But past scientific discoveries have equipped us with good synthetic rubber, with a good possibility of making synthetic camphor, with substitutes for quinine that in some respects are perhaps to be preferred to it, and with a great variety of silk substitutes. Past research has given us the entire group of sulfanilamide drugs which are even more useful perhaps in military medicine, in curing wounds, than they are in general practice. Past research has given us high-compression motor-fuels which are probably not equalled by those of any of the nations that stand against us at the present time. I'd like to point out that every one of

WAR AND THE SCIENTIST

these discoveries has utilized knowledge developed by research which, when it was first reported, would have been regarded as impractical. In such developments as I have mentioned, as a rule there will be fifty or one hundred of these impractical discoveries laying the foundation for every obviously practical discovery that comes later. I imagine, Mr. Goodrich, that the history of the development of radio furnishes an outstanding example of the same thing, doesn't it?

MR. GOODRICH: That's quite true, Mr. Edwards. We might, for example, point out some of the very recent developments. Take the so-called radio locator, which is a device for locating airplanes some distance away. That device, you will remember, was employed at Pearl Harbor, or should have been employed at Pearl Harbor; you remember that when the boy who was reading the instrument reported, his work was not followed up.

MR. EDWARDS: No fault of the instrument.

MR. GOODRICH: No fault of the instrument or of the men who developed it. Of course it doesn't end there. Detection devices have been developed over a period of years, and of course are in the rapid state of development at the present time—detecting devices for magnetic mines, and methods of handling them once they are found. All of these things really represent the excursions of the pure scientists, I would say, into applied science. A physicist is usually thought of as a pure scientist. And I think we ought to recognize that the applied scientist, or the made-over applied scientist, is the man who is developing something right now for use in our war effort. What would you say about that, Mr. Miller?

MR. MILLER: Industry at the present time is doing a great deal to promote research in the applied field. The war itself has given a big impetus to the development of research in all phases of war effort—in foods, for instance. Most recently, since the shortage of tin, the research industry has been taxed to find

A WORLD AT WAR

ways and means of preserving food to ship to our allies and our soldiers abroad. You might be interested—you've heard Mr. Edwards state some of the things that have been accomplished—to know just how much private industry has been giving to research. Over 250,000,000 dollars annually is being spent for research by private industry, or more than five times as much as state and federal institutions combined. Another comparison might be that such institutions are only spending one-half of one percent of the national income for research. What do you think of that, Mr. Stanley?

MR. STANLEY: Do you think that there might be some danger that pure science is going to be given a severe set-back now that the war is on and that we are spending so much of our time in applied science? Which, of course, we have to realize that we must do; but do you think that there is a possibility that we might, as a body of scientists, more effectively impress people with the need for pure science keeping on in every one of its details possible?

MR. STEETLE: I'd like to throw this in—what is "pure science"?

[*General hesitation.*]

MR. MILLER: Mr. Goodrich?

MR. GOODRICH: Well, you give me a subject of some broadness. I would say that the "pure scientist" as distinguished from the "applied scientist" is one who is investigating a part of our experience primarily for the sake of satisfying his curiosity. Incidentally, of course, it works out almost universally that this results in the good of mankind. The ball has to be taken up by the applied scientist, and he carries it on from the various developments in pure science. For instance, the radio which we spoke of a little bit ago; it's well known that the theory of radio was developed way back in the nineteenth century by the famous physicists Maxwell and Faraday, yet they had no thought

WAR AND THE SCIENTIST

of using it in the way we're using it today. It took an applied scientist to make that development.

MR. MILLER: Don't you think that scientists as a whole have freed men's minds of many superstitions and ignorances? Ignorance that has bothered mankind for centuries?

MR. GOODRICH: Without doubt that's true. Some have said, however, that we have replaced such things by a new mysticism of science, which is something we still have to conquer.

MR. EDWARDS: Well, that mysticism, I would say, doesn't belong in the body of science itself. There's a misconception there that we might discuss at this time—it really ties in with one of our announced subjects: the question as to whether science has an obligation to promote political and sociological improvements, and whether it's responsible, practically speaking, for everything that takes place on the surface of the earth. Now to me that's a mistaken conception. Science, as I see it, is not a complete way of life; it's a method of approach to a knowledge of material things. As long as it sticks to that, it's supreme, but when it gets outside of its element it gets confused, and the scientists who try to get outside of their element flounder around in a rather grotesque way.

MR. GOODRICH: I think we ought to recognize, Mr. Edwards, that what we're really feeling is that while the scientists as such, or science as such, is not concerned primarily with such things as good or evil, or rather, truth or untruth, yet scientists, as men, of course, must be interested in good or bad.

MR. EDWARDS: Yes, but the scientist no more than any other citizen.

MR. GOODRICH: No, except insofar as the scientist probably has a stronger tool at his command than a great many other people; in that sense, his personal responsibility is no doubt greater.

A WORLD AT WAR

MR. EDWARDS: I may be wrong, but I think Mr. Stanley has somewhat different opinions on that subject.

MR. STANLEY: Well, I have the feeling, of course, that a wicked man might very well take over almost anything that's been discovered by science and use it for his own ends; likewise, a good man might come along and take the same thing and use it for the good of humanity. It seems to me that the obligation to make men good is probably not in the realm of science; in fact, I don't think that science can make men good; something else has to come in to do that, to determine how they are going to behave.

MR. MILLER: I believe that scientific work in an epidemic of disease provides a good example of the function of science; an epidemic may be due to ignorance, ignorance of fact, ignorance in the medical profession. Well, as I see it, we need greater knowledge, more scientific work rather than any decrease. As a result of the war, we need more scientific work in order to answer the questions that we have to face now and will have to face after the war.

MR. STANLEY: One thing that we've certainly got to keep in mind is this: That if science is to live, freedom has got to be kept alive—and of course that is the immediate purpose of this war. It seems to me that the British Association for the Advancement of Science advanced some rather good ideas at their meeting last fall. Among the things said were these: that for the world of tomorrow, scientists must concern themselves with the establishment of some kind of a world order wherein the liberty to learn and the opportunity to teach and the power to understand are permitted to exist. That's absolutely necessary for the extension of knowledge, and we as men of science maintain that they cannot be sacrificed without the degradation of human life. Since all communities depend for their existence, survival, and advancement on the knowledge of themselves and

WAR AND THE SCIENTIST

the properties of the things in the world around them, all nations and all classes of society have contributed something to the knowledge and utilization of natural resources, and to the understanding of the influence that they exercise on human development. The achievement of these ends depends on independence combined with cooperation and is influenced by the progressive needs of humanity. Men of science are among the trustees of each generation's inheritance of natural knowledge, and they are bound, therefore, to foster and increase that heritage by faithful guardianship and service through high ideals. All groups of scientific workers are united by the fellowship, the commonwealth, of science, which has the world for its province and the discovery of truth as its highest aim. The pursuit of scientific inquiry demands complete intellectual freedom and unrestricted international exchange of knowledge, and it can flourish only through the unfettered development of civilized life.

MR. STEETLE: That "unrestricted exchange of knowledge" that you mention reminds me of a statement I read or heard somewhere that British and German astronomers are still exchanging scientific information. It seems to me that that might be a point of discussion here; the existence of a scientific exchange in a world where a political exchange of ideas is no longer possible.

MR. STANLEY: Certainly that must be considered when we discuss the peace that should follow the war. Some kind of peace should be established so that all peoples can exchange ideas freely; for instance, we can't have one section of the world shut off so completely from the others that it does not know what the other parts of the world are doing. And for science to exist at all, men have to exchange those ideas freely. I have read somewhere that Russia has recently established a large scientific laboratory for the study of the inheritance of condi-

A WORLD AT WAR

tioned reflexes. Modern biologists, of course, would merely laugh at this sort of thing, because it seems so preposterous; it may be due to the political boundaries which Russia has set up around herself, which have excluded the free exchange of opinion with other workers throughout the world.

MR. GOODRICH: Don't you think that if we had a thousand times as many people thoroughly aware of the scientific method, it might make some difference? For instance, we have a great many people today who are interested in science only in a superficial way. It reminds me of a story about a student who wanted to continue the devotions that he had learned; so he tacked up on the foot of his bed the Lord's Prayer. Each morning, when he got up, he saluted the little document and said, "O. K., Lord, them's my sentiments."

MR. EDWARDS: There's no doubt about it that modern warfare demands of scientific educators something more than one or two inventors in a generation who'll produce a devastating weapon or some similar outstanding invention. It demands thousands of well-trained men and women of ordinary intelligence to employ scientific tools on a large scale. Someone has said that scientifically-trained college-graduates are vital and strategic war material. If the training of such men and women stops, the shortage is going to be felt immediately, and not at some future time. That's true in peace time; it's probably more true in time of war.

MR. GOODRICH: I'm reminded that just today I heard that Harvard is asking, hunting, combing the country for forty more teachers of electronics and electricity in connection with the national war effort.

MR. MILLER: Speaking of facts, don't you think that if, when peace comes, we'd use the actual facts we have, that would help to bring about an honest peace, an honest settlement of world conditions?

WAR AND THE SCIENTIST

MR. EDWARDS: It is very possibly true that scientific training develops an attitude that respects facts—facts that can be demonstrated, that can be studied impartially, rather than opinions loudly stated.

MR. STANLEY: Perhaps I am getting over into the field of philosophy just a little bit, but it seems to me that something must be done about the Genus Homo to make him a little better kind of person before these facts are going to be very convincing to him, Mr. Miller.

MR. MILLER: Well, don't you believe, that for the last twenty years, particularly, more scientific training has been given, even to high-school students?

MR. GOODRICH: I'm inclined to take exception to that in some fields, Mr. Miller. I've just heard, for instance, that the Army is complaining quite bitterly about its reserve officers' not knowing any mathematics any more. I know, also, that there are certain trends in the physical sciences which are rather bad from our point of view. There are less physics and less chemistry actually taught in the high school; consequently we get students who are less prepared to go on in the university.

MR. EDWARDS: Well, you can't get away from fashions in education, just as you have fashions in everything else.

MR. GOODRICH: I believe that we may be getting a change in educational fashion since the war.

MR. STANLEY: Possibly the war's calling to our attention the fact that we have to know something in order to deal with the applied sciences; that is, we have to know something about mathematics, about physics. Certainly physics is going to play a larger and larger role in our every-day living.

MR. STEETLE: The point, gentlemen, that you touched upon a while ago is the question of the scientist's responsibility for his discovery. I think we hurried over that a little bit, and I'd like you, if you will, to go back into it. Take the man who dis-

A WORLD AT WAR

covered gunpowder; was it his responsibility, if that discovery was inherently a bad one, to control the uses of that discovery, or is that the problem of the people who come after him and use it?

MR. EDWARDS: I'll lead off in answering that, because my opinion can be stated briefly: I don't think it's his responsibility at all. I think that it's a responsibility that's rather artificially forced on the scientist.

MR. GOODRICH: Of course, I would take exception to saying that gunpowder was bad. Think of the many cases in which gunpowder is very useful. How would you clear a field of stumps without dynamite?

MR. EDWARDS: There's something in that; the antidote for almost all evil is scientific invention: we developed war gases, and then we developed scientifically-produced gas masks, and so it goes.

MR. STANLEY: You don't seem to think, then, that there's very much chance for the scientist to try to make better men out of people?

MR. EDWARDS: When he says, "Because I'm a scientist, I can tell men what they ought to think and do, and how they ought to worship, and how they ought to vote, and how they ought to do a lot of other things," then I think he's being foolish. That's not a new idea. Aesop wrote a fable on it a long time ago.

MR. MILLER: Don't you believe, though, that most scientists would like to see the results of their endeavors, the good of their endeavors, transmitted, you might say, to the well-being of mankind?

MR. EDWARDS: Oh, yes, so would almost any individual.

MR. GOODRICH: That's generally true of people. On the other hand, we have a certain, I imagine rather constant, percentage of people of whom that isn't true, and there's no doubt

WAR AND THE SCIENTIST

a certain percentage of the scientists who would be willing to prostitute their science for their own ends, or for some end that is not good for society.

MR. EDWARDS: We see so often a man who is eminent in one field shoved by his well-meaning friends into some other responsibility that he is not qualified for. We see wealthy meat-packers being elevated into diplomats and showing, when they function in that capacity, that they ought to have stuck to their pork-butchery. We see a general who wins a battle, and is elected a President or a Governor, and so on, and usually his reputation suffers. There's not much gained by assuming that the scientist is the man who knows it all.

MR. GOODRICH: It was pointed out in the article of Professor Lindsey's which Mr. Stanley quoted a little while earlier, that . . .

MR. STANLEY: That the method of science has not got over very far into the thinking of the people.

MR. GOODRICH: He made that point very strongly, I thought—that the reason why we have the paradox of great scientific achievement, and yet no great development of mankind as yet in the direction of good, is because we haven't really developed enough people in this direction.

MR. STEETLE: In summarizing, then, gentlemen, our answers to the questions we posed for discussion, "How can the scientist best serve in the war effort?" "What is he doing?" we see that science is developing substitutes for materials that we can no longer have, such as rubber, camphor, and silk. Even drugs, such as quinine, are being replaced by substitutes. The scientist contributes to the war effort in the development of such things as the radio-detector, which is really a result of pure science, yet of pure science being applied. There's a problem in preserving pure science in time of war because the demand seems to be largely for applied science. But we shouldn't lose the freedom of approach allowed by the definition of pure science. Per-

A WORLD AT WAR

haps our institutions of higher learning should accept the responsibility for the preservation of pure science. Scientists are interested in having a world in which men are free to experiment and learn; that's true not only of the scientist, but of the rest of us that live in that world, too. Scientists are interested in the development of the scientific point of view, the scientific way of thinking is much to be desired, the study of facts is always to be desired. The scientists feel somewhat divided, judging by tonight's forum, on whether or not the man and the scientist can be separated, whether or not the scientist has the responsibility for his discoveries; in general, I think the theme can be stated that as a scientist he is a scientist, and as a man, if he's a good man or a bad man, he's still a good man or a bad man.

The Artist in Wartime

PETER A. CARMICHAEL

Professor of Philosophy

EDWARD R. OTT

Assistant Professor of History

RICHARD VALENTE

Instructor in Musicology

RALPH L. WICKISER

Assistant Professor of Fine Arts

MR. STEETLE

MR. WICKISER: The topic, The Artist in Wartime, is very general. To make the symposium specific, we would like to discuss three pertinent questions. First, is the artist a product of the social forces of his time? Second, does the war definitely affect the creative ability of the artist? Third, can the artist pursue the same aims in time of war? In this discussion, the term "artist" is meant to include all creative artists, such as poet, painter, actor, sculptor, dancer, and musician. Now, to proceed with the discussion, I shall re-state the first question: Is the artist a product of the social forces of his time?

MR. STEETLE: Well, Valente, when we were having lunch the other day, it seems to me that you had some things to say about this particular topic. How about it?

MR. VALENTE: Well, yes. And what I had to say didn't seem to be true to anyone else.

MR. STEETLE: That's good, then.

MR. VALENTE: But in any case, I'm quite convinced that the artist, though I shouldn't say he's a product, or at least not a product merely of the social forces of his time, is certainly, as a

A WORLD AT WAR

personality, conditioned by the social forces of his time. Therefore, in the expression of his personality, or, if you want to use the term which Mr. Carmichael is fond of, "lyric intuition," his intuition would be conditioned by the social forces of his time. And so I do maintain the affirmative of that question.

MR. CARMICHAEL: Well, I should like to ask how the influence is exerted there. How is it that social forces or any other extraneous forces get entrance into the intuitive side of the artist?

MR. VALENTE: It seems to me perfectly obvious if you grant, with me, that the personality of the artist is what registers the qualities and the faults which create impressions in a work of art. Then it's perfectly obvious that the personality of the artist, just like the personality of anyone, is modeled and controlled by the social forces of his time.

MR. WICKISER: It seems to me, Mr. Valente, that what you say is perfectly true, that the artist is conditioned, more or less, by society, but I believe that the creative artist is one who is a leader, both in his intuition and in his thinking, and, therefore, he has the ability to rise above any adverse social force.

MR. VALENTE: If he rises above social forces, he is reacting, nevertheless, to social forces. I don't follow you there at all. Will you elaborate that, please?

MR. WICKISER: I would maintain that the social forces that you are speaking of would have either a positive or negative influence.

MR. VALENTE: Everything is positive or negative. I still don't follow you, and I don't see the difficulty.

MR. CARMICHAEL: May I? How is it that artists differ so widely when they are in the same environment?

MR. VALENTE: Because there are any number of social forces in any given society. For that matter, you could have twins in the same household, apparently in the same environment, and

THE ARTIST IN WARTIME

since their personalities differed, they'd react differently to these forces. I'm not stating, of course, that the artist doesn't have certain personal qualities. To begin with, he must have certain qualities. Well, that's obvious; otherwise I wouldn't use the term "artist." There's something positive, to begin with, but I'm saying the artist is conditioned by the social forces of his time.

MR. STEETLE: Mr. Ott, this is a free-for-all; so feel perfectly free to join right in here.

MR. OTT: I should like to point out that what Mr. Valente has to say looks a little more true on the surface than perhaps it does on a little careful examination. If it were true that people were conditioned so strongly as we are led to believe by life outside of them, why don't they all fall into the same pattern? Why do not all painters paint after the same pattern after they have gone through a depression or upon emerging from a war? Yet we find that apparently the differences of the individual are much more powerful than the pressure that society can bring to bear upon these outstanding individuals.

MR. WICKISER: That seems to me, Mr. Ott, to be a more logical solution to the question of just how much the artist leads in society. It seems to me that all of the really great creative thinkers are leaders in society, and if they are conditioned by society, it may be a minor conditioning, and not a conditioning of forces entering into a certain pattern of thought or action.

MR. VALENTE: But it's the very social conditions which I am discussing which make the social attitude of this artist as it's represented in his painting or his music; these very social forces are what give him his leadership. In other words, the leader, to my mind, is a person who is extremely sensitive to his social currents; and, as a vigorous, energetic individual, acts positively in relation to his society, and that makes him a leader.

MR. STEETLE: Would you say, Mr. Valente, that the facts

A WORLD AT WAR

about many of our great composers—the three B's, for example, came from one period—would be substantiation for your argument?

MR. VALENTE: No, I don't think it is substantiation. As a matter of fact, I think too much is made of the great three B's. I think that the three B's, viewed from a broader historical perspective, are not by any means so great, but I don't see that that necessarily follows. I think that the character of the work of each of those three B's is different, one from the other, because their social backgrounds were different, however. It's true that Brahms was a romantic; well, he lived in a bourgeois community, civilization, and he expressed a bourgeois art.

MR. WICKISER: On the other hand, Michaelangelo lived in an age that was very ornate in design, and yet he rose above that by the very power of his personality. Mr. Carmichael, what do you think about such individuals?

MR. CARMICHAEL: I think this: that many of the greatest artists have worked in retirement, in withdrawal from society. Take, for example, Cézanne, who sequestered himself in the country there, and yet produced great work. As a matter of fact, I should like to say a word or two here about the ivory-tower conception; I think that's been grossly misapprehended and maligned; it has justification. A great artist does live in an ivory tower, as do many other great individuals, and not out in the public; he's not just a sort of reflection or echo of other men, but he's a man himself. Otherwise, you wouldn't give attention to him.

MR. VALENTE: I think there's a confusion here—

MR. CARMICHAEL: I agree with you.

MR. VALENTE: I meant that the confusion is on the part of all three of you—

MR. CARMICHAEL: I thought it was all around. [*General laughter.*]

THE ARTIST IN WARTIME

MR. VALENTE: Now that we've got through with these urbanities, I'd like to point out that the artist as a recluse is by no means working in a social vacuum. Even the neurotic, a man like Kafka, is still reacting, you might say, negatively, to a social condition.

MR. CARMICHAEL: You don't think that a painter or a poet could make his subject anything non-social, then?

MR. VALENTE: Well, what would you—what do you mean by non-social?

MR. CARMICHAEL: The stars are a pretty good subject.

MR. VALENTE: What's that?

MR. CARMICHAEL: The stars, for example.

MR. VALENTE: Yes, but his attitude toward the stars is conditioned by society. An Indian and a Chinese and a Renaissance Italian are going to paint three different impressions of a star. It's culture again; your impression.

MR. CARMICHAEL: Yes, you say different impressions, but you think that the difference all traces back to some social fabric or source.

MR. VALENTE: Not all of it, no.

MR. CARMICHAEL: That might be, but let's get some evidence for it, some specific kinds of—

MR. VALENTE: Well, it seems to me that in every period we find a basic unity in styles, though you have degrees of differences, so that we can speak of a Rococo period, a Baroque period. That in itself is sufficient evidence—

MR. WICKISER: Mr. Ott, what do you think about the second question? Does war definitely affect the creative ability of the artist?

MR. OTT: I think that it can be shown that war does affect his creative ability, because it takes him out of the realm of a normal work of art. He finds himself in a position where he must cooperate in the war effort, or he must bear arms; it's a

A WORLD AT WAR

period in which he cannot create. The fact that he is an artist implies a creation of some sort, but he is denied the right to create during wartime. The fact that periods following a war are usually sterile periods as far as artistic production is concerned, is evidence of the fact that war does very seriously limit the work of an artist.

MR. CARMICHAEL: You think he can't create while he's out there on the battlefield, or perhaps recuperating from being blown up a time or two, maybe, or lying in a cell somewhere as a prisoner. Couldn't he create then?

MR. OTT: Yes, he could create, but most of them don't.

MR. WICKISER: It seems to me, Mr. Carmichael, that there's a good point there. George Grosz, the German painter, was drawing at the same time he was at the battlefield, drawing very satirical, caustic cartoons about the German regime. And they were so bitter that he was ostracized from Germany for those drawings that he made, his ideas being gleaned at the front.

MR. OTT: If being ostracized from Germany is the mark of an artist, the world is full of them. [*General laughter.*]

MR. CARMICHAEL: But there have been many examples of Germany in the past, that is, in this respect. Many artists have been ostracized, of course, and many of them barely make a living.

MR. VALENTE: I think the facts substantiate Mr. Ott's point of view. I think in recent wars there has actually been relatively little artistic production. Just why that's so—whether it's merely the effect of the war, of war conditions on the artist, of the loss of opportunity to work, or of lack of audience—I don't know; that's a difficult question. But I certainly think that the facts point to that as a correct statement.

MR. OTT: The argument is brought forward sometimes in the case of Diego Rivera—and here I'm going to steal one of Mr.

THE ARTIST IN WARTIME

Wickiser's arguments before he has a chance to present it—that he was able to do very fine murals in a Mexico in which war was an almost constant state of affairs. In Mexico, it should be pointed out, warfare for many years was endemic rather than epidemic, and he was just merely living in what was the normal life of Mexico, and his work to a large extent does reflect that.

MR. WICKISER: It seems to me, Mr. Ott, that the artist doesn't have to spend sixteen or eighteen hours a day on his creative activities. If he shoulders a gun all day long, he still has two or three hours at night in which he can pursue his creative activities, and I think that's being done more or less now in many of the camps. I don't see how his creative ability can be impaired at all, but the fact is that his time is limited. He can spend less of it on creative work.

MR. OTT: I am inclined to believe that it does affect his ability rather seriously, that it retards it, that it cuts down his production, and that it affects the nature of his work. It may affect that very seriously, as it did in the case of Mr. Grosz.

MR. STEETLE: Would it affect the work of the artist any more than it would affect the work of any other occupation or profession? Is the artist different from other men? I think, somehow, we might clarify that a little bit.

MR. WICKISER: If he is different, it's probably because he doesn't get paid.

MR. CARMICHAEL: Yes, but the thing he creates from, the gift by virtue of which he does create, is rather different from that by which a man sells goods, maybe, don't you think?

MR. WICKISER: In all probability, yes, but his special aptitudes may often take him away from the group and may mean a certain period of concentration, as for a research worker in science.

MR. CARMICHAEL: In other words, the distinguishing mark of an artist is something inward, something with perhaps a

A WORLD AT WAR

spiritual character, a purely creative character, and that is not directly affected by these external conditions, always, or so extensively as we sometimes suppose.

MR. WICKISER: I'd certainly agree with that point of view. Now in attacking the third question, should the artist pursue the same aims in time of war: Mr. Valente, I think that you have decided opinions on that topic.

MR. VALENTE: Well, I'm not so sure that I have a very decided opinion. I think that the question—the implied question—here is, should the artist become a propagandist? That seems to be the only difficulty here, because what the artist actually will pursue as a man in time of war is very largely contingent on the draft board. But whether or not the artist should direct his activities toward propaganda is another matter, and I'm by no means certain whether I'm really clear on the notion of propaganda. I've come to the conclusion, perhaps, that we might define propaganda as a conscious use of art, or a use of art to consciously—pardon the split infinitive—advance the truth of some organization, whether it's religious or something else; in the broader sense, all art may be considered propaganda. But I think in the sense we're using it now, we mean using art to advance some political or other organizational idea, such as the religious idea. And I don't see, really, why the artist shouldn't devote himself to advancing the notion that democracy is a very fine thing and worth defending, consciously doing that. Insofar as he does that, he will be pursuing the same aims in time of war as he does in time of peace; and if he's not a democrat and he doesn't believe in it, why, I still think that he should try to make himself believe in it at the very least.

MR. CARMICHAEL: How about the meaning of the word *should* here? Does that refer to some moral obligation that he has, that takes precedence over his function or occupation as an artist?

THE ARTIST IN WARTIME

MR. WICKISER: Well, don't you think that the war definitely changes the position that the artist finds himself in?

MR. CARMICHAEL: Oh, to a great extent, yes, but I think that he's on the same footing as other men with respect to his obligations as a citizen. And I don't suppose there's any question as to whether he should or should not perform his duties as a citizen there.

MR. WICKISER: In this recent situation some of the Hollywood actors have been found exempt because they are found to be vital to national morale.

MR. OTT: If one wants to extend the concept of creative ability to include Hollywood, I suppose that can be done. But it seems to me that the object of the artist, and this is a layman's viewpoint, is to achieve perfection, and it seems to me that he can follow that goal as well in time of war as he can in time of peace.

MR. VALENTE: Isn't it everybody's goal to achieve perfection, artist and non-artist?

MR. WICKISER: It depends on the type of perfection he tries to achieve.

MR. VALENTE: Well, yes, what would be the distinction between an artist and someone else, is, in fact, the kind of perfection; perfection in what? There's such a thing as a seeking perfection in crime—such a thing as a perfect crime. I don't know that I'd accept that as a definition of an artist.

MR. WICKISER: That brings up an interesting point, the fact that people feel that art is something that is achieved after middle age, or after a person has been very successful economically. On a former program, I remember, the chairman said that if we could industrialize the South highly, so that we'd have a great amount of wealth here, then we could have art. And I think that it's a popular fallacy that art is something that is superimposed on an economic structure, rather than being some-

A WORLD AT WAR

thing integral, something that begins at birth, and advances through life with you—

MR. OTT: Don't you think, Mr. Wickiser, that art is a product of some talent? It's not merely a hysterical desire to do something or to create. In other words, the lady who, lacking in talent, wants to be artistic so desperately, can amuse herself, but beyond that can amuse no one else. And it seems to me that this quest of perfection must come from talented people, and art, at least from a layman's viewpoint, is a product of a great mind bringing a certain artistic craftsmanship, and artistic ability and perfection, if you will, to the task of creating something, whether in music, or in painting, or what it may be.

MR. WICKISER: You think, then, that in time of war, his aim would be just the same aim—

MR. OTT: Yeah, I would say the aim—

MR. WICKISER: In any external situation?

MR. OTT: Achieving perfection is necessary.

MR. STEETLE: I might go along with you, Mr. Wickiser, in your belief that art can come before economic success, but I'd like to pose this point. The artist won't be able to pursue his art in a world dominated by totalitarian themes, will he?

MR. WICKISER: No, I believe—

MR. STEETLE: Isn't his responsibility to assist in the carrying through of this war effort, and thus be free thereafter—

MR. VALENTE: Well, that's what I say: he should indulge in propaganda.

MR. WICKISER: I agree, and I think that the government should make full use of the artist's ability in terms of propaganda and in many other ways, as in making the place a more beautiful place to live in—

MR. VALENTE: That's right.

MR. WICKISER:—in making America a beautiful America, as well as a free America.

THE ARTIST IN WARTIME

MR. VALENTE: To return to Mr. Carmichael's question: I think that you answered that yourself, that the *should* merely refers to the artist's obligations as a citizen; that's how I understand it.

MR. CARMICHAEL: Now, about these goals that we've been speaking of here, it seems to me that we've implied that the artist is always subservient to some such goal. Now, if we're going to speak of the artist as being creative, as possessing some capacity or gift for expressing new things—things which we do not know about, are not able to judge in advance—if you can see the artist from that standpoint, I don't see how you can say he's subservient to any goal; how he sets advancing a law or retarding a law or anything of the kind as an end to himself.

MR. VALENTE: No, he probably doesn't do that normally, but when he does, he's indulging in propaganda; and I think it's something that he, as a citizen, should be willing to do in time of war.

MR. CARMICHAEL: You, then, think of all expression, all artistic production and creation, as propaganda!

MR. VALENTE: No! In the broader sense of that term, it has propaganda value, but I say that art becomes propaganda when it is consciously used to advance a political notion, or to advance, to map, the fortunes of war.

MR. WICKISER: I agree with you, Mr. Valente, that in a democracy there's been a reluctance to use propaganda. There's a feeling that propaganda is something that is always bad, whereas, propaganda could be very beneficial in perpetuating democratic ideals.

MR. CARMICHAEL: Don't you think that the artist could propagandize about one-tenth of his artistic time, employing just about one-tenth of his talent, say, and produce the posters that are necessary, the slogans, and so forth—

A WORLD AT WAR

MR. VALENTE: It isn't just the slogans—

MR. CARMICHAEL: Well, what else are you going to do?

MR. VALENTE: Plenty! Of course, as you suggested, Mr. Wickiser, the government ought to help in this; you have to do something about giving the artist a chance to do something. For instance, this interminable cheap popular music that we hear I think might very well be supplanted by a kind of music which would have an inspiriting, and even a martial, effect.

MR. CARMICHAEL: I don't see that; if the end is to move people, and jazz moves them, that's the proper—

MR. VALENTE: Yes, but how does it move them?

MR. CARMICHAEL: In ways only too familiar, I thought.
[*Laughter.*]

MR. VALENTE: Yes, but that's the point; we don't want to move them in those ways. We want to direct them toward a particular goal.

MR. CARMICHAEL: Then we should set an end for art—

MR. VALENTE: No! We set an end for propaganda, not for art. And we use art as propaganda.

MR. OTT: We've been spending a lot of time in discussing whether or not the artist shall allow his subject matter to be determined for him by the exigencies of the situation in which he finds himself. It seems to me that subject matter is a matter for the artist himself to decide, according to his gifts, wouldn't you say, Mr. Carmichael?

MR. CARMICHAEL: Exactly.

MR. VALENTE: If the artist is a completely convinced democrat who feels his whole society, the whole structure of his civilization, being threatened, I imagine that he'll feel pretty sincerely and pretty strongly about the loss of it, and I should think that then, when he indulges in propaganda, it might not only be a conscious piece of art with a certain goal, but a very sincere and very good art.

THE ARTIST IN WARTIME

MR. OTT: It seems to me that the subject matter that he deals with is not so very important; after all, great paintings and great music can be written on almost any subject at all.

MR. VALENTE: Yes, but I'm maintaining that it's possible to create other impressions very different, various impressions and states of mind, by means of art; I maintain that popular music creates one kind of impres—

MR. STEETLE: Don't let me interrupt you, Mr. Valente, but, in summary, we might say that the artist is a personality affected by the social forces of his time, with reservations, and that the creative artist, by virtue of his leadership, sometimes rises above the social forces of his time. The artist was said by another member of the forum to inhabit an ivory tower, while Mr. Valente maintains that the artist does not exist in a social vacuum. The second question posed for discussion, does the war definitely affect the creative ability of the artist? received an answer something like this: that the war limits the creative power of the artist at times, whereas, in spite of that limiting effect, other artists have produced works throughout times of war. Should the artist pursue the same aims in time of war as in time of peace? was the question that received the bulk of the attention. The artist should consciously portray and clarify democracy, according to one member of the forum, because of his obligations as a citizen, and that seems to be agreed with in toto by the group. And since his object is to achieve perfection, he may pursue that goal throughout the war, irrespective of the war. The artist has a responsibility to assist in the achievement of victory, whether that responsibility be discharged through his performance of civic duties or his participation in propaganda.

VI

AFTER THE WAR

Economic Aspects of the Peace

DAVID F. BENDER

Instructor in Physics

JOHN S. GAMBS

Associate Professor of Social Welfare

R. DANA RUSSELL

Associate Professor of Mineralogy

WILLIAM T. SCROGGS

Dean of The Graduate School

MR. STEETLE

MR. GAMBS: Hitler could never have forced war on a peace-loving world if our earth had not been the scene of widespread economic dislocation. The last peace was a bad peace, not because it was harsh on the Central Powers—it was not—but because it dealt inadequately with economic problems. Those problems might in the end have been solved peacefully. The Axis, however, seized upon the small trickles of dissatisfaction here and there to turn them, in China, Africa, and Spain, into rivers of blood.

General war will not solve these problems; it can only intensify them, increase their scope, enhance their power for evil. After the last war we Americans deceived ourselves into thinking that we had gone back to normalcy. There was no normalcy abroad: there were bankruptcy, disease, starvation, civil strife, revolution, dictatorship.

Reflecting on these events is beginning to make us realize that, while military defeat would mean ruin, a glorious victory is not enough. When the next armistice is declared, we shall, of course, blow our factory whistles and toss our hats in the air

A WORLD AT WAR

and greet each other deliriously—but we must also take a few moments to ask ourselves soberly whether we, who have won the war, are capable of winning the peace.

The next peace must take into account not only the political questions of boundaries and national aspirations, but also the economic questions of abundant production and a more just distribution of goods. Americans should be glad that their President has already given consideration to these problems of peace.

Even before this country was at war—exactly four months before Pearl Harbor, indeed—Roosevelt and Churchill met at sea and worked out the broad outlines of reconstruction. The eight-point document, now generally known as the Atlantic Charter, was the result. Less than one month after Pearl Harbor the twenty-six United Nations subscribed to that declaration. The fourth, fifth, and sixth points of that paper suggest the framework of post-war economic planning. The points made are: First, all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, shall have access, on equal terms, to the trade and raw materials of the world. Second, the United Nations desire to bring about the fullest collaboration among all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic adjustment, and social security. Third, the United Nations wish to see established a peace in which all men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

Six weeks later, on February 23, another important step was taken in the direction of a stable peace. Great Britain and the United States signed an agreement that the settlement of lend-lease accounts shall be such as to promote the betterment of world-wide economic conditions. The agreement invites other countries to join in conversations to be held in the near future, conversations that will look toward the expansion of production, employment, exchange and consumption of goods—to

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE PEACE

ward elimination of discrimination, toward the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers.

It is too early to foresee all the implications of these official declarations, but a few things at least seem to be clear at this time. First, the next peace, unlike the last, will not be confused by the vexing problem of war debts. Second, the United States, if Congress is willing, abandons its unworkable policy of the past, namely, that it claims the right to sell goods abroad without buying goods in return. Third, the policy of isolationism in peace is abandoned. After taking active part in two bloody wars, we are beginning to discover that, hereafter, we are also going to have to take part in international affairs during the years of peace. Finally, the standard of living of the common man, both here and abroad, will be elevated, partly by increasing production, partly by governmental intervention, aiming at a more just distribution of goods and services.

These, gentlemen, are, I believe, the broad outlines of the proposed peace in the economic domain. These are the goals toward which we, as loyal Americans, must work.

MR. BENDER: Mr. Gambs, I would like to amplify a little bit on the next to the last point that you made. You pointed out how important it is that we as Americans abandon this policy of isolationism. Now it seems to me that that is an important step in advance. But, in taking it, we must remember, it seems to me, that the system of the balance of power, maintaining a peace by a balance of power, has led to inevitable war. And I think that we should see if there is not some method by which we can enter the international situation without entering at the same time the game of power-politics. But I would like to ask a question before we proceed further, namely, "Can we have a just peace?" The pacifists have advocated for a long time justice, equality, tolerance, and the practice of non-violence. Many people have objected to this position, saying that human

A WORLD AT WAR

nature cannot be changed that way, that man's nature is always to be selfish and to want to fight. Now we are in a war, and a few of us are discussing what kind of a peace we want to have. It seems to me that the position of the pacifist is just about reversed now, in that he can say, "You are in a war, and you want to try to have a just peace. And you're fighting with all of the power that you have, spreading violence and destruction over the earth. I don't see how it's possible to have a just peace under such conditions."

MR. SCROGGS: Mr. Bender, I think that we should have a just peace, as you have stated, but we are in the war now. It's like a surgical operation. When once the blood is being shed, we cannot stop in the middle of the operation. We have a cancer eating at the vitals of democracy. That cancer must be removed. When that cancer is removed, we can work out a just peace, but so long as we have this disease, we cannot have a just peace, we cannot have any kind of a peace. It is essential that we carry the war through to a finish. Remember that when Woodrow Wilson first discussed the problems of the first World War, he spoke of a peace without a victory. Later he spoke about force, force without stint or limit, until peace was attained. We cannot attain peace today in the world so long as there is a threat to the world of democracy. There are different kinds of peace. There will be no just peace if we give up our liberty in order to have it. We must fight for our democracy; we must have a peace which will guarantee freedom, freedom to the enemy nations as well as to the United Nations.

MR. RUSSELL: Mr. Scroggs, I would agree with that viewpoint, but it seems to me Mr. Bender also has a good point, and I fail to see, for myself, how simply winning the war would insure a just peace. It seems to me that we need more to win a just peace than simply a military victory. The crux of the matter would be, first, perhaps, the education of the American peo-

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE PEACE

ple, and the people throughout the world, to the ideas which are necessary to a just peace, both politically and economically.

MR. SCROGGS: I would agree with you, Mr. Russell, that the military victory alone will not bring a just peace, but we must have a military victory before there can be a just peace. After that, we can consider the questions of peace, and meantime educate the people as to what are the requisite elements of a just peace.

MR. GAMBS: Don't you believe, too, Dean Scroggs, that there is this kind of difference between you and Mr. Bender; that is, I think that Mr. Bender thinks of a kind of ideal peace, with absolutely no rough edges anywhere, and I think that you are thinking of a sort of rough-and-ready justice, the kind that we do expect in this world, one not based on theoretical considerations, but one based on the rough-and-tumble of every-day life. And I think that we can have what you might call rough-and-tumble justice, which will approximate the kind of justice, Mr. Bender, which you would like to see, but which we'll never achieve.

MR. RUSSELL: In that connection, Mr. Gambs, it seems to me that one of the main problems of peace, both political and economic, is the question of reparations. You said that there will not be the vexing problem of war debts, but how about the equally vexing problem of reparations? The hatred engendered by a war, as pointed out by Mr. Bender, tends to develop in the victorious people the desire for revenge, expressed in reparations of one sort or another.

MR. GAMBS: Yes, that's quite true, Mr. Russell, and I would say in addition to that, that the idea of reparations has certainly existed in international relations for a long time; they used to be known as indemnities. I think that toward the end of the nineteenth century the indemnity had gone into disrepute. Then at the time of the Treaty of Versailles, in order not to use the

A WORLD AT WAR

somewhat discredited word "indemnities," they used the new word "reparations." It's possible, I think, Mr. Russell, to make a nation pay something in return for all the trouble that it has caused. But I think that reparations on anything like the scale that we had in the last war are economically unworkable. I think that we're learning that we just don't get anything by it. We think we do, at least we think for a while we do, and it's possible to excite people, to excite the mass, perhaps, into feeling that it should get some revenge. Actually, however, they don't get anything out of reparations, because if I pay you ten dollars, you get ten dollars, but if a nation like Germany is expected to pay another nation 31 billion dollars, which was the reparations bill at the end of the last war, it's a lot different problem to transfer 31 billion dollars from one nation to another—not merely because of the different magnitudes, but because nations are not like individuals, and national budgets are not like individual budgets, and so on.

MR. RUSSELL: That may all be true, Mr. Gambs, but how are you going to get around the universal, the almost universal, feeling on the part of peoples for revenge against the nations who have consistently for the last fifty years forced aggressive wars upon the world?

MR. SCROGGS: May I add a word there, before you start, Mr. Gambs? The situation when this war ends will be enormously different from 1918, because at that time the enormous demands for reparations came from France. It was France that was seeking revenge. France, at the next peace table, will have to play an entirely different role, because France is no longer in a position to make the type of demands that she made in the first World War [April 8, 1942].

MR. BENDER: Mr. Scroggs, may I comment upon my question? It may be that we cannot have a very just peace, but it stands to reason that we cannot have even the slightest justice

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE PEACE

in our peace without previous consideration of it. And so I think that all of us, whether we're pacifists or not, can work together to make a better world. One of the things that we have often talked about is the question of the interchange of goods after the war. And that brings up a question which has long troubled the world, namely that of free trade. I wonder whether you gentlemen consider that free trade will help us after this war.

MR. GAMBS: Oh, indeed yes, Mr. Bender, and that is almost what is accepted as the economic basis of the peace as present discussions go. I was reading today a rather interesting comment about that. It's hard to get nations to agree to have free trade. And as far as concerns the United States, as you know, we have a Congress which rather likes tariffs. We also find sometimes that a tariff is not in harmony with our foreign policy, and the suggestion was made in the magazine *Fortune*—by John Foster Dulles, I think—that the body that is responsible for our foreign policy should also be responsible for all of those economic policies that affect our international relations. That would mean, as far as I can see, that Mr. Hull, who is Secretary of State, at least for as long as he remains Secretary, would be in charge of those economic policies that contribute to international understanding, and that that power would continue to be vested perhaps in the State Department. Now it may seem rather amazing that we should give that power over to a governmental department and take it away from the representatives of the people. But we have been going in that direction. After all, we do have these trade agreements which Mr. Hull has pushed so vigorously.

MR. RUSSELL: Congress still has to ratify them.

MR. SCROGGS: No, Congress does not have to ratify trade agreements.

MR. GAMBS: There is some Congressional control—

A WORLD AT WAR

MR. SCROGGS: They're not treaties—

MR. GAMBS: Yes, and the President, too, has had a sliding scale, hasn't he, for a large number of years, for twenty years or more—

MR. SCROGGS: You mean in respect to the tariff?

MR. GAMBS: Yes. So you see, Mr. Bender, there is a real possibility of getting what you are suggesting there.

MR. BENDER: I was very interested, Mr. Gambs, in reading in the present edition of the *Christian Century* a suggestion by a number of members of the Yale faculty that we must go even farther than any statements we have made so far in insisting on a system of collective security—more or less, it seems to me, like a United States of the whole world—in which there will be presumably no tariff barriers whatever among the various states of the world, just as there are none among the various states of the United States.

MR. RUSSELL: Mr. Bender, doesn't that article also specify that the provisions in the Atlantic Charter which provide for the autonomy of peoples in the present occupied countries should be abrogated?

MR. BENDER: Yes.

MR. RUSSELL: If that's the case, what are we going to do with these Jugoslavs and Czechs and Poles, who have a very intense national consciousness, who have certainly been promised that they will have their territorial integrity returned to them? Isn't it possible to have the economic union without complete loss of sovereignty, or is it? And can we settle economic problems without considering at the same time the political ones?

MR. BENDER: I would say that probably we couldn't solve them separately. It seems to me that it's just those particular states in Central Europe who have been long advocating col-

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE PEACE

lective security, and I would imagine that they would likewise include political union in that.

MR. SCROGGS: As I interpret the Atlantic Charter, and also the later declarations in February, these documents do not contemplate absolute freedom of trade, but freer trade, that is, the abolition of artificial tariff barriers that are so high that they are intended not to afford protection to domestic industries, but to exclude goods. Now, if we are going to have a smaller reparations bill this year, that in itself will be an inducement to countries to promote freer trade. One reason for the general jacking up of the tariff rates after the First World War was the large reparations payments which had to be made, and the countries which were the creditor countries had to take goods from Germany or take nothing. They were going to take goods, so they put up the tariff barriers to keep out too many goods from coming from other parts of the world. It was largely as a result of these heavy reparations payments that the general movement for higher tariff rates began, and we will not, I think, have that same impulse this time.

MR. RUSSELL: Mr. Scroggs, weren't high tariff rates also induced by the policy of political self-determination, by which each of the small states of Europe not only wanted political entity but economic independence?

MR. SCROGGS: Yes, and our own war debts, of course, played a part in our attitude toward the tariff.

MR. GAMBS: I'm thinking, too, that it should be stated that some of the countries of central Europe, of southeastern Europe, that raised their tariff barriers so high after the last war are now engaged in conversation, in New York City as a matter of fact, and these conversations look to a free customs union among those countries. I think that Poland, Jugoslavia, Greece are certainly talking, and Czechoslovakia, yes, Masaryk, Benes—all of these people are now, and already documents have

A WORLD AT WAR

been published by this group. One resolution was taken to the International Labor Office last November, and since then there has been another publication of their reports. Very interesting. But I didn't quite understand, Mr. Bender, this part of your question. Did you mean to imply that, by giving these peoples political autonomy, you give them so much that it cannot be curbed at any point, and that they have no obligation whatever to join the League or anything of that sort? It doesn't seem to me that a state is necessarily giving up all independent existence as a state simply because it is willing to adhere to something like the League covenant.

MR. RUSSELL: No, I wouldn't agree to that, Mr. Gambs, but it seems to me that some limitation of the national sovereignty is necessary for economic interdependence and the international economics. And one of the striking things about the Atlantic Charter was the lack of any statement that national sovereignty would have to be limited.

MR. GAMBS: Yes, but also in the Atlantic Charter, I think, Mr. Russell, there's nothing saying that we would not have some sort of new League of Nations, either; and nothing which would suggest that nations would not give up some of their sovereignty to establish a League.

MR. BENDER: Then again, I would like to suggest that the Atlantic Charter which we are talking up is not so wonderful as it might seem, in that it is not definite enough. When Wilson offered his fourteen points in 1918 to the Germans, they felt that there was something definite that they could base an armistice on, but we all know that the armistice of 1918 did not in any great way follow Wilson's fourteen points. So it seems to me that if we wish to get to the people of these other countries the idea that we don't intend to extinguish them but that we want to be fair, we have to propose something much more definite than the Atlantic Charter.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE PEACE

MR. SCROGGS: Don't you think, Mr. Bender, that the statement of February 26 goes into that somewhat by offering a ray of—more than a ray—of economic hope to the enemy—

MR. BENDER: I certainly do.

MR. RUSSELL: But, Mr. Scroggs, how about this matter? In points 4, 5, and 6 of the Atlantic Charter, and in the statement of February, the general idea is a raising of living standards throughout the world. Now the problem that occurs to me is, how far can we raise living standards in the Far East among the Asiatic peoples without seriously lowering our own? Are we to bring them up to ours, or are we to lower our own to theirs? There's a very serious problem there that is not touched upon at all—by the Atlantic Charter. How far can we go toward raising standards in the Far East?

MR. SCROGGS: We can go a considerable distance, I think. If, after the end of the war, we stimulate the production of consumer's goods, there will be a great demand for goods from Japan. That will raise the standard of living in Japan, and it will not lower our own standard of living. That is, we do not have to lower our own standard of living in order to raise the standards of living of the people of Asia. What helps us, helps them; what helps them, helps us, in the long run. There may be certain readjustments to make, as a result of buying a few more goods.

MR. STEETLE: Sorry, gentlemen. In summary, we might say that it's important to begin thinking in terms of the peace, even though we must not let up in our drive for the victory which must come first. The forum seems to agree that the last peace was not a particularly effective one, not because it was a harsh peace, but because it didn't seem to take cognizance of economic problems. The Atlantic Charter and the Lend-Lease settlement arrangement are steps that consider the economic problems of the peace when it shall come. Establishment of a just

A WORLD AT WAR

peace depends upon carrying through the war to victory for the powers of democracy. The education of people is necessary—education to prepare our citizens for world thinking, for world citizenship; we can no longer stay off and think we can be completely self-sufficient. The forum seemed to think that reparations, on the scale of the last war, at least, were economically unworkable, and that free trade is a factor that must be considered in settling the economic problems of the post-war world. They should be considered not only by the political leaders of the world, but they should be understood by the citizens of the United States, and other citizens, through education in world affairs.

The Post-War Problem: Resuming National Life

ROY A. BALLINGER

Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics

DONALD S. BURRIS

Assistant Professor of Social Welfare

JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM

Professor of Law

DONALD H. MORRISON

Assistant Professor of Government

MR. STEETLE

MR. FORDHAM: The subject of this forum, "The Post-War Problem: Resuming National Life," invites a preliminary word of explanation. We have not ceased nor suspended national life for the duration; on the contrary, the war experience involves a very intense phase of national life. What we are concerned with is the conduct of our national affairs during the period just following the war. And we are not using the word "national" to denote strong, self-centered isolationism. It is employed merely for descriptive purposes in dealing with post-war problems from the American standpoint. The immediate job of the American people is the decisive winning of the war. There is a danger, however, that preoccupation with the business of licking the Axis powers might cause us to give scant attention to the difficult problem of adjustment which necessarily will confront the nation after the conflict. The fruits of victory may be lost if we do not plan foresightedly for the post-war years. My colleagues and I have, therefore, no misgivings about the terminus of our topic.

A WORLD AT WAR

It must be evident that there can be no such thing as an abrupt change from a war-time to a peace-time footing. Human affairs cannot be segmented in that manner. Imagine the dislocation that would attend the abrupt demobilization of the armed forces. Consider the immense job of re-converting our productive plants to so-called normal uses. It seems plain enough that the exertion of extraordinary governmental powers such as general price control will continue for some time after the war, and that the hand of government will be a vital force in shaping our economic destiny. Nor can we effectively deal with our subject as a largely static affair. It confronts us as a dynamic, highly relative complex of human and material factors. Stated more plainly, our assignment is like shooting quail from a galloping horse. Just try it, if you think it's easy. We must be prepared to deal flexibly with a fluid problem that can no more stand still than we do. The relative and transitional character of the matter does not defy planning; it merely prescribes the crystallization of thought on the subject.

One factor that looms large in our planning for the post-war period is the character of the international settlement that will be made at the close of the war. Are we going to fumble the ball at that stage again, or are we prepared realistically to insist upon a peace that is politically and economically tenable, and to assume the responsibility of vital leadership and the subsequent adjustment of international questions by means short of war? Surely there is a widespread realization that we cannot put down our arms after the war, as though the military victory wound up that item of the business, and set our hearts on that delusive goal, normalcy, which made an empty mockery of the twenties.

And the fact is that our business is not to return to normalcy, and is not to resume anything. We are moving ahead to a period which we expect to be, and must make, different from

RESUMING NATIONAL LIFE

previous eras of peace. And thus we cannot confine ourselves to our own internal problems. At the close of the war, the United Nations may be expected to attempt to set up some sort of international political arrangement which will provide an effective sanction, or sanctions, against future breaches of the international peace. Whether such an arrangement will take the form of regal federations of states, or an international police force, or some sort of super-state, or what not, remains to be seen. In all events, the United States should play a leading part in making the decision.

If what we want internally after the war is maximum employment and a general trend upward in the standard of living, the prospect is not at all bad, assuming judicious use of our human and material resources. Think of the development of the machine-tool industry under war conditions; of the increase in the ranks of skilled labor; and of the huge development of plant facilities, convertible to peace-time uses. Think of the great back-log demand for consumer goods that is accumulating. Instead of impoverishment and depression, it is altogether possible that we will have a post-war boom, requiring continued governmental brakes on inflation. The potentials will be available for an improved economic life in this country. It remains to be seen whether we will apply the intelligence and real cooperation necessary to bring us to greener pastures.

In the discussion that follows, we hope to give these general considerations more definite focus by relating them to interests of the American farmer, and to persons who will be in need of social welfare services, as well as those of the community in general. Mr. Morrison, you seem to be bursting with ideas.

MR. MORRISON: Well, gentlemen, what I am really bursting with is economics. You mentioned, Mr. Fordham, that there is a possibility that we might have inflation after the war, and therefore a possibility that governmental control to prevent in-

A WORLD AT WAR

flation will have to be continued. There's one point that might be made in that connection: for example, it might be decided by the political leaders of the country that one of the first steps facing the American people at the conclusion of hostilities would be the reconstruction of some of the devastated areas of Europe. That would mean, presumably, that we would have to postpone the satisfaction of some of our consumer wants until after some reconstruction had been effected in Europe.

I'd like to talk a little bit further, though, about some of the economic aspects of this problem. Now, perhaps the easiest way to show the seriousness of the post-war re-adjustment period is to indicate just what our national efforts will be during this period of the war. Conservative estimates have said that we will have perhaps three and a half or four million men in active military service by 1944; perhaps another twenty-three and a half million in war production. Using these figures, and they are admittedly conservative, we can say that at the conclusion of the war about twenty-seven million people would suddenly be torn from war-time activity and faced with resumption of peace-time activity. Or, in terms of our national wealth, by 1944 the national income will be approximately 105 billion dollars. About 62% of this will be derived from military expenditures; and if we should suddenly curtail military expenditures in 1944, it will mean that suddenly we will cut off from the national income an amount just about equal to the national income in 1936. In other words, if the war is over about 1944, or if our economic activity is maintained at about the 1944 level for a period of years until the war is over, it appears that about one-third of our national income will be terminated, unless the activities of twenty-seven million Americans are directed into other channels. The question then becomes, what shall we do with the twenty-seven millions? I realize, of course, that we may not suddenly demobilize these people. There will certainly be

RESUMING NATIONAL LIFE

a necessity for maintaining a rather large military force for some years after the war is over. But many of those Americans will certainly have to be demobilized.

Another problem arises there. In order to handle rather easily the national debt, the economists tell us that we will have to maintain the national income at about the hundred-billion-dollar level. Now, if we assume the federal tax structure of 1940, the taxes on that national income would produce about fourteen billion dollars. That is about seven billion dollars more than we ordinarily spend for non-military federal expenditures, during the time of the New Deal recovery period. Now that would mean that seven billion additional dollars would have to be spent. And that would be spent, presumably, in taking up the slack in our economic structure. Possibly five or six billion would have to be spent for military expenditures, that is, maintaining our Army and Navy, maintaining an effective police force. That would leave perhaps two billion dollars which would be spent for additional social services and public services of various sorts.

MR. STEETLE: Well, gentlemen, do you agree with the way Mr. Morrison is spending our money?

MR. BALLINGER: I would like to raise, perhaps, some little question about the matter of prices and what may happen to price levels. One thing in connection with all statistics about the national income that must be kept in mind is that the actual income has not gone up as the dollar income has gone up. What has gone up is prices. The inflation that we talk about is in its simplest terms nothing but a more or less simultaneous rise in the price of everything. And we have inflation now and have been having it for some time. The problem of supporting the government, of finding employment after the war, and so forth, is very definitely connected with the problem of maintaining a fairly stable price level at least during and immedi-

A WORLD AT WAR

ately after the war, because it is entirely possible that for at least the first few months after the close of hostilities the deficits of the federal government will continue large, and prices will continue to rise, unless some steps are taken to restrict the price rise. The higher prices rise, in general, the further they have to fall, or the greater the lasting adjustment that must be made in our economic life. What we need as much as anything else is devices to control prices now to simplify the price problem later. Up to now the United States appears to have had relatively little efficiency or luck or whatever you want to call it in controlling price rises; at least the rate of price rises during the current war is roughly similar to what happened in the last war. The higher these prices go, the greater the difficulty now and later on. All of this means that the more effectively we control price rises now, the fewer our difficulties in the future.

MR. BURRIS: Don't you think, Mr. Ballinger, that the present administration is becoming increasingly conscious of that necessity?

MR. BALLINGER: I think that's perfectly true, and I think we may be approaching a time when the administration is preparing to do something effective about the price rises. All of the attempts at price control so far have been attempts at setting ceilings on the prices of certain specific things, sometimes without too much legal authority on the part of the price administrator. Other things, notably wages, have as yet had no ceilings whatever placed on them. If prices of some things go up, the prices of other things are almost certain to go up. For example, there have been attempts to set a price ceiling on cotton cloth, but no attempts at setting ceilings on raw cotton, and as the price of raw cotton has risen, it has been necessary for the administrator to raise the ceiling on cotton cloth.

MR. MORRISON: Isn't the real answer to that, Mr. Ballinger, that we have not been too concerned about the rising price of

RESUMING NATIONAL LIFE

these commodities; that is, they haven't risen yet to a point where we need to be seriously concerned about them.

MR. BALLINGER: I think that you're at least partly right there. The difficulty is that by the time they get that high, it's rather too late to take any action as effective, let's say, as could have been taken earlier.

MR. BURRIS: Would you suggest, Mr. Ballinger, that Congress provide by appropriate legislation for a definite ceiling on wages? That's a very touchy subject, you know, because that's the support that a man's family lives by. If you do that in respect to the working man, what about professional people, who live on a service basis, and other people who are engaged in service activities as distinguished from those involved in the production and distribution of goods?

MR. BALLINGER: One difficulty with setting maximum prices on goods, either special goods, or goods generally, is that the price level of different commodities never remains the same. The general average of all prices may remain fairly constant; but during the war, as well as during peace, the prices of some goods ought to be going up and those of other goods ought to be going down. If you set arbitrary maximum prices, you stop that sort of automatic adjustment. Nevertheless, the problem is so serious that I think we are going to have to go a very long way toward what amounts to a maximum price on very nearly everything.

MR. MORRISON: I'd like to suggest an alternative to that, one which obviates some of the difficulties which you suggested; that is, we'll simply ration all of the basic consumer's goods, and if they want to pay two hundred dollars for a bottle of perfume, why, that will be perfectly all right.

MR. FORDHAM: It seems to me that we have developed that aspect of the problem relatively adequately, in view of our time limitations. I'd like to hear Mr. Burris on some of the public-

A WORLD AT WAR

welfare aspects of the post-war period; because certainly we're going to be faced with a very grave problem of human dislocation and reorientation that will come about at that time.

MR. BURRIS: Well, Mr. Fordham, you, in your opening statement, spoke about the fact that the prospects for conditions after the war are not all bad, assuming, as you said, judicious use of our human and material resources. I think that the fact is that the plans that we are making now are going to have a deep effect on conditions after the war. That's obvious. Now, what are some of those plans we are making now, not only to win the war but to win the peace? Here in Baton Rouge, we are attempting a form of mobilization, using Mr. Morrison's word; we are trying to organize the social-welfare structure of Baton Rouge. All of you gentlemen will recall that the Community Chest came out of the last war, so to speak. Now, I think you will admit that Community Chests frequently are the distinguishing mark of a democracy. What is going to come out of this war in this line? As I have said, Baton Rouge, like many communities, is attempting to organize its social-welfare resources. What about the state? Well, a good deal depends upon the state legislature, upon 139 state legislators, upon the action that they will take upon the appropriations for the various departments, especially welfare and health.

MR. MORRISON: There's one thing that worries me considerably about this community-health business. We've seen the development of the government's public-welfare services; that is, the state and federal government are subsidizing more and more people in more and more ways. Now does this mean that more and more demands will also be made upon private citizens to support the indigent and needy citizens of the community?

MR. BURRIS: The answer to that is: yes, of course, there will be a great many more demands. They will be continuing—we can look forward to that—but it will be a process of mobilizing

RESUMING NATIONAL LIFE

our communities to win this war. It has to be done on a private as well as a public level; they are pretty much the same thing.

MR. FORDHAM: There's one aspect of the war and our preparation for it that is rather significant from a standpoint of post-war health expenditure. In our canvassing of our manpower for war purposes, we are discovering a good many weaknesses that don't give us cause for pride; but they do give us a good deal of information that ought to stimulate constructive public and private attacks upon that problem in the years following the war.

MR. BURRIS: I think that I have an example of that, Mr. Fordham; you said that we are mobilizing our manpower. All right, your selectees must be in good health to be mobilized into our armed forces. While the number of men who are being rejected is not terrifyingly large, the fact remains that there are quite a few. It follows, then, that if we are to mobilize our total manpower, we must do something about the health of these individuals. Well, that effort, which is coming on both the federal and the state levels, will carry over, we can certainly hope, after the war. Perhaps, although it's a smug thing to say, perhaps the war will have a good effect on our health program.

MR. MORRISON: There's one thing that I would like to inquire about; I've noticed recently that some of our state legislatures have already curtailed the funds allocated to public welfare. I've also noticed in one of our local papers recently that an organization has gone on record as favoring decreases in appropriations for public-welfare services in this state. Now, Mr. Burris, how is that going to affect our organization for the war, and particularly, how will it affect our capacity to take care of our citizens after the war?

MR. BURRIS: Health work and welfare work go together. If we are to win this war, we certainly must do something about our welfare work, because at that time we are doing something

A WORLD AT WAR

about our health, too. Here in Louisiana—as in most of our states—appropriations for welfare are not too high. Perhaps we will have to have federal assistance at least to maintain if not to increase our appropriations so that we can partially mobilize the men and women that we need to win this war. That will have a deep effect after the war; it will carry over.

MR. FORDHAM: Mr. Ballinger, let's assume that we shall win this war. The factors that will be in play in the international settlement will be, of course, very complex. Which do you think will preponderate, political factors or economic?

MR. BALLINGER: It's very difficult to guess on that. I expect that at a given moment the political factors will appear to dominate, but if you look at it over a period of several years, I think the economic factors may, in actual fact, prove to be much more important. For instance, after the last war, one of the great characteristics of the world economically was that we went in for less foreign trade, for higher tariffs, quotas, restrictions on imports of all sorts. Now if the fourth point of the Atlantic Charter is to be observed at all, we are going to have to do the opposite after this war. And I think we may thus do more, perhaps, Mr. Burris, to solve some of the problems dealing with welfare work than a good many of the tax proposals that have been made. Because, after all, if you have a prosperous country, you have less need for relief than you would have otherwise. For instance, if freer foreign trade for the United States could be so arranged as to increase the export market for cotton, it would probably do more than any other one thing to solve the most difficult farm problem existing in Louisiana and in the South, and it might reduce the necessity for government welfare subsidies of one kind or another, perhaps by several million dollars a year, throughout the whole country. I think that is a matter that needs to be considered very carefully; it is also, of course, an extremely difficult matter because the re-

RESUMING NATIONAL LIFE

arrangement of the economy during war is somewhat the opposite of what we need following the war. For instance, at the present time the country is bending all of its energies to create factories to make synthetic rubber. We must have them now, but after the war it is entirely probable that from the economic point of view we should go back to the business of importing rubber. That doesn't mean that we must throw away our synthetic-rubber factories entirely, by any means; perhaps we can find some new uses for much of the specialized types of rubber which they will be able to produce.

MR. STEETLE: In summary, then, gentlemen, while winning the war is our immediate goal, planning for the post-war period must be undertaken. We can no longer retire upon the dream of isolation; this nation must take part in world affairs. Continuing control of inflationary tendencies after the war will be necessary because of the possibility of booms and a continuing rise in prices. The problems of changing war spending into peace-time spending are going to need much time spent upon them. We need devices to control prices right now, so as to make the post-war adjustment less difficult. For example, we must control not only the price of cloth, but perhaps also the cotton from which it is made. Plans to meet the post-war social welfare problems are being undertaken; Baton Rouge, for example, is trying to organize and mobilize welfare agencies, and this perhaps is being done on wider bases elsewhere. The war is shedding light upon certain lacks and needs in our country; for example, those rejected because of physical defects, poor health, and so forth, are being rehabilitated now, and the possibility is that the United States will continue to study this problem, even after the war is over.

An Old Map in New Colors

ROBERT T. CLARK

Professor of German

ALDEN L. POWELL

Professor of Government

WALTER C. RICHARDSON

Assistant Professor of History

CHALMER J. ROY

Assistant Professor of Economic Geology

CHARLES E. SMITH

Professor of History

MR. POWELL: Tonight's discussion of an old map in new colors concludes the forum series presented by Louisiana State University on aspects of a world at war. Faculty members who contributed their time to these forum programs have pretended to solve no problems. Nevertheless, they have rendered a valuable service to Louisiana and to the nation by bringing emphasis to one of the priceless values for which we are fighting the present war: the right of free discussion.

MR. SMITH: It seems to me that we should at the beginning agree upon certain concepts, certain premises, preparatory to a discussion of some of the more specific problems that will naturally arise when peace is made after an Allied victory. It seems to me first that peace will undoubtedly be an imposed peace. It's almost impossible to imagine a situation wherein it would be desirable or even possible to negotiate with the governments of the Axis. These governments have behind them a record of treachery and duplicity almost without parallel in modern times. Then, too, there is reason to believe that the particular philosophies of these Axis governments have so permeated the popu-

A WORLD AT WAR

lations of the Axis countries that a mere change in the personnel of the Axis governments would hardly afford a sufficient guarantee of sufficient governmental action to enable us to enter upon a negotiated peace.

Now, an imposed peace is also usually the result of an overwhelmingly decisive military victory. And there is reason to believe that we cannot anticipate any crack-up in the Axis countries until such time as the Allied Nations have demonstrated overwhelming military mastery. Furthermore, it's hardly likely that the victorious statesmen will be in a position to quell demands for punitive action at the peace conference. While it's still possible in our own country for people to talk about fighting a war without hatreds, I doubt very much that such arguments would have very much weight with Norwegians, Poles, Dutch, and other peoples that have been forced to undergo the tyranny of the Axis conquerors. Now, of course, I would be the first to agree that from a purely objective standpoint there would be much more chance of establishing a long-term peace on durable foundations if the peace could be made without retaliations, without demands for vengeance, without territorial or economic changes imposed for any punitive reasons; but I have no expectation that such a peace can be made.

Prolonged Allied occupancy of the defeated countries undoubtedly will be necessary if for no other reason than to avert civil war and anarchy that otherwise undoubtedly would break out in these countries. And prolonged occupancy, prolonged armistice conditions in these countries, may of course serve to minimize to some degree the clamor for vengeance preparatory to the final conclusion of peace.

Then, undoubtedly, since we really are committed to the restoration of the countries that have been over-run by the Axis, the boundary lines will be drawn with nationalistic considerations in mind. We are pledged to restore Norway, Holland, yes,

AN OLD MAP IN NEW COLORS

even Luxembourg, and therefore the basis for the new territorial settlement, it seems to me, will have to be primarily nationalistic. Many interesting suggestions have been made for a re-drawing of the maps on ethnic, lingual, or economic lines, and there's always something very intriguing about these counsels of perfection, but the mere fact that we are committed to the restoration of these nations that have been conquered by the Axis countries seems to indicate that the peace of 1919 will be taken as a norm.

Now, of course, if the exact divisions of 1919 are followed, Europe will still be confronted with the problems of minorities; if some of the countries succeed in pressing their demands for territorial compensations, these problems of minorities will be considerably aggravated. It is to be hoped, however, that plebiscites and voluntary migrations and other devices may be employed to minimize some of the difficulties that will arise in connection with the re-distribution of territories. It's hard to imagine any post-war situation in which efforts will not be made to establish some sort of world federation. Quite possibly the beginning of this world federation will be found in the close cooperation between the United States and Britain. Certainly Anglo-American cooperation will play a major part in any situation that may arise in the post-war world. It seems, then, it may be wise to have Mr. Richardson say a few words about that particular angle of the problem—that is, Anglo-American cooperation.

MR. RICHARDSON: I agree with you that we are not facing a theoretical peace. I think the statesmen of the conference table will be almost entirely concerned with one essential fact—namely, expediency. In the settlement they will be asking themselves the question, "Is it practical? Can it work in a world of nationalism and power politics as attained in the twentieth century?" I think it's not too much to assume that the treaty will

A WORLD AT WAR

be dominated, primarily, by the two remaining democracies, Great Britain and the United States, and that of those two democracies, the United States will occupy the principal role. But, and this seems to me essential to remember, these democracies will not find themselves in entire agreement with their third ally, Russia. Therefore, they will probably be forced to turn to each other for mutual support and some form of co-operation. Now, given such a practical situation, what would seem to be the basic principles upon which these powers can cooperate?

In order to get this discussion under way, I would suggest that they can find concord on three broad fundamentals that will determine, perhaps, the peace settlement. The first of these should offer little difficulty. The Nazi form of government will have to go; and with it will go the war lords of Japan, and the Fascist state system. There seems to be no discord on that particular point. Second, the restoration of occupied territories must be effected, and in many cases boundaries re-established. It really will be, I believe, a recognition of the status quo as of 1920 and 1930; likewise, a recognition of the balance-of-power diplomacy as it has operated in Europe for over a century, and an acceptance of the necessary evils of territorial concessions. Russia, undoubtedly, will make demands, and for the most part they will be granted. The British perhaps, and even the dominions, will make certain territorial gains. There will probably be mandated territories, perhaps called shields of aggression, or even protectorates, call them what you will. Of course, the United States seeks no territory, and obviously none will be forced upon her.

There has been a great deal of discussion recently as to the future of the British Empire. I believe that the British Empire will remain intact after the war. There will of course be certain fundamental changes that are bound to arise as a result of the internal conditions caused by the war. Just what those changes

AN OLD MAP IN NEW COLORS

will be is very difficult to guess. Undoubtedly, Canada will have a more forceful part in the commonwealth of the future. India will probably be given an advanced status. New Zealand and Australia will no doubt drift more closely into the arms of the United States; but the British Empire will not be dismembered; and the commonwealth of nations, I think, will remain pretty much as it is, essentially unchanged. Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the British are willing to dismember their empire, which certainly they are not, it would be necessary for some power or groups of powers to take over the empire, either in totality or in part, and I know of no nation, at the present time, that wants the job.

Certainly, the victorious nations will probably attempt, as they did in 1919, to set up certain safeguards for the future, guarantees that it won't happen again. These may take the form of coalitions and agreements to maintain the balance-of-power diplomacy as it operates in the three crucial and difficult quarters of the world today; namely, in the Western Hemisphere of the Americas, in Europe, and in the Far East. This has been Britain's policy for almost four centuries, and I see no reason to believe that she will change it now. Now this leads us to the vital problem of Anglo-American cooperation, to which both the United States and Britain are already committed. I suggest that this may be some form of cooperation between the British commonwealth of nations and the United States. Or possibly there may be three world confederations—Pan-American, European, and an Asiatic system. I am not at all sure that a British-American accord is possible in the present world, but I do feel that some form of federation will be attempted. Such an accord or understanding has several points to recommend it. In the first place, it will be a step in the direction of international federation, which I do believe will eventually develop; and I base this assumption on two hypotheses which are almost facts at the

A WORLD AT WAR

present time: namely, that the era of national isolation is dead and gone, whether we like it or not, and the interrelation and the interdependence of the world are upon us and they are here to stay. International organization seems to be almost inevitable. Whether it will develop within decades or within a century I know not.

But such an Anglo-American accord, if it succeeded, would become a nucleus, in a sense, for future world federation, of which the world is so badly in need today. It has a second advantage, that it has the support of, the strong support, I might add, of many leaders in both the United States and Great Britain. The British government has for several years been laboring for it. The Dominions strongly desire it. Our own government has virtually accepted it as a working principle. Some leaders in the commonwealth have gone so far as to say that without it there is no possibility of a future peace. And, finally, these two world entities, the United States and the British commonwealth of nations, seem to be the only two groups of nations that can possibly work together in cooperation. The reasons are obvious: they have a common heritage, common principles, common philosophy and conditions; they are even fighting together for the preservation of a democratic way of life.

But such a federation will not be an alliance in the older sense of the term; it will be more than that. It would incorporate not only Great Britain, but the United States and all of the Dominions, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and so on—freely associated nations, with an organization loosely patterned, perhaps, after that of the 1931 organization of the British commonwealth of nations itself; the associates autonomous, equal in status, but not necessarily equal in function; working together in cooperation to establish and to maintain peace and order in a world sadly in need of some constitutional hinge-pin

AN OLD MAP IN NEW COLORS

to hold it in some way together. Mr. Clark, what are your views?

MR. CLARK: I would agree very definitely with the views stated by Professor Smith. I would say that both of those who have preceded me, however, give too slight a weight to the enigmatic factor in the entire problem, namely, Russia. For more than 100 years (I presume one of these historians could probably give you the exact date) the chief theme of Russia's foreign policy has been an outlet on warm seas and access to world markets. This has in the past been frustrated by England. At the treaty of Versailles the natural desire of Russia was still further frustrated through the erection of a system of buffer states. Now, it is quite obvious that as we draw the map of the new Europe we are going to have to leave out the buffer states, because as I remember the last speech of Stalin's, any restoration of the states which kept Russia out of Europe, so to speak, is just not going to be tolerated. Now that's one point.

And what would be the Russian conception of a good peace? To quote the same speech, Stalin insists that any destruction of the German State is absurd. Of course, that may have been purely and simply a propaganda measure. He may have been intending purely to arouse German interest in the victory of the Soviet Union. I don't know. But there is no need for us to become upset or in any way seriously concerned with the prospects of sharing peace-making with Russia, because it seems quite natural that the largest power in Europe—the largest European continental power—should naturally have a greater voice in the establishment of peace in Europe than either the British Empire or the United States, which has practically no interest whatever on the European continent.

Now this brings up the question of what type of Germany should come after this peace. Of course, there have been various proposals made. For instance, it has been suggested that Ger-

A WORLD AT WAR

many be divided into the states which existed before Bismarck in 1870. But in any type of arrangement that is going to take cognizance of economic factors, that is, of course, absurd. The other proposal, and one which has more weight behind it, is to divide Germany into a Northern German state and a Southern German state, and the presumption would be that they would act possibly against each other in some matters. I believe, though, that the very act of division might have the directly contrary effect.

But, as I said, the real peace, if Russia is victorious in its campaign against Hitler on the eastern front, will rest largely with the desires of Russia, which presumably will have the military power at hand to enforce its decisions, and the type of government in Germany that agrees best with the Russian desires is the type that existed in Germany in 1918, or rather 1920, with the adoption of the Weimar constitution, and 1933. In fact, Russia has long been a traditional ally of Germany, and it was the abandonment of the German-Russian alliance by Emperor Wilhelm II that largely precipitated the World War. And it was the peculiar type of relation that existed between Russia and Germany from 1933 until the signing of the anti-aggression pact that brought about a good deal of the—well, shall I call it the matrix—from which the later attack on Russia developed. I think that is undoubtedly the case, that the type of Nazi philosophy and the general conditions were given to back Hitler up in breaking the non-aggression pact. This was his most serious and probably his fatal mistake, because the Russians have given him the biggest fight that he's been given so far.

As to the influence of the British Empire on the European continent I am rather pessimistic. I doubt that the British Empire will have very much to say about it, because the European states are going to decide for themselves in the long run. In

AN OLD MAP IN NEW COLORS

the short run, I believe that the largest military power on the continent will probably have its final say as to how things are handled.

MR. ROY: I find myself here in the presence of power politicians and Union-now-or-eventually, and Eventually-why-not-now-ers, but I'm afraid I'd have to agree with Professor Smith that it's going to be an imposed peace. But I wonder if we shouldn't talk about what it should be like, in the hope that talk might have something to do with it. He mentioned the possibility of a long armistice—the cooling-off period. We have applied that principle, or tried to apply it, to labor relations in this country, declaring a thirty-day cooling-off period. I wonder if the United Nations could declare a ten-year cooling-off period after the war is over. Of course the labor cooling-off period was designed by someone for someone else. Can the United Nations design a policy for themselves which they will live up to? At the end of ten years of armistice perhaps there will be enough cooling off so that we can arrive at a just peace. We will have national boundaries, and we're dedicated to the restoration of certain boundaries which have been violated; we have certain governments-in-exile which expect to be reinstated.

If we consider what the peace should be, we can take as a starting point, perhaps, some of the declarations of the Atlantic Charter which seem to be, at least so far as the Atlantic is concerned, a guide to our war aims. One aspect of the Atlantic Charter concerns the free access of all nations to raw materials. Now that, I suppose, in its broader sense involves the freedom of all countries to develop their natural resources. If we admit that that necessarily follows from the declaration of the Atlantic Charter, then we run into some interesting problems, which I am afraid we are not prepared to face. Supposing we think of South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Belgian Congo, with perhaps the largest and richest copper ores in the world; they

A WORLD AT WAR

were discovered back in 1927. When they went on the market, they wrecked the copper market of the world, and the United States put a four-cent tariff on copper to protect our own domestic industries. Supposing that we declare, at the end of the war, free access to natural resources and raw materials and include in that the freedom of any country to develop its raw materials and to dispose of them on the world market; in other words, I suppose, free trade. Our copper industry could very easily and probably would be very easily wrecked. Will we stand for it? Are we willing to give up our copper industry to somebody else in order to promote the kind of peace the Atlantic Charter seems to imply? In other words, we may be facing the end of an era of a standard of living which we have perhaps become accustomed to, at least some of us, perhaps the majority of us, and, I wonder, are we really prepared to sit down and give as well as take? Most of the nations which you fellows have discussed have been a little inclined to be on the taking side of the peace table. Who's going to give? Have you fellows got a good answer?

MR. POWELL: On that matter of natural resources, is there any likelihood, if nationalistic patterns aren't followed too much in the peace settlement, that the resources for which nations fight might be pooled in some kind of an arrangement?

MR. ROY: Of course, natural resources, and particularly mineral resources, the things we hear the most about nowadays, are unequally distributed. But if we can say in general that the world supply of most of the strategic raw materials, mineral materials at least, is in the countries around the North Atlantic, and if, after the war, we should propose that every nation should aspire to a standard of living comparable to ours, that means that they should be encouraged to become industrial nations, and that means that the nations around the North

AN OLD MAP IN NEW COLORS

Atlantic have got to give them the raw materials with which to do it.

MR. POWELL: Professor Smith, on your question of the nationalistic pattern, do you think that it is necessary that we go back to the 1919 norm, and begin from there? Is that assumed when we sit down at the peace table?

MR. SMITH: I should say that the mere commitment to restore so many nations means that we have to go back to that settlement as the starting point, at least; unquestionably, there are going to be many adjustments of the 1919 boundaries. Certainly there will be every effort made to rectify some of the inequities, maldistributions of populations, and so on, which were involved in the 1919 settlement, but certainly, as long as nationalistic boundary lines have to be followed, and it seems to me, on the face of the situation, they will be followed, you are bound, of course, to run the risk of incurring some of the same problems of minorities and maldistributions of resources that Professor Roy spoke of, and some of the other problems with which we became so painfully familiar in the years after 1919.

MR. ROY: Professor Richardson said that the Fascist form of government had to go; yet the Atlantic Charter says that every people shall have the privilege of determining how they shall be governed. Now, supposing that somebody, some nation, decides that they want to be governed that way, are we going to permit a Fascist state to be set up after the war?

MR. RICHARDSON: I think that we might permit certain other states, but not the defeated powers. I assume that the Atlantic Charter, in part, states the ideals we would like to achieve, and not actually, perhaps, what we will achieve.

MR. POWELL: Gentlemen, the limited time has proved one thing—that the world peace won't be made in thirty minutes. Among the views expressed in this forum were that peace with

A WORLD AT WAR

the Axis would be an imposed peace and that it could not be a negotiated peace; that while a punitive settlement is likely in any event, it would not likely lead to a lasting peace; that a prolonged armistice would be desirable to allow the passions of war to cool down and new boundary lines to be drawn; that the peace might have to begin with the assumption that the 1919 nationalistic patterns be followed; that Anglo-American cooperation is going to be a dominant force in the settlement, but that Russia, having defeated Germany, will be in a position to exercise an active voice.